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The Netherlands has experienced changes in the ethnic composition of its 
society. One of the challenges related to these changes is the integration of 
ethnic minorities as citizens of our democracy. This book investigates the 
political representation of ethnic minorities and its influence on their vote 
choice. This thesis shows that the share of Turkish and Moroccan minorities on 
parties’ candidate lists and in the House of Representatives is larger than their 
share in society. Other ethnic minority groups are, however, underrepresented. 
Furthermore, left-wing political parties are more likely to nominate ethnic 
minority candidates and more likely to attract the ethnic vote than right-wing 
parties. Parties with higher shares of ethnic minority candidates are more 
popular among ethnic minority voters. The importance of ethnic minority 
candidates is further demonstrated by the finding that ethnic minority 
candidates attract a larger share of votes among ethnic minority voters. This 
study has shown the relevance of political representation for the vote choice of 
ethnic minority citizens. 
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1.1 | Introduction 
Like other democracies in Europe, the Netherlands has experienced changes in the ethnic 
composition of its society (Schmitter, 2011). One of the challenges related to such changes 
is the integration of ethnic minorities as citizens of pluralistic democracies (Fukuyama, 
2006). Active and engaged citizens are important because participation is essential to 
the functioning of democracy. The legitimacy of democracies is based on the notion that 
elected representatives represent the interests of the population. If certain groups in 
society are politically excluded or alienated, it is likely that the interests of these groups 
will not be represented and that the legitimacy of democracy will be under pressure. In 
the political context of the 2010s, where the failure of integration policies has been at the 
center of political debates and where anti-immigration parties have become increasingly 
successful throughout Europe, one of the democratic challenges that has been formulated 
is to encourage active citizenship from all parts of society, including ethnic minorities 
(Aleksynska, 2011; Phillips, 1995). Certainly, substantive representation – representing the 
interests of a specific social group such as an ethnic minority group – is not only reserved 
to Members of Parliament (MPs) belonging to that specific social group. However, when 
ethnic minorities are represented by MPs from a similar ethnic background – referred to 
as descriptive representation – they are not only objects of policy but have also become 
actors in the political process (Saggar & Geddes, 2000). 
Even though the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is increasing, the share 
of ethnic minority MPs continues to be lower than the share of ethnic minorities in the 
population in many European countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b). With the current 
demographic development of increased ethnic diversity, the ethnic minority electorate 
may become essential for political parties to gain power. Political parties have begun to 
pay more attention to the inclusion of ethnic minorities, which partly can be understood 
as a strategy to win more ethnic votes (Dancygier, 2017). Despite this, existing literature 
provides little information about the relationship between political representation and 
ethnic minorities’ vote choice. For this reason, the aim of this dissertation, which mostly 
focuses on the Netherlands, is to provide an overview of the political representation of 
Dutch ethnic minorities and to examine how this relates to their vote choice.
This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part gives an overview of the 
descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in Dutch national politics and 
investigates what explains minorities’ descriptive representation. Up to now, there has 
been little quantitative analysis of the role that political parties play in the descriptive 
representation of ethnic minorities. To this end, I focus on the role of political parties 
and empirically study three aspects of the electoral process that are relevant to ethnic 
minority representation (Kunovich & Paxton, 2005). First, political parties have to recruit 
ethnic minority candidates to stand for election. Second, ethnic minority candidates have 
to be nominated for winnable positions. Third, ethnic minority candidates have to be 
elected to become MPs. For minorities’ descriptive representation, parties are essential 
since they recruit and nominate the candidates for their candidate list. Accordingly, 
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the first contribution of this dissertation to the field is to study the influence of party 
characteristics on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates, albeit not necessarily 
implying electoral success. Building on existing studies, this dissertation provides a 
quantitative test of parties’ influence on ethnic minority nomination by addressing 
nomination from three different angles: whether minorities are nominated as a candidate, 
at what position they are on the candidate list, and whether they are nominated in a safe 
list position. In addition to nomination, I address how many of the candidates are elected 
as MPs.
The second part of this dissertation concentrates on the vote choice of ethnic 
minorities. Even if ethnic groups are adequately represented in parties and in parliament, 
this does not provide us with information on whether ethnic minority voters (or others) 
have voted for the parties representing their interests. It is important to study the vote 
choice of ethnic minorities because they provide an indication of the extent to which 
ethnic minority citizens perceive these parties and ethnic minority candidates within 
these parties as actors representing their interests. For this reason, the main aim of 
the second part of this dissertation is to examine whether the representation of ethnic 
minorities influences their party and candidate choice.
To date, few empirical studies have examined the impact of representation on the 
vote choice of ethnic minority voters (but see Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders, & 
Sobolewska, 2013 for a study in the UK). It is therefore not clear yet what the association is 
between the two, even though the literature on ethnic minorities’ political representation 
in Europe is increasing, and several studies have focused on ethnic minorities’ vote choice 
(Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2015; 
Heath, Fisher, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2011; Murray, 2016; Zapata-Barrero, 2017; Zingher & 
Farrer, 2014). Existing research shows that there are several individual-level determinants 
for vote choice that are similar for majority and minority voters (Heath et al., 2013). In my 
study, I focus on ethnic minority voters only and study the influence of minority-specific 
explanations on vote choice. Minority-specific explanations for ethnic minorities’ vote 
choice have been studied before and established that factors such as discrimination 
and ethnic identification are determinants of party choice (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; 
Heath et al., 2013; Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Sanders, Heath, Fisher, & Sobolewska, 
2014). However, there is very little scientific understanding of whether the vote choice of 
ethnic minorities, with various levels of ethnic identification, depends on the extent to 
which parties emphasize ethnic minority interests. Similarly, it is unclear how the vote 
choice of ethnic minorities is influenced by the number of ethnic minority candidates. My 
second major contribution to the literature is that this thesis investigates the relationship 
between ethnic minorities’ representation and ethnic minorities’ vote choice in a 
systematic way. 
After assessing the degree to which ethnic minority representation affects ethnic 
minorities’ vote choice, this dissertation provides a further addition to the existing 
literature on this topic by studying whether ethnic candidates attract the ethnic vote. 
I test the so-called ethnic affinity thesis, which states that voters are likely to vote for 
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someone with shared characteristics (Bird, Jackson, McGregor, Moore, & Stephenson, 
2016; McDermott, 1998). While there is indeed evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis, it 
remains unclear under which conditions ethnic affinity effects are stronger (Barreto, 
2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConnaughy, 
White, Leal, & Casellas, 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006; Teney, Jacobs, 
Rea, & Delwit, 2010). Accordingly, in order to gain insight into the influence of both parties 
and ethnic minority candidates in ethnic minority voting, the purpose of this study is to 
assess the differences in the strength of ethnic affinity voting between ethnic minority 
candidates within parties, and whether this differs between ethnic groups. To this end, 
the main research question I aim to answer in this dissertation is: 
 ‘To what extent have ethnic minorities been politically represented, how is this affected 
by political parties, and how does ethnic minority representation affect the vote choice of 
ethnic minorities?’
My research question is mainly addressed in the Dutch context. One of the chapters, 
however, focuses on the Canadian context. This chapter provides some first insights 
into the testing of the theorised relationship between ethnic minority representation 
and ethnic minorities vote choice in the Netherlands in another societal context. In this 
chapter I go from an explanatory question in the Netherlands to a testing question in 
Canada. 
The introduction of this thesis is further structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses 
the Dutch ethnic and political contexts, while section 1.3 provides an overview of the 
theoretical perspectives, gaps in the literature, and theoretical contributions of this 
dissertation. In this regard, section 1.3 begins by delineating the theoretical perspectives 
used in Part 1 of this dissertation, focused on ethnic minority representation before 
outlining the theoretical perspectives used in Part 2 relating to ethnic minorities’ vote 
choice. In section 1.4, the data and methodological contributions are described, whereas 
the last section provides an outline of the empirical chapters in this dissertation. 
1.2 | The Dutch context
Section 1.2 provides an overview of the societal and political contexts and their relation to 
ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The section starts with a clarification and discussion 
of ethnic minority background before going on to present more information about ethnic 
minorities and their position in Dutch society. Finally, the Dutch political system and the 
three elections under study are briefly discussed. 
1.2.1 | The conceptualisation of ethnic minority background
In most of the chapters in this thesis, the focus is on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. 
In European research into integration and political representation of ethnic minorities, 
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the terms ethnic minorities, (im)migrants, visible minorities, and citizens of immigrant 
origin are sometimes used interchangeably. Predominantly, this refers to citizens of 
immigrant origin. It is therefore necessary here to clarify what is meant by the term ‘ethnic 
minorities’. 
The specific conceptualisation of ethnic minority background varies in different 
countries, contexts, and research, and it is often based on both theoretical and practical 
considerations. Each of these conceptualisations has its own particular advantages and 
limitations (Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 
2013). In some countries, a distinction is made between ethnic and/or immigrant origin 
and indigenous, national, and/or linguistic minorities. This is an important distinction 
because national or linguistic minorities, such as the Catalans in Spain, do not have 
an immigrant-origin background. Their political representation and vote choice may 
therefore be very distinct from those of ethnic minorities. In the Netherlands, there are no 
prominent indigenous, national or linguistic minorities.1
Some researchers only focus on so-called visible minorities or racial minorities, in 
which case ethnic minority status is often identified based on physical appearances. In 
many European countries, visible or racial minorities cover to the ethnic groups most 
salient in public and political debates: usually referring to non-Western minorities 
(Bloemraad, 2013). This conceptualisation is especially relevant in the context of political 
representation where the representation of marginalised groups that experience or 
have experienced exclusion is addressed (Bird et al., 2011; Phillips, 1995). However, the 
choice to study visible or racial minorities can also be the result of practical issues. In 
studies on descriptive representation, it is common to identify the ethnic background 
of representatives by looking at a combination of names, photographs and information 
about country of birth (e.g. Black, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). This is a relatively 
simple approach to identifying the ethnic minority background of a large number of 
political candidates or MPs. Nonetheless, names and photographs can sometimes be 
misleading, and such a method could therefore result in incorrect identifications. 
The conceptualisation of ethnic minority background can also be based on citizens’ 
countries of birth or the countries of birth of their (grand)parents. This is a more precise 
method for identifying ethnic minority background. Moreover, it has the advantage 
that Western minority groups can also be identified. The practical limitation of this 
approach is that it is a time-consuming way to identify the ethnic minority background 
of political candidates and/or MPs in addition to possibly leading to the incorrect 
identification of those with a former colony background (Bloemraad, 2013). Theoretically, 
neither country of birth nor a focus on visible minorities necessarily relates to ethnic 
identification. Candidates or MPs that are identified as ethnic minorities based on their 
names, photographs, or places of birth may identify more with the native population 
than with their ethnic origin group. Rather than identifying ethnic background based 
on names, photographs, or birthplace, another approach is therefore to focus on ethnic 
self-identification. Although self-identification is a relevant approach for identifying 
ethnic minority candidates, in descriptive representation research it is also relevant to 
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consider how these candidates are identified by others, such as political parties and voters 
(Zapata-Barrero, 2017). Moreover, this approach is not always possible in research on the 
ethnic background of representatives. Such information could be gathered by the use of 
interviews or by sending questionnaires to political candidates or MPs. A strategy that has 
the risk of high and selective non-response. 
In this thesis, minorities with both non-Western and Western backgrounds are 
investigated, and I use the term ethnic minorities to refer to these two groups. I focus on 
citizens with a migration background, and I specifically concentrate on minorities with a 
Turkish, Moroccan, former colony, or Western background. This conceptualisation aligns 
with most Dutch research and policy making, and therefore fits in well with the relevant, 
existing literature. 
1.2.2 | Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands 
In research on ethnic minorities, whether relating to their economic position, cultural 
integration or political participation, non-Western minorities are mostly the subject 
of study. This is not surprising, considering the migration history of these groups. In the 
1950s and 1960s, labour migrants came to countries such as The Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany from Morocco and Turkey, or from Southern-European countries like Italy and 
Greece. Whereas most of the South-European migrants returned to their origin countries, 
most Moroccan and Turkish migrants did not. Instead, their families also moved to Europe, 
and family reunification and formation increased the immigrant-origin population (Castles, 
De Haas, & Miller, 2013). At present, there is a large group of Dutch citizens with an immigrant 
background whose parents or grandparents were born in either Morocco or Turkey; they 
belong to two of the largest non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands. As shown in 
Figure 1.1, 3.5% of citizens with Dutch nationality have their origins in Morocco or Turkey, 
whereas other important minority groups have their origins in Indonesia, Suriname, or 
the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Suriname and Indonesia are former 
colonies of the Netherlands and many Surinamese and Indonesian minorities are there 
because of these historical ties. The countries Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten, in addition 
to the special municipalities Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba are part of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and citizens from these areas – although referred to as former colony 
minorities – therefore have Dutch nationality. In this sense, minorities from former colonies 
form another large minority group in the Netherlands. Since ethnic minority groups differ 
in regard to their country of origin, cultural background, language and migration history, 
it is not surprising that their integration processes also differ. Therefore, if possible, I will 
examine minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, former colony, or another non-Western 
background separately. However, Western minorities also make up a considerable part of 
the population. To illustrate this, 1.9% of Dutch citizens have a German background, which 
is similar in size to the section of the population with a Moroccan or Turkish background. 
Moreover, Polish minorities belong to one of the largest growing Western minority groups in 
the Netherlands (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013; Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2010). 
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Minorities with a Western background are often thought to be more similar to Dutch 
citizens than those from a non-Western background. The culture, norms, values, and 
economic position of Western minorities are comparable to native Dutch citizens (Favell, 
2008; Favell & Guiraudon, 2009; Van Tubergen, 2006). This is probably the reason why 
little attention has been paid to their political integration into Dutch society or in other 
Western countries (English, 2018). As can be seen from Figure 1.1, 4.6% of the population 
with Dutch citizenship has a Western background. This is a considerable proportion of 
the population, although their similarity with native Dutch citizens does not mean that 
their interests are the same. We therefore cannot assume that citizens with a Western 
migration background are politically well represented. This is why, if possible, I also study 
the political representation and vote choice among Western ethnic minorities.
Both non-Western and Western minorities are bound to the same rules and 
regulations regarding nationality acquisition. Dutch law regarding citizenship is based on 
the principle of ius sanguinis, meaning that children from parents with Dutch nationality 
automatically have Dutch citizenship and that citizenship is not determined by the place 
of birth. Those who do not have Dutch nationality can request naturalisation after five 
years of residence and three years when married to a Dutch citizen. People that pass a test 
on language skills and civic knowledge, and who attend the naturalisation ceremony, can 
obtain Dutch nationality.2 All those with Dutch citizenship are allowed to vote and have 
the right to stand for election at the national level. At the local level, migrants have active 
and passive voting rights in local elections. This only applies to migrants from the age of 
18 who live in that municipality, have citizenship from another European Union member 
state, or have legally resided in the Netherlands for five years or longer.3
figure 1.1 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship in the total Dutch population in 
2017a
Note: This figure is based on 2017 data, but from 2010-2016, the share of ethnic minorities with Dutch 
citizenship is very similar. aThis refers to the population eligible to vote (20 years or older; data from 18 
years or older was not available).  
Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018a, 2018b (own calculations).
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1.2.3 | The position of ethnic minorities in Dutch society
Scientific research has paid ample attention to the structural and socio-cultural integration 
of non-Western minorities (Alba & Nee, 1997; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010; Leszczensky, 2013; 
Martinovic, Van Tubergen, & Maas, 2015; Maxwell, 2010; Phinney, Horenczyk, & Vedder, 
2001; Van Tubergen, 2006), but much less attention has been paid to the integration of 
Western minorities (but see Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013; Lubbers, Diehl, Kuhn, & Larsen, 2018) 
Studies on the structural integration of non-Western minorities show that they generally 
have lower educational levels, incomes, and levels of employment when compared to 
native populations (Algan, Bisin, Manning, & Verdier, 2012; Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; 
Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Sanders et al., 2014; Van Tubergen, 2006), in addition to 
experiencing more discrimination (André & Dronkers, 2017; Maxwell, 2015; Safi, 2010). From 
existing research on this topic, the picture that emerges is that non-Western minorities 
have a particularly marginalised position in many areas of society. Nevertheless, diversity 
has become a salient issue in the media and attention towards anti-discrimination 
measures and the representation of minorities in (political) organisations has increased.4 
In addition, second and third generations are performing better in schools and in the Dutch 
labour market (Wennekers, Boelhouwer, van Campen, & Bijl, 2018). 
In the European context, the Netherlands has long been regarded as a tolerant country 
with relatively successful integration processes. Nowadays, the Netherlands is more often 
seen, both inside and outside of the Netherlands, as a country where integration policies 
have failed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Joppke, 2007; Koopmans, 2010). Within the country, 
debates about immigration and integration have intensified since 2000 (Joppke, 2007). 
Several incidents have contributed to the intensification of these debates, such as 9/11, the 
murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the murder of Islam critic Pim Fortuyn, and the rise 
and fall of his party LPF (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). Since 2005, Geert Wilders, 
the party leader of the anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV), has won a considerable 
amount of the votes in national elections, which has led to almost continuous political 
attention being paid to migration and integration issues. These are not isolated 
developments, in that other countries show similar developments with regard to the rising 
popularity of anti-immigrant parties and heated debates about migration and integration. 
Nevertheless, the Netherlands is described as one of the few countries that became less 
open to multiculturalism between 1980 and 2010 (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Such a 
constraint on multiculturalist policies could have a negative impact on ethnic minorities’ 
descriptive representation (Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2013b). Even though adequate cross-
country research is scarce, there are indications that, in Dutch society, and in comparison 
to most other Western countries, the share of non-Western ethnic minority MPs mirrors 
the ethnic composition of the population relatively well (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). 
On the one hand, the Netherlands is considered to be a country where integration has 
failed. On the other hand, it has been suggested that non-Western minorities are better 
represented in the Netherlands than in other Western countries. This contradiction makes 
the Netherlands an interesting context in which to study the relationship between ethnic 
minority representation and ethnic minorities’ vote choice.
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1.2.4 | The Dutch political system 
The Netherlands has a list system of proportional representation (PR), resulting in a 
multi-party system. On average, about ten political parties hold seats in the House of 
Representatives. The parties that held seats in the House of Representatives between 
2010 and 2017 are shown in Table 1.1. Most of these parties can be placed into known party 
families, such as the Christian parties (CDA, SGP, and CU), the Social Democrats (PvdA), the 
Socialists (SP), the Greens (GL), the Liberal parties (D66 and VVD), and the anti-immigration 
party (PVV). Because there is a very low threshold for political parties, small parties can 
also win seats in the House or Representatives, which explains why there are so many 
political parties in parliament and why new and small parties have been able to win seats 
in parliamentary elections. Relatively new parties include the Party for the Animals (PvdD), 
50Plus, DENK, and Forum for Democracy (FvD). The Party for the Animals (PvdD) is regarded 
as economically left and is committed to the environment and animal rights; 50Plus aims 
to represent the interests of the elderly; DENK was established in 2015 and focuses on 
equality and addressing racism and discrimination; finally, Forum for Democracy (FvD) 
is a right-wing party that supports direct democracy and is against the European Union. 
The Dutch multi-party system provides an opportunity to study how parties from all over 
the political spectrum deal with ethnic minority representation and the extent to which 
they attract the ethnic vote. This thesis will therefore advance an understanding of how 
differences between parties affect the political representation of ethnic minorities.
Another interesting feature of the Dutch political system is that it is regarded as one 
of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Unlike voters 
in majoritarian systems, voters in PR systems can choose between different candidates 
affiliated with the same party. It has been argued that it is easier to represent both 
majorities and minorities in PR systems because votes are more directly translated into 
seats (Htun, 2004; Lijphart, 1979). The Dutch PR system has compulsory candidate voting, 
which means that voters receive a ballot paper with the candidate lists of all parties 
and, from these lists, they cast a vote for a single candidate. The sum of votes cast on all 
candidates of a party determines the share of votes for a political party. The distribution of 
the 150 seats in the House of Representatives and the candidates who have won a seat are 
based on this share of votes. 
Most voters cast a vote for the first candidate on the list of the party of their preference, 
which typically expresses party support. However, a voter can also cast a preference vote 
by choosing a candidate ranked lower on the party list. Preference votes are often used to 
support a female candidate or a candidate from an ethnic minority background (Andeweg 
& Irwin, 2009). A candidate that receives enough preference votes can be elected and 
overtake the position of higher ranked candidates. Nonetheless, this is not very common 
and has only happened seven times since 2010. Five of these candidates were native Dutch 
women, while the other two were native Dutch men.
With regard to ethnic minority representation, the Labour Party (PvdA) has historically 
been the most important political party for ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In 1986, 
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the first MP with a non-Western background was elected for the Labour Party (Pvda): John 
Lilipaly, a teacher of Moluccan origin (Rath, 1988; Tillie, 1998). Moreover, the Labour Party 
(PvdA) supports ethnic minorities both in their issue positions and within the party, such 
as with an ethnic minority network (Ensel, 2003). In this regard, the ties the party has 
established with the ethnic minority population over the years have made them a popular 
party among ethnic voters (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Tillie, 1998). 
table 1.1 | Political parties in the House of Representatives in 2010, 2012, and 2017
Party Party name in Dutch Abbreviation
50Plus 50Plus -
Christian Democratic Appeal Christen Democratisch Appél CDA
Christian Union ChristenUnie CU
Democrats 66 Democraten 66 D66
DENK DENK -
Forum for Democracy Forum voor Democratie FvD
GreenLeft GroenLinks GL
Labour Party Partij van de Arbeid PvdA
Party for Freedom Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV
Party for the Animals Partij voor de Dieren PvdD
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie VVD
Reformed Political Party Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij SGP
Socialist Party Socialistische Partij SP
 
1.2.5 | Time frame of the study 
This thesis covers studies conducted around three parliamentary elections, held in 2010, 
2012, and 2017. This section briefly discusses these three national elections and their 
electoral results. 
The Balkenende IV cabinet collapsed in 2010 due to conflict about the military mission 
in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. The parliamentary elections for a new government were held on 
9 June 2010. Of the seventeen parties that participated in the elections, ten won seats. The 
most votes were won by the Liberal Party (VVD; 21%) and the Labour Party (PvdA; 20%). 
A remarkable election outcome was the electoral gain of the anti-immigration Party for 
Freedom (PVV), which increased its political power from nine seats in 2006 to 24 in 2010 
(16% of the vote). Moreover, the Christian Democrats (CDA) experienced a major loss, 
going from 40 seats in 2006 to 21 seats in 2010. For the first time in the Netherlands, a 
minority government was formed by the Liberal Party (VVD) and the Christian Democrats 
(CDA), supported by the anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (PVV), with Mark Rutte as 
prime minister. The two parties forming the government did not form a majority and were 
therefore dependent on the support of the Party for Freedom (PVV).
chapter 1
20
In April 2012, the Rutte I cabinet was dissolved after only two years in office because of 
disagreements on the budget cuts for 2013, which led to the Party for Freedom (PVV) 
ending its support for the minority government. This resulted in new elections, which 
took place on 12 September 2012. Voters could vote for candidates of 21 political parties, 
of which eleven were represented in the House of Representatives after the elections 
(Parlement & Politiek, 2016). The highest share of the votes went, again, to the People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 27%) and the Labour Party (PvdA, 25%). Together, 
these parties shaped the new government: Rutte II.
After a conflict relating to integration policies in 2014, two Labour Party MPs, with 
Turkish backgrounds, left the party. Subsequently, they founded their own party called 
DENK in 2015, aiming to represent all Dutch citizens. DENK is a Dutch word meaning ‘think’ 
in English, but it is also a Turkish word that translates as ‘equal’. The party’s focus is on an 
inclusive society and the promotion of equality and anti-discrimination measures. Sylvana 
Simons, of Surinamese origin, joined the party, but she left after a conflict and established 
her own party, Artikel 1, just a few months before the elections. The name Artikel 1 (Article 
1) refers to the first article of the Dutch constitution, which states that everyone should be 
treated equally and that discrimination based on religion, belief, political opinion, race, 
sex, or any other grounds is forbidden.5 Similar to DENK, the main aim of Artikel 1 is to 
fight racism and discrimination and to promote equality. These developments took place 
shortly before the elections on 21 March 2017, which were held after the Rutte II cabinet 
had served its entire four-year term. 
In the parliamentary election of 2017, a total of 28 political parties participated, of 
which thirteen won seats. Even though, compared to the previous election, they lost eight 
seats, the largest share of the vote went, once again, to the Liberal Party (VVD; 21%). The 
Liberal Party (VVD), the Christian Democrats (CDA), the social-liberal D66, and the Christian 
Union (CU) formed Rutte III. Whereas DENK was successful and won three seats in the 
elections, Artikel 1 did not win any seats. The party nevertheless won a substantial part 
of the vote share in Amsterdam and won a seat in the Amsterdam municipality elections 
in 2018. Additionally, the new party Forum for Democracy (FvD) added more competition 
to the radical right of the political spectrum as one of the parties competing with Wilders’ 
party for votes. Other notable election outcomes were the large support for the anti-
immigrant party PVV and a major loss for the Labour Party (PvdA), which went from 38 
seats in 2012 to only 9 in 2017. Historically, the Labour Party (PvdA) has been the party most 
strongly connected to the ethnic community in the Netherlands; the emergence of Artikel 
1 and DENK suggests that competition for the ethnic vote has increased.
1.3 | Theoretical framework 
A number of theoretical concepts and approaches are used in this thesis, which will be 
discussed in this section. Section 1.3.1 examines one of the study’s key concepts, which is 
political representation, whereas the theoretical perspectives used in the first part of this 
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thesis are examined in Section 1.3.2. Finally, the theoretical perspectives on ethnic voting, 
the focus of the second part of this thesis, are outlined in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.1 | Political representation
The key concept in this thesis is political representation, which has been defined in 
different ways. The general definition of representation is that it is a delegated act on 
behalf of someone else (Urbinati, 2011). The concept of representation applies to all citizens 
of democratic countries, and many political scientists have explained why proportional 
representation is important (Kymlicka, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2011; 
Urbinati, 2011). One school of thought has focused specifically on politically marginalised 
groups (Bird, 2005; Htun, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Sapiro, 1981), which has 
generated the base for the representation literature of women and ethnic minorities.
An important discussion in this literature relates to the significance of descriptive 
and substantive representation (Mansbridge, 2003, 2009, 2011; Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 
2011). Descriptive representation is about who represents; it is the degree to which the 
characteristics of the electorate are resembled by its representatives (Phillips, 1995; 
Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). The similarity between representatives and those they 
represent may include visible characteristics, such as gender or ethnicity, but it can also 
be related to shared experience (Mansbridge, 1999). Substantive representation is about 
what is represented, i.e. the degree to which the interests and the policy preferences of 
the electorate are represented (Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). Some authors also discuss 
symbolic representation as a separate dimension, which refers to symbols such as flags or 
the head of state (Pitkin, 1967).
There are several reasons why the descriptive representation of social groups is 
important. A lack of diversity in political institutions sends a message of exclusion; when 
certain groups in society feel and/or are excluded from political institutions, this decreases 
the legitimacy of the political system (Phillips, 1995). Moreover, ethnic minorities, or other 
minority groups, who feel excluded from politics may experience feelings of alienation 
(Lijphart, 2012; Maxwell, 2015; Röder & Mühlau, 2014). These arguments for the descriptive 
representation of ethnic minority groups do not necessarily mean that all minority groups 
should be descriptively represented, such as red-headed people or those with blue eyes. 
Whether descriptive representation is necessary for a certain group depends, among 
other things, on whether a social group is politically relevant, e.g. because they have a 
marginalised position in society (Phillips, 1995; Sapiro, 1981). If an underrepresented group 
has experienced a history of exclusion, descriptive representation can counteract feelings 
of exclusion. Descriptive representation may be one way to decrease feelings of alienation 
and increase feelings of trust among marginalised groups (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 
2004). 
Advocates of substantive representation argue that, as long as the interests of a 
certain group are represented, it does not matter by whom these interests are represented 
(Bloemraad, 2013; Mansbridge, 1999). Moreover, if a person is represented by someone from 
chapter 1
22
their own group, this does not imply that the group members and the representatives have 
the same interests. However, increased awareness relating to the political representation 
of women shows that this is not entirely true. Few people today would accept to be 
represented by men only, which was the case in many countries some decades ago 
(Paxton, 1997; Sapiro, 1981). This highlights the importance of the descriptive meaning 
of proportional representation, which relates to the identity and experiences of social 
groups in society (Phillips, 1995). Nevertheless, both the presence and the representation 
of particular issues and policy preferences of marginalised groups are important aspects 
of their political representation.
Following the existing literature on this topic, I define descriptive representation as 
the extent to which the ethnic minority electorate is represented by candidates and MPs 
from the same ethnic background. Although some studies specifically compare the share 
of ethnic minority candidates or MPs with the share of ethnic minorities eligible to vote in 
order to establish the level of ethnic minority representation (Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-
barrero, Dähnke, & Markard, 2017), this is not always the case or it is unclear whether 
their focus lies on minorities with citizenship (Bird, 2005; Black, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013; 
Murray, 2016; Ruedin, 2013b). However, scholars in the field rarely discuss whether ethnic 
minorities should be represented in national-level politics if they lack the right to vote 
due to the absence of citizenship in their country of residence. An exception is Bloemraad 
(2013), who discusses practical limitations in focusing on the ethnic minority electorate, in 
addition to arguing that non-voters can support ethnic minority candidates in other ways 
than only voting. In this thesis, the ethnic minority electorate only relates to those ethnic 
minorities that have Dutch citizenship and are thus allowed to vote and stand for election. 
With regard to substantive representation, various interpretations and measurements 
exist. Some researchers focus on party manifestos and use the issue positions in these 
manifestos to measure substantive representation (Ruedin, 2013b), whereas others 
examine the political behaviour of MPs, such as the questions they ask and their voting 
behaviour in parliament. They argue that this behaviour exemplifies the MPs acting on 
behalf of the interests of ethnic minority groups (Aydemir & Vliegenthart, 2016; Saalfeld, 
2011; Saalfeld & Bischof, 2013). In this thesis, substantive representation refers to the extent 
to which policy preferences and issue positions of certain social groups are represented.
The first part of this study examines how party characteristics, including substantive 
representation, are related to descriptive representation. As a result, substantive 
representation is a predictor, whereas descriptive representation is the outcome variable. 
In Part 2, the influence of both descriptive and substantive representation on the vote 
choice of ethnic minorities is examined, and therefore descriptive and substantive 
representation are both predictors.
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1.3.2 | Part 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities
1.3.2.1 | Theoretical perspectives on descriptive representation 
Many studies on minority representation have been carried out in the context of the 
US (e.g. Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran, 1996; Mansbridge, 1999; 
Wolfinger, 1965). Nonetheless, the issue of ethnic minority representation has received 
increasing attention in the European context (e.g. Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; 
Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013), in addition to the intersection of ethnic minority 
background and gender (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Hughes, 2013; Krook & Nugent, 2016; Mügge, 
2016; Murray, 2016). Studies have provided an overview of the share of ethnic minority MPs, 
in which they have mainly focused on the outcome of the electoral process. These studies 
highlight, over and again, that ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the elected 
bodies of most of the democratic countries in Europe. This was, amongst others, found for 
Denmark, the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland (Bloemraad, 2013; Murray, 
2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, 2017). 
Up until now, there has been little scientific understanding of the role of one of the 
most essential actors in descriptive representation: political parties. Only recently, 
European scholars have begun paying more attention to the influence that political 
parties may have on ethnic minority representation (Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Sobolewska, 2013; 
Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). The theoretical importance of political parties in descriptive 
representation has been established in studies on the underrepresentation of women 
(Caul, 1999; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Matland & Studlar, 1996). 
It is argued that the main aim of political parties is to win votes in order to gain political 
power. Political parties’ recruitment and selection are therefore crucial because candidates 
are an important tool for winning votes. With a growing ethnic minority electorate, it 
becomes relevant for parties to include ethnic minority candidates. The selectorate – the 
body within a party that selects candidates –makes up the candidate list that is presented 
to voters and determines for whom they can vote. This line of thought argues that political 
parties therefore have a considerable influence on ethnic minority representation and 
are an essential locus of study in relation to ethnic minority representation (Gallagher & 
Marsh, 1988; Hazan & Rahat, 2006; Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008; Scarrow, 2000).
Scholars have also sought other theoretical explanations for the degree of political 
integration of ethnic minorities. Although my main aim in this thesis is to test the 
relevance of party characteristics as an addition to existing explanations for descriptive 
representation, I will briefly discuss other relevant explanations. To begin with, some 
studies focus on the macro level and zoom in on political systems and the institutional 
context to argue that macro-level factors affect ethnic minorities’ political integration 
(Bird, 2005; Bloemraad, 2006; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; 
Ruedin, 2013b; Sobolewska, 2013; Togeby, 2008). More specifically, these researchers argue 
that factors such as citizenship regimes, electoral systems, and multiculturalism have an 
influence on the degree to which ethnic minorities are politically involved and represented. 
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However, comparable cross-national data about the representation of ethnic minorities 
is rather scarce, and systemic tests of the influence of macro level factors are limited 
(nonetheless, see Bird, 2005; Ruedin, 2013b). In one of the few cross-national quantitative 
studies on ethnic minority representation, Ruedin (2013b) found that electoral systems 
and other institutional factors did not affect ethnic minority representation. Apart from 
the lack of comparable data, it is also the diversity in and conceptualisation of ethnic 
minority groups that makes it difficult to determine the influence of such macro-level 
factors on ethnic minority representation. 
Other theoretical explanations for ethnic minorities’ political participation and level 
of descriptive representation are based on ethnic group factors, such as the size and 
spatial concentration of ethnic minority groups, their social capital, and the strength of 
ethnic communities (Barreto, 2007; Bird, 2005; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Fennema & Tillie, 
1999; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008b; Maxwell, 2013; Morales, Giugni, & Solomos, 2011; Stokes-
Brown, 2006). Evidence for the influence of ethnic group factors has been found for the 
more general political integration of ethnic minorities. For instance, Dutch research shows 
that Turkish minorities have the strongest ethnic communities in the largest Dutch cities, 
and that they are the group with the highest level of turnout and other forms of political 
participation (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004; van Heelsum, 2016). The influence of 
ethnic communities on minorities’ descriptive representation has only been tested at the 
local level (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Maxwell, 2013; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Morales et 
al., 2011; Tillie, 1998). Hence, although sometimes mentioned as an explanation (e.g. Bird, 
2005) there is no clear evidence that the strength of ethnic communities at the local level 
is an explanation for descriptive representation at the national level. 
1.3.2.2 | Political parties and descriptive representation
Several steps are required to go from candidate selection to MP, starting with the supply 
side. One alternative explanation for the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is 
that there are not enough suitable candidates. Resources and motivation are important 
determinants for citizens to become politically active (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). 
Although the difficulty in recruiting ethnic minority candidates may vary between 
parties, depending on the party ideology, it is unlikely that a lack of suitable candidates 
is responsible for low levels of descriptive representation in the current European context. 
Considering the size of the ethnic minority population, it is implausible that there are 
no suitable candidates either in the general European context or in the Netherlands (for 
a more detailed discussion of the supply side, see Dancygier, 2017). Existing literature 
shows that the demand side is more likely to have significant influence and that 
ethnic minorities experience barriers within political parties (Dancygier, 2017; Durose, 
Richardson, Combs, Eason, & Gains, 2012; Mügge, 2016). In this thesis, the first step I 
investigate is the extent to which the selection and election processes affect descriptive 
representation. Ethnic minorities can only be elected if they are nominated as candidates. 
However, it is about more than nomination only. If candidates are placed in low or unsafe 
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list positions, ethnic minorities may be well represented on candidate lists with little 
chance of electoral success. This study provides new insight into the nomination of ethnic 
minority candidates. The last step to be examined is the actual election of ethnic minority 
candidates.  
The strategies and motivations for nominating ethnic minority candidates differ 
between parties, depending on specific party characteristics. Recent literature has 
identified several party characteristics that affect ethnic minorities’ descriptive 
representation, but they have not been tested in a single framework nor studied using a 
quantitative approach (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis, Erzeel, Mügge, & Damstra, 2014; Mügge, 
2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017), which is why I test the extent to which 
three party characteristics affect ethnic minority nomination. 
The following party characteristics are the focus of my research: substantive 
representation, intra-party ethnic minority support, and candidate selection methods. 
The rationale for looking at substantive representation is the assumption that parties that 
value the inclusion of ethnic minorities are likely to emphasise this both in their party 
programme and in the composition of their candidate list. Studies with a more qualitative 
and descriptive approach have demonstrated the relevance of intra-party support for the 
representation of ethnic minorities (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016), 
but this has not been tested using quantitative methods. Finally, how political parties 
select their candidates may have an impact on descriptive representation, which is why 
the selection processes of candidates have been extensively studied in order to explain the 
underrepresentation of specific social groups (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 
2016; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Sobolewska, 2013). Several studies have found that ethnic 
minority candidates are often symbolic candidates who do not have much in common 
with the ethnic minority electorate (Dancygier, 2017; Durose et al., 2012; Van der Zwan 
& Turner-Zwinkels, 2017). So far, there is little understanding of how the composition of 
the selectorate affects ethnic minorities’ descriptive representation. I therefore theorise 
about the inclusiveness of the selectorate and test if it matters to the nomination of 
ethnic minority candidates whether the selectorate consists of party leaders only or of all 
party members. 
To summarise, in the first part of this thesis, I investigate the extent to which 
ethnic minorities are represented in the Netherlands and how this is affected by party 
characteristics. The research question addressed in Chapter 2 is:
 ‘To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western 
and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of 
Representatives in the Netherlands?’
1.3.3 | Part 2: The vote choice of ethnic minorities
Knowledge of the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities and its determinants is 
increasing (Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b), but it is also important to 
look at its effects. One of the goals of the inclusion of ethnic minority MPs is that they 
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represent the interests of the ethnic minority population. Therefore, I examine if ethnic 
minority voters actually vote for parties who aim to represent their interests. In the 
second part of this thesis, I first study the influence of both substantive and descriptive 
representation on ethnic minorities’ party choice. Thereafter, I examine whether ethnic 
minority candidates attract ethnic votes and if this differs between political parties and 
ethnic groups. 
1.3.3.1 | Theoretical perspectives on ethnic minorities’ vote choice
The vote choice of ethnic minorities has been the topic of many studies. Explanations 
of their vote choice are often based on general voting theories, which have produced a 
large number of explanations and schools of thoughts (Adams, Merill, & Grofman, 2005; 
Andersen & Heath, 2000; Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Downs, 1957; Miller & 
Shanks, 1996; Sanders et al., 2014). On the one hand, there are sociological theories 
suggesting that vote choice is influenced by sociodemographic factors, including class, 
ethnicity, and gender (Adams et al., 2005; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Lijphart, 1979; Miller & 
Shanks, 1996; Tillie, 2004). According to the sociological perspective, group identities, e.g. 
based on ethnic background, influence people’s (group) interests and attitudes and that 
these (group) interests and attitudes shape vote choice (Andersen & Heath, 2000). On 
the other hand, there is a school of thought that relies on a rational choice perspective. 
Downs’ (1957) spatial theory of voting states that voters are rational and self-interested 
actors that try to maximise their utility in each election. Voters compare their own issue 
positions with those of parties to determine which party represents their position best 
and will receive their vote (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Downs, 1957; Van der Brug, 2004; 
Zingher & Farrer, 2014). 
Existing literature on ethnic minorities’ vote choice is largely based on these schools 
of thought. In line with sociological models of voting behaviour, socioeconomic position 
is the main explanatory factor for the vote choice of the ethnic minority population in the 
European context (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011). This explanation is not 
surprising, considering the overwhelming evidence that ethnic minorities of non-Western 
origin support left-wing political parties. Evidence for their left-wing preferences is found 
in the UK – where the Labour Party is the most preferred party – France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands (Heelsum, Michon, & Tillie, 2016; Schmidtke, 2016; Tiberj & Michon, 2013; 
Tillie, 1998). While the socioeconomic position of ethnic minorities does partly predict 
their vote choice, this cannot fully explain ethnic minorities’ substantial support for left-
wing parties. Other explanations include discrimination, ethnic identification, parties’ 
issue positions, and ethnic affinity voting (Bird et al., 2011), which are minority-specific 
explanations of vote choice. The rational choice perspective has been researched less 
often, but a factor such as the issue proximity between parties and ethnic voters has also 
been found to affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities, at least in the UK (Sanders et al., 
2014; Sobolowska, 2005). 
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1.3.3.2 | Substantive and descriptive representation and the vote choice of ethnic minorities
To formulate expectations about ethnic minorities’ vote choice, I combine the 
propositions stemming from both sociological and rational choice theories. I expect that 
voter characteristics as well as issue positions affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities. 
Following the rational choice perspective, I expect voters to be rational actors, while 
assuming that their rational decisions are affected by the social groups to which they 
belong (Andersen & Heath, 2000). Thus, voters vote according to what they consider 
contributes to the interests of the social groups to which they belong. This may explain 
why voters do not always vote for the party that best represents their individual interests. 
The main contribution of this thesis to the research literature on the vote choice of ethnic 
minorities consists of two components. First, I anticipate that parties’ substantive and 
descriptive representation of ethnic minorities affect vote choice. Second, I expect that 
this relationship depends on ethnic minorities’ characteristics. Hence, I combine party and 
individual level explanations. In particular, I take into account the substantive economic 
positions that parties take and their standpoints on migration and integration. In line 
with sociological theories, I also examine the extent to which socioeconomic position 
and ethnic identification affect ethnic minorities’ vote choice in the Dutch context. 
Accordingly, I investigate whether ethnic minorities make rational choices by voting for 
parties with issue positions that are in line with the interests of the group to which they 
(feel like they) belong. 
In addition to substantive matters, I test whether the presence of ethnic minority 
candidates on parties’ candidate lists is decisive for ethnic minority voters. There are 
several reasons why ethnic minority voters would prefer to vote for someone similar to 
themselves. To start with, for ethnic minority groups, an ethnic minority candidate on a 
party’s candidate list can be an indicator of acknowledgement (Wolfinger, 1965). Moreover, 
a shared language, culture, or migration experience between voters and candidates can 
affect co-ethnic voting (Barreto, 2007). Additionally, it is possible that ethnic minority 
voters believe that such parties, or the ethnic minority candidates within these parties, 
will do a good job representing their interests (Landa, Copeland, & Grofman, 1995). 
Another reason may be that ethnic minority voters are mobilised by candidates with the 
same ethnic background (Fisher et al., 2015; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013). I investigate the 
question regarding the extent to which descriptive representation plays a role in ethnic 
minorities’ vote choice in two different ways. First, in Chapters 3 and 4, I test whether 
ethnic minority voters prefer parties with a higher share of ethnic minority candidates 
on the list. In this case, descriptive representation may be a predictor for party choice. 
Second, in Chapter 5, I examine whether ethnic candidates attract votes in areas with a 
larger share of ethnic minority inhabitants. The research question addressed in Chapter 3 
is specified as follows:
  ‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining 
vote choice among ethnic minority voters in the Netherlands?’
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1.3.3.3 | The vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and Canada 
Most of this thesis focuses on the Netherlands, but one of the chapters centres on Canada 
in order to provide an additional test of the influence of substantive and descriptive 
representation on ethnic minorities’ vote choice. I test whether substantive and descriptive 
representation play a similar role in vote choice in another context and time period. In this 
regard, I examine ethnic minorities’ vote choice in a comparable way in the Netherlands 
and Canada.6 First, I will explain why Canada is an interesting case for such an additional 
test of the influence of ethnic minority representation of ethnic minorities’ vote choice.
Both Canada and the Netherlands are interesting countries for the study of ethnic 
minority representation since they are regarded as countries with relatively high levels 
of ethnic minority representation. This notion is based on a study by Bloemraad (2013), 
who was one of the first researchers to provide a descriptive overview of ethnic minority 
representation in Western countries. The variation in relevant minority groups, time 
points, data sources, and data collection should be considered when interpreting this 
index. Nevertheless, it provides an indication of how well Western countries do in terms 
the political representation of minority groups.
 What is interesting about this finding for Canada and the Netherlands is that, 
despite being regarded as countries with high levels of ethnic minority representation, 
they differ in many other aspects. The Netherlands is one of the most typical examples 
of a country experiencing a backlash against multiculturalism (Banting & Kymlicka, 
2013). Integration policies have become stricter over the years, and support for anti-
immigrant parties has increased since 2001 (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Joppke, 2007; 
Koopmans, 2010). During the parliamentary elections of 2017, the anti-immigration Party 
for Freedom (PVV) became the second largest political party. Canada, on the other hand, 
is known for its multiculturalism and installed its most diverse cabinet in 2015 (Black & 
Hicks, 2008; Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, & White, 2013). Unlike the Netherlands, Canada 
has a large proportion of highly skilled minorities (Bird et al., 2011). Moreover, there is 
no anti-immigration party, and parties have generally similar views on immigration 
(Ambrose & Mudde, 2015; Marwah et al., 2013). Another important difference between 
the Netherlands and Canada is their electoral systems. Whereas the Netherlands has a 
system of proportional representation, Canada has a first-past-the-post system, in which 
the candidate with the most votes wins. Moreover, when voters vote for a candidate, this 
is a vote for the party. Different from the Dutch system, voters cannot choose between 
different candidates from the same party (Lijphart, 2012). 
Regardless of these macro-level differences, which are seen by some researchers as 
explanatory factors for the level of ethnic minority representation, both countries seem to 
do well in representing ethnic minority groups. Two aspects, however, remain unclear. First, 
how the representation of minorities, both substantively and descriptively, relates to the 
vote choice of ethnic minorities; second, it is unknown if voter and party characteristics 
have similar effects on minorities’ vote choice in very different political contexts. Hence, 
this thesis adds to the ethnic voting literature with an elaborate test of the influence of 
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substantive and descriptive representation on ethnic minorities’ party choice. Moreover, 
the comparison between these two countries enhances our understanding of the 
consequences of ethnic minority representation and the extent to which this influences 
party choice among the ethnic minority electorate. If I do find similar results for the 
Netherlands and Canada, with very different electoral systems and multiculturalism 
policies, this may imply that the role of ethnic minorities’ representation for their party 
choice is robust. In Chapter 4, I therefore aim to answer the following research question:
  ‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining 
vote choice among ethnic minorities in Canada?’
1.3.3.4 | Ethnic minorities’ candidate choice 
In addition to investigating the influence of descriptive representation within parties 
on the vote choice of ethnic minority voters, I examine candidate choice. In Chapter 5, 
I concentrate on whether ethnic minority candidates attract the ethnic vote in order to 
investigate the extent to which it is individual candidates, rather than parties, that attract 
the ethnic vote. Using similar theoretical propositions to those in Chapters 3 and 4, 
I examine whether ethnic minority candidates attract more votes in areas with a larger 
ethnic minority population. This proposition is called the affinity thesis, according to 
which voters are likely to vote for someone with whom they share certain characteristics, 
such as social class, gender, or ethnic background (Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; 
McDermott, 1998; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). The affinity thesis is not limited to ethnic 
groups but can also be applied to other social groups. Nevertheless, there is a large body 
of literature that has applied affinity voting to ethnic background, i.e. investigating ethnic 
affinity effects (e.g. Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016; Brians, 2005; Goodyear-Grant & Croskill, 
2011; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). 
At the time of writing, the most recent Dutch national election in March 2017 offered 
an interesting setting in which to study such ethnic affinity effects. Most of the political 
parties, left- and right-wing, nominated ethnic minority candidates. This makes it 
possible to study ethnic affinity voting within and between parties. Moreover, I study 
whether ethnic affinity voting effects for the two new minority-oriented parties – DENK 
and Artikel 1 – differ from the more traditional political parties. With all this in mind, the 
research question examined in Chapter 5 is:
 ‘Under which conditions do ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in the 
Dutch parliamentary election of 2017?’
1.4 | Data and methodology 
In addition to several theoretical contributions, this thesis also makes methodological 
improvements to the current literature, which the present section will outline. Section 
1.4.1 is followed by an overview of the data used in this study. 
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1.4.1 | Methodological contributions
First, research in the field of ethnic minority representation has often been descriptive and 
has taken a qualitative approach (e.g. Mügge, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Bloemraad, 2013). 
This is especially the case for research on this topic in the Netherlands (Celis & Erzeel, 
2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016). These studies have provided useful insights into 
descriptive representation and its explanations, and this thesis builds on such research in 
testing whether similar results are found when a quantitative approach is taken. In order 
to test the effects of party characteristics on descriptive representation in a systemic way, 
I collected data on the ethnic minority representation on parties’ candidate lists and in the 
House of Representatives for three parliamentary elections, in addition to how political 
parties deal with minorities within the party.
Second, I use innovative methods to study and explain ethnic minorities’ vote choice. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine the influence of parties’ substantive and descriptive 
representation, meaning that I have to include characteristics of the outcome variable, 
which is party choice. This is only possible using conditional logistic regression models 
(Long & Freese, 2006). These models estimate whether party choice depends on 
substantive and descriptive representation. While conditional logit models have been 
used in voting research (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998; Dow & Endersby, 2004; Jansen, De Graaf, 
& Need, 2011; McFadden, 1973; Thurner, 2000), they are applied here for the first time to 
examine the influence of party characteristics relevant for ethnic minority voters on their 
vote choice. 
Third, to test ethnic affinity effects, I use fine-grained geographical data. More 
specifically, I examine the vote share of individual candidates at the polling station level 
in twenty large cities in the Netherlands. With these data, I distinguish general ethnic 
affinity effects from co-ethnic affinity effects and examine whether ethnic affinity voting 
is dependent on party affiliation and other candidate characteristics. Since most voters 
vote for the party leader, the distribution of vote share is heavily skewed, and using OLS 
regression models would therefore lead to biased estimates. For this reason, I test my 
hypotheses among observations with a vote share larger than zero and use beta (inflated) 
regression models. Regression models where the outcome variable is beta distributed 
(beta regression models) take into account the skewness among the observations. 
Data on the political representation and vote choice of ethnic minorities are not 
readily available. Data limitations are one of the reasons why, for instance, cross-national 
research is not widespread on this topic. Hence, to be able to test my theories and 
hypotheses, I use a wide range of data sources and collected data myself. Table 1.2 shows 
an overview of the data and methodology used in each chapter.
1.4.2 | Data 
This section provides a short overview of the data collected for this thesis and the 
secondary data sources used.
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1.4.2.1 | Descriptive Representation Data 2010-2017
I collected Dutch Descriptive Representation data to determine the extent to which ethnic 
minorities were descriptively represented in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2010, 
2012, and 2017 (Van der Zwan, 2017, 2018). For all political parties that received at least one 
seat in the House of Representatives, I collected information about the candidates’ ethnic 
backgrounds. In the first two chapters of this thesis, the groups of interests are Western 
and non-Western minority groups. For the data in these chapters, I collected information 
about the candidates’ countries of birth and the countries of birth of their parents. I 
followed the definition of Statistics Netherlands for ethnic minority background: those 
born abroad for whom at least one parent was also born abroad were considered as an 
ethnic minority, and everyone who was born in the Netherlands but for whom at least 
one parent was born abroad. I identified the following ethnic minority backgrounds: 
Moroccan, Turkish, former colonies, other non-Western, and Western. With this method, 
it was also possible to identify Western minority candidates. In 2010 and 2012, there 
were 805 unique candidates, 219 of whom were nominated in both elections. In addition 
to ethnic origin, information was obtained about a number of background variables, 
including gender, age, and position on the candidate list. Data were gathered online; 
small online biographies about MPs7 were used and complemented with other online 
resources, such as newspaper articles, social media, and personal websites. I contacted 
all candidates for whom sufficient information regarding their ethnic origin could not 
be found. Most of these candidates responded and provided the requested details about 
their ethnic background; the background of the remaining candidates was coded by three 
independent coders. Therefore, the data include all candidates that were nominated for 
the elections of 2010 and 2012.
I collected data about ethnic minority candidates nominated for the national 
elections of 2017 for the last study in this thesis that tests ethnic affinity voting (Van der 
Zwan, 2018). For the twelve parties included, there were 548 unique candidates nominated 
for the candidate lists. To be able to test ethnic affinity effects for specific ethnic groups, 
I only included non-Western minorities. It was not possible to include specific Western 
minority groups, since Statistics Netherlands only provides information about the share 
of Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese/Antillean minorities in neighbourhoods. Such data 
are not available, for example, for German minorities. Therefore, the focus is on ethnic 
minority candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean/Aruban background, 
or other non-Western background belonging to either first, second, or occasionally third 
generation immigrants. Two independent coders used names and photographs to identify 
ethnic minority candidates. For all candidates that were identified as an ethnic minority 
(90), an additional search was carried out to look for more specific information about their 
ethnic background. This information was gathered using small online biographies about 
MPs and other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media, and personal 
websites. 
chapter 1
32
1.4.2.2 | Ethnic minorities’ party choice 
Data sets with representative numbers of ethnic minority respondents are limited; 
to study the party choice of ethnic minorities, I therefore combined four different 
Dutch survey data sets: Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), The NEtherlands 
Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), the Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM), and 
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS; Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, 
Degen, & Renema, 2018; De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp, & Monden, 2010a; Korte & 
Dagevos, 2011). These particular surveys were used because they all sampled different 
ethnic minority groups. Based on these surveys, I can examine the party choice of Turkish, 
Moroccan, former colony, other non-Western, and Western minorities. Since the four 
surveys differ regarding the ethnic minority groups they focus on, there are also some 
differences in the background characteristics for each survey. More information about the 
survey characteristics is presented in Appendix B.
To measure party choice among ethnic minorities in Canada, I use eight waves of the 
Canadian Election Survey (CES) from 1993–2015 (Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, & Stolle, 2015). 
This is a rich data set, and pooling all these waves makes it possible to have a large enough 
number of ethnic minority respondents and enough variation to study ethnic minorities’ 
vote choice.
1.4.2.3 | Ethnic affinity voting data
To study ethnic affinity voting effects, election results were used from the Dutch 
national parliamentary elections of March 2017. These data are combined with the 
Descriptive Representation Data for the national election of 2017 and with neighbourhood 
characteristics from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c; Van der Zwan, 
2018). Data were obtained through the Dutch Electoral Council. The 20 largest cities 
for which data were available were included. For all of these cities, there is information 
about the number of votes for each candidate on the candidate list in each of the polling 
stations. To be able to examine the influence of neighbourhood characteristics on affinity 
voting, the polling stations were linked to the administratively defined neighbourhood 
characteristics in which they were located. In total, I had election results from 2,121 polling 
stations, which were located in 1,089 neighbourhoods. Since the number of votes for each 
of the 548 candidates in each polling station were analysed, I had 2,121*548= 1,162,308 
observations. 
1.5 | Outline of the chapters
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the chapters in this thesis. The first part begins with 
an examination of the extent to which both Western and non-Western minorities are 
represented on the candidate lists of political parties in the 2012 Dutch parliamentary 
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elections. Moreover, it tests how political parties affect the descriptive representation 
of different ethnic minority groups. More specifically, I systematically analyse the role of 
issue positions of Dutch parties, their ethnic minority support, and candidate selection 
methods. As list position is related to electoral success, I study the nomination of ethnic 
minority candidates as well as their position on the candidate list. Accordingly, Chapter 2 
addresses the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and how 
that is affected by party characteristics. 
 The second part of this thesis concentrates on ethnic minorities’ vote choice. 
Chapters 3 and 4 expand the existing theoretical scope to the role of parties’ substantive 
and descriptive representation in ethnic minorities’ vote choice. In these chapters, I study 
the effects of parties’ substantive viewpoints and how descriptive representation affects 
ethnic minorities’ vote choice in the Dutch and Canadian contexts. 
 Chapter 5 provides a detailed test of where, and under which conditions, ethnic 
affinity voting takes place. It is unknown for which political parties and specific ethnic 
candidates, and in which geographical localities, ethnic affinity effects occur. To study 
how neighbourhood and candidate characteristics affect ethnic affinity voting, I look at 
the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates at the neighbourhood level in the 
Netherlands in 2017, when a minority-interest party entered parliament and the traditional 
minority-vote-catching Labour Party (PvdA) imploded.
table 1.2 | Overview of the chapters 
 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Country Netherlands Netherlands Canada Netherlands 
Ethnic 
groups 
Western and 
non-Western 
 minorities
Western and 
non-Western 
 minorities
Visible minorities Non-Western 
 minorities
Predictors - Party characteristics 
-  Candidate charac-
teristics
- Voter characteristics 
-  Descriptive repre-
sentation
-  Substantive repre-
sentation
- Voter characteristics 
-  Descriptive repre-
sentation
-  Substantive repre-
sentation
-  Neighbourhood 
characteristics 
-  Candidate charac-
teristics
Outcome 
variable 
Descriptive represen-
tation
Party choice Party choice Candidate choice
Data 
sources 
Dutch Descriptive 
Representation Data 
2012; Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey
Dutch Descriptive 
Representation Data 
2010–2012; MIFARE; 
NELLS; LISS; SIMa; 
Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey 
Canadian Election 
Survey; Comparative 
Manifesto Project
1993-2015
Dutch Descriptive 
Representation Data 
2017; Election results 
Dutch parliamentary 
elections 2017; Statis-
tics Netherlands
Analytical 
techniques
Poisson rate regres-
sion analysis, linear 
regression analysis, 
logistic regression 
analysis
Conditional logistic 
regression analysis
Conditional logistic 
regression analysis
Beta regression 
analysis
Note: a Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE), The NEtherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse study (NELLS),  
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) and Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM).
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Notes 
1  One exception would be the Frisians represented by the Frisian Party. However, 
this party never participated in national level elections. At the national level, this 
distinction is therefore not very salient in the Dutch context.
2  More information about the specific requirements for naturalisation can be found on: 
https://ind.nl/Nederlanderschap/Paginas/Naturalisatie.aspx.  
3  For more information, see: https://www.kiesraad.nl/verkiezingen/gemeenteraden/
stemmen/niet-nederlandse-inwoners.
4  See for example the following reports and newspaper articles: Staatscommissie 
parlementair stelsel. (2018). Tussenstand. Den Haag, Nederland: Staatscommissie 
parlementair stelsel.; Pietersen, R. (2015, February 18). Meer discriminatie moslims. 
Trouw, p. 9.; Magendane, K. (2016, September 9). CDA een volkspartij? Met zo’n witte 
kieslijst? NRC Next, p. 30.; De Boer, M. (2016, October, 8). Denk wil koloniale straatnamen 
veranderen. Trouw, p. 10.; Bahara, H. (2017, March 30). Lelieblanke Kamer. De Volkskrant, 
p. 10.; Nekuee, S. (2017, April 8). Denk is goed voor de democratie. NRC Handelsblad, p.2.
5  Article 1 of the Dutch constitution can be found on: https://www.denederlandse 
grondwet.nl/id/via0icz1krrf/artikel_1_gelijke_behandeling_en.
6  In Chapter 4 the term visible minority is used rather than ethnic minority. In Canada, 
the term visible minorities is most commonly used and it is defined by the Employment 
Equity Act; it refers to any non-Aboriginal person who is non-Caucasian in race or non-
White in colour (Canada, 2008). In the current chapter I use the term ethnic minorities 
for reasons of consistency.
7 Retrieved from the website parlement.com.
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part i
The descriptive 
representation of 
ethnic minorities

chapter 2
The political representation of ethnic 
minorities in the Netherlands:  
ethnic minority candidates and the 
role of party characteristics* 
*A slightly different version of this paper has been published in Acta Politica: Van der Zwan, 
R., Lubbers, M. & Eisinga, R. (2019). The political representation of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands: ethnic minority candidates and the role of party characteristics. Acta Politica, 
54(2), 245-267. The authors jointly developed the idea for this paper. Roos van der Zwan 
wrote most of the text and conducted the analysis. Both Marcel Lubbers and Rob Eisinga 
contributed to the manuscript. It also greatly benefited from the input of the participants 
of the ECPR Joint Sessions in Pisa, 2016.
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2.1 | Introduction
In most Western societies, the representation of ethnic minority groups remains low 
despite the strongly increasing diversity in ethnic composition (Bloemraad, 2013; Murray, 
2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). In a context where migration and 
integration belong to the most salient political topics, it is claimed that a political voice 
given to ethnic minorities from within these groups is essential to stimulate social 
cohesion (Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). It is therefore key to understand ethnic minorities’ 
descriptive representation. Descriptive representation concerns the resemblance of 
the electorate by their political representatives, and the absence of ethnic minorities in 
political institutions sends a message of exclusion to both majority and minority groups 
(Phillips, 1995). Moreover, the exclusion or underrepresentation of particular groups of 
citizens is perceived as problematic for democratic legitimacy. This study adds to existing 
explanations of the political representation of ethnic minorities (e.g. Bird, 2005; Black & 
Erickson, 2006; Dancygier, Lindgren, Oskarsson, & Vernby, 2015; Martin, 2016; Michon & 
Vermeulen, 2013) by studying the role of political parties in descriptive representation. We 
move beyond the focus on visible minorities and study all ethnic groups. More specifically, 
our research question is: 
 ‘To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western 
and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of 
Representatives in the Netherlands?’ 
Political parties play a fundamental role in ethnic minority representation (Celis & 
Erzeel, 2017; Szlovak, 2017; Zapata-barrero et al., 2017), for they decide how many ethnic 
minorities candidates are nominated. Accordingly, parties have a substantial influence on 
the composition of parliament (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Hazan & Rahat, 2006). Moreover, 
political parties reflect and influence public opinions about (ethnic) diversity and they 
are involved in policy-making (Zapata-barrero et al., 2017). However, the strategies and 
motivations to incorporate ethnic minorities differ between political parties. That is why 
we study how party characteristics affect ethnic minority representation. 
This study brings together three party characteristics. We argue that the access of 
ethnic minorities to the party candidate lists depends on differences in parties’ policy 
positions on migration and integration, on ethnic minority support within parties, 
and on the parties’ candidate selection methods. These party characteristics have 
been identified as relevant for ethnic minority representation, but they have not been 
examined in a single framework (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016; 
Sobolewska, 2013). Consequently, this study tests whether parties’ issue positions, intra-
party ethnic minority support, and parties’ selection methods affect ethnic minority 
representation.
To better understand the influence of parties on ethnic minority representation, we 
assess ethnic minority nomination in three different ways. Since a candidate’s list position 
is an important predictor for electoral success, studying nomination only is not sufficient. 
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Therefore, we hypothesise about the role of political parties for candidates’ nomination, 
their relative position on the list, and whether they are nominated for a (relatively) safe 
list position. Safe list positions are positions on the list of which it is expected that these 
candidates will obtain a seat following the elections. 
Another contribution to existing research is our focus on both Western and non-
Western minorities. Definitions of minority groups vary between countries and between 
studies (Bird et al., 2011; Bloemraad, 2013), and in the European context the focus often 
is on immigrants or ethnic minorities with a non-Western background (e.g. Dancygier 
et al., 2015; Mügge, 2016; Murray, 2016). This approach makes sense from the perspective 
that especially these groups experience exclusion from mainstream society and that their 
representation has become salient (Bloemraad, 2013; Celis et al., 2014). However, Western 
minorities constitute a relevant part of the ethnic minority population in many Western 
countries (European Union, 2015), and we know little about the political representation of 
this particular group. Therefore, in this study the term ethnic minorities refers to citizens 
with a Western or non-Western immigration background. The immigration background is 
defined by the countries of birth of the candidates and their parents.
2.2 |  Case selection: The Dutch electoral system and 
political context
The Netherlands has long been considered as a multicultural country with a successful 
approach to integration. Nowadays, the Netherlands is more often seen as a country where 
integration policies have failed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Koopmans, 2010). Within the 
country, debates about immigration and integration have intensified since 2000 (Aydemir 
& Vliegenthart, 2016). These debates mainly focus on the (lack of) integration of the largest 
non-Western groups, which are minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or 
Antillean background. Nevertheless, with regard to political integration the Netherlands is 
one of the countries with the highest levels of descriptive representation of non-Western 
ethnic minorities (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). This provides an interesting political 
context to study ethnic minority representation.
There are several distinct features of the Dutch electoral system relevant to this 
study. The Netherlands, which has a list system of proportional representation (PR), is 
characterised by one of the most proportional systems in the world (Andeweg & Irwin, 
2009). Since voters in PR systems often have a choice between different candidates of the 
same party, such systems, unlike majoritarian systems, are thought to make it easier to 
increase the descriptive representation of minority groups (Htun, 2004), 
The Dutch multi-party system is another feature of the electoral system. There are, on 
average, about ten political parties that hold seats in the House of Representatives. The 
majority of these parties can be placed into known party families, such as the Christian 
parties (CDA, SGP, CU), the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Socialists (SP), the Greens (GL), the 
Liberal parties (D66 and VVD), and the anti-immigrant party (PVV). The Dutch multi-party 
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system provides the opportunity to study how parties from all over the political spectrum 
place ethnic minorities on their candidate lists. 
Political parties that aim to participate in national elections are required to submit 
a candidate list. All candidate lists are presented to the voter, and from these lists they 
can cast a vote for a single candidate. The sum of votes casted on all candidates of a party 
determines the share of votes for a political party. How many seats a party wins, and which 
candidates are elected is based on this share of votes. Most voters cast a vote for the first 
candidate on the list of the party they prefer. However, a voter can also cast a preference 
vote by choosing a candidate ranked lower on the party list. Preference votes are often 
used to support a female candidate or a candidate with an ethnic minority background 
(Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). A candidate that receives enough preference votes can be 
elected and overtake the position of higher ranked candidates. Nonetheless, this is not 
very common and happened only seven times since 2002 (Parlement and Politiek, 2016). 
Five of these candidates were women, and one of these women also belonged to an ethnic 
minority group. 
We gathered data on the – at the time of collection latest – Dutch national elections 
held on 12 September 2012. The data include 531 candidates on the candidate lists of eleven 
political parties and provide information about the countries of birth of the candidates 
and their parents. In 2012, voters could vote for candidates of 21 political parties and eleven 
of these parties won seats in the House of Representatives. Most of the votes went to the 
Liberal Party (VVD, 27%) and the Labour Party (PvdA, 25%), as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
table 2.1 | Number of candidates on the list and seats in the House of Representatives in 2012, by party
Ideologya Party (abbreviations) Candidates Seats
Left Socialist Party (SP) 45 15
GreenLeft (GL) 42 4
Party for the Animals (PvdD) 25 2
Labour Party (PvdA) 74 38
50Plus 34 2
Democrats 66 (D66) 50 12
Christian Union (CU) 50 5
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 57 13
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 75 41
Reformed Political Party (SGP) 30 3
Right Party for Freedom (PVV) 49 15
 a Scale based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
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2.3 | Theoretical framework
Representation can be defined as a delegated act on behalf of someone else (Urbinati, 
2011). Although there are various definitions and interpretations of political representation 
(Mansbridge, 2003, 2011; Rehfeld, 2011), the main interest of this study is in who represents. 
In other words, we focus on descriptive representation. We argue that political parties 
play a crucial role in the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities. First, descriptive 
representation is likely to be related to parties’ issue positions. Hence, we study if parties’ 
issue positions are in accordance with their actions by examining the extent to which 
their restrictiveness on migration and integration issues is reflected in the nomination of 
ethnic minority candidates. Second, the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities may be 
the result of parties’ internal measures to incorporate ethnic minorities (Zapata-barrero 
et al., 2017). Therefore, we assess whether there is some form of ethnic minority support 
available within each party, such as an ethnic minority network, and how this affects 
descriptive representation. Third, we study candidate selection processes because those 
deciding – the selectorate – have the power to nominate ethnic minority candidates.
2.3.1 | From candidate selection to Member of Parliament
We examine two moments in the selection and election process of candidates important 
for ethnic minority representation. First, candidates have to be nominated by political 
parties before they can stand for election. Second, candidates that are nominated for a 
position on the candidate list still have to be elected to become a Member of Parliament 
(MP; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Mügge & Erzeel, 2016). In a list system of proportional 
representation, the selectorate nominates candidates and determines the order of the 
candidate list (Koole & Leyenaar, 1988). This means that the selectorate decides about 
the list position and about who is placed in a safe or unsafe list position (Rahat & Hazan, 
2001). Therefore, it is possible that ethnic minorities are placed on the list, but that they 
have little chance of election. That is why we look at three outcome variables. We start 
with an examination of the ethnic composition of the candidate lists by looking at the 
share of ethnic minority candidates, followed by an investigation of their positions on the 
list. Successively, we examine whether ethnic minorities are placed in safe or unsafe list 
positions. Safe list positions are positions of which it is expected that these candidates 
will win a seat in the elections. Studying safe list positions is relevant because it plays a 
role in the selectorates’ decision-making (Koole & Leyenaar, 1988). Even though safe list 
positions do not guarantee a seat in parliament, winning a seat is highly more likely for 
candidates in safe than unsafe list positions (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Once the candidate 
list is determined, the voters decide who gets elected. Consequently, we also examine 
the extent to which the representativeness of parties’ candidate lists is related to the 
representativeness of the House of Representatives.
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2.3.2 | Who gets selected? 
Left-wing parties often have positive views on minority groups and support minority rights 
(Messina, 2006). Moreover, studies have shown that these parties are more likely to have 
women and ethnic minorities among their MPs (Caul, 1999; Sobolewska, 2013; Wängnerud, 
2009). We examine the extent to which the issue positions of parties on migration and 
integration are related to descriptive representation. We study specific issue positions 
instead of party ideology (left-right division) because most Dutch parties are quite explicit 
in their views on this topic during political debates, and because they have included their 
positions in the party programme. Parties supportive of ethnic minorities can be expected 
to reveal this in their issue positions, and, additionally, by including ethnic minority 
candidates on their list. We argue straightforwardly that a more restrictive issue position 
on migration and integration is related to a smaller share of ethnic minorities on the 
candidate list. Furthermore, it is anticipated that parties that are more restrictive about 
migration and integration are less likely to place ethnic minorities in higher list positions 
and to nominate them for a safe list position. 
What also differs between parties is whether there exists some form of support for 
ethnic minority party members. Examples are quotas, targets, and intra-party ethnic 
minority networks. Quotas are a popular method to increase the share of underrepresented 
minorities in political institutions (Htun, 2004; Wängnerud, 2009). We expect that quotas 
or targets at the party level increase the number of ethnic minorities on candidate lists, 
much like they have done for women. Another opportunity used by Dutch parties to 
support ethnic minorities is an intra-party ethnic minority network. In such networks, 
minority issues are discussed and members can bring possible ethnic minority candidates 
to the attention of the selection committee (Mügge, 2016). In parties that provide support 
for ethnic minority members, these members have more chances of electoral success. For 
that reason, we anticipate, at the party level, that parties with ethnic minority support 
nominate more ethnic minority candidates. Moreover, to increase chances of electoral 
success, parties providing ethnic minority support are more likely to both place ethnic 
minority candidates in higher list positions and in safe list positions than parties with no 
form of ethnic minority support. 
Another party characteristics we theorise about is that of candidate selection 
methods. Candidate selection is a crucial stage in the political recruitment process. The 
body responsible for the selection of candidates is the so-called selectorate (Hazan & 
Rahat, 2006). This selectorate is the gatekeeper of a party and decides who is nominated 
and who is not. By doing so, they indirectly influence the composition of the House of 
Representatives and, consequently, policy-making  (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Rahat et 
al., 2008; Scarrow, 2000). That is why candidate selection processes have been studied to 
explain the underrepresentation of particular groups (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995) and there 
has been some support that candidate selection, although time and context dependent, 
affects ethnic minority representation (Celis & Erzeel, 2013; Celis et al., 2014; Sobolewska, 
2013). Yet, it is unknown if it matters who decides about the candidates. 
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In the Netherlands, there are no legal rules on how candidates should be selected, and the 
composition of the selectorate is different for each party (for more details on candidate 
selection processes in the Netherlands, see: Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Selectorates are 
most inclusive when all voters can vote for who gets selected and most exclusive when 
a single leader decides about the candidate selection (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). The level 
of inclusiveness can influence representativeness because a more exclusive selectorate 
(e.g., the party leader) has more influence on the candidate list than a more inclusive 
selectorate. Hazan and Rahat (2006) have argued that it is easier for a small and exclusive 
selectorate to set up a balanced and diverse candidate list. With a more inclusive 
selectorate, for example consisting of all party members, it is more difficult to oversee 
the overall composition of the list and to discuss and compromise about its composition 
(Rahat et al., 2008). Nevertheless, there are few studies testing this assumption. Existing 
studies on the influence of inclusiveness of the selectorate have mainly focused on the 
selection of women and the results are mixed (Luhiste, 2015; Rahat et al., 2008). Testing 
the effects of inclusiveness of the selectorate on ethnic minority representation for 
the first time, we examine whether parties with a more exclusive selectorate nominate 
more ethnic minority candidates and are more likely to place them in higher and safe list 
positions. 
In summary, the following hypotheses are formulated:
The more restrictive political parties’ issue positions on migration and integration, the 
fewer ethnic minorities are nominated for the candidate list (H1a), the lower the relative list 
position of ethnic minority candidates (H2a), and the less likely they are to be nominated 
for safe list positions (H3a).
Parties providing ethnic minority support, nominate more ethnic minorities for the 
candidate list (H1b), place ethnic minority candidates in higher relative list positions (H2b), 
and are more likely to nominate them for safe list positions (H3b).
The less inclusive the selectorate of a party, the more ethnic minorities are nominated for 
the candidate list (H1c), the higher the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates 
(H2c), and the more likely they are to be nominated for safe list positions (H3c).
2.4 | Data and measurements 
2.4.1 | Data 
Both self-collected data and secondary data sources we used to test our assumptions. 
First, we collected information on all candidates on the candidate lists of the eleven parties 
who won at least one seat in the House of Representatives in the Dutch parliamentary 
elections of 2012.1 In addition to ethnic origin, information was obtained about a limited 
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number of background variables including gender, age and position on the candidate list. 
Data were gathered online; small online biographies about MPs (PDC, 2016) were used and 
complemented with other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media and 
personal websites. Second, data were collected for two of the three party characteristics: 
ethnic minority support and inclusiveness of the selectorate. Third, secondary data 
sources were used to determine safe list positions (Opinion poll data; Louwerse, 2014) and 
to measure parties’ issue positions on migration and integration (Expert surveys; Bakker 
et al., 2015).
2.4.2 | Ethnic background
For all 531 candidates, information about their countries of birth and that of their parents 
was collected. We considered a candidate to be of Dutch origin when he or she and 
both parents were born in the Netherlands. When the candidate was born abroad but 
both parents were born in the Netherlands, the candidate was also considered to be of 
Dutch origin. Candidates who were born abroad and of whom at least one of the parents 
was born abroad were considered as belonging to an ethnic minority group. Moreover, 
candidates who were born in the Netherlands but of whom at least one of the parents was 
born abroad were identified as ethnic minorities. 
Information about the countries of birth was found online for 431 candidates. If no 
information about the countries of birth of the parents was found, and if there was no 
evidence that proved otherwise, such as names, we coded the parents as Dutch. We 
contacted 100 candidates of whom no sufficient information about their ethnic origin 
could be found.2 In total, 61 candidates responded, and they provided the requested details 
about their ethnic background. For the last 39 candidates, the country of birth and that of 
their parents was coded by three coders. We assumed these candidates and their parents 
to be Dutch unless any evidence proved otherwise.3
Two variables were constructed using these data. The first variable indicated whether 
a candidate belonged to an ethnic minority group or not, and the second variable specified 
the ethnic background of the candidate. In addition to Dutch, a distinction was made 
between the most important non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands, which are 
Turkish, Moroccan and former Dutch colony minorities. Considering that they make up 
one third of all ethnic minorities in the Netherlands with Dutch citizenship, a category 
of Western minorities was also included (See Figure 2.1). The final category consisted of 
minorities with another non-Western background (See Table A.1 in Appendix A for a more 
detailed overview). 
2.4.3 | Dependent variables
Three different dependent variables were constructed. The first was a dependent variable 
at the party level and was simply the share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list. 
Second, at the candidate level we obtained a variable to measure the relative position of 
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candidates on the list. This was calculated as T-P×100, where T stands for the total number 
of positions available on a candidate list and P for the position of a candidate on the list. 
This candidate level variable ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 is the lowest position on the 
candidate list and 100 the highest position on the list (party leader). Hence, the higher the 
value, the higher the relative list position of the candidate. 
Our third dependent variable, which is also at the candidate level, measured whether 
candidates were placed in a safe or in an unsafe list position. Safe list positions have 
often been based on a party’s current number of seats (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). We depart 
from this definition, and used opinion polls to determine the number of safe seats for 
each party. We argue that opinion polls in the months before the elections offer a better 
prediction of the number of seats each party may win than the party’s current number of 
seats. Therefore, we used opinion poll data from the polling institute NOS Peilingwijzer, 
which combined three different national opinion polls to estimate the support for each 
political party (Louwerse, 2014). Based on these polls, the data set provided the proportion 
of electoral support for each party on each day. The average support in the months May, 
June and July of 2012 was calculated for each party.4 This average proportion of electoral 
support was converted into seats by multiplying it by 150 (the amount of seats in the House 
of Representatives).5 The average number of seats predicted by the NOS Peilingwijzer in this 
period was used to determine the number of safe seats for each party. For example, it was 
predicted that the Liberal party (VVD) would obtain 30 seats. For this party, candidates on 
position 1 to 30 were coded as having a safe list position and candidates on position 31 to 75 
were coded as having an unsafe position. 
2.4.4 | Individual characteristics
Considering that candidates and MPs are often middle-aged, we include age as a control 
variable (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). Candidates were between 21 and 77 years old. For 28 
candidates the year of birth was unknown; the mean age (44) of the 503 other candidates 
was assigned to them.6 Additionally, we control for gender because recent studies have 
shown the relevancy of gender in ethnic minority representation in the Netherlands (Celis 
et al., 2014; Mügge, 2016). 
2.4.5 | Party characteristics 
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey was used to measure the positions of parties on migration 
and integration issues (See Bakker et al., 2015 for more detailed information about these 
data). Dutch politics experts were asked to rate the positions of political parties on 
several topics; three variables from this survey were used. First, the positions of parties on 
immigration policy (from fully opposed to (0) to fully in favour of (10) a restrictive policy 
on immigration); second, the positions on the integration of immigrants and asylum 
seekers (from strongly favouring multiculturalism (0) to strongly favouring assimilation 
(10)); and last, the position towards ethnic minority rights (from strongly supporting (0) to 
T-1
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strongly opposing (10) more ethnic minority rights). The survey data were collected in 2010 
and 2014. Because our concern was the election of 2012, we used the mean score of these 
two years. The only exception was for the 50Plus party, this party was established in 2011. 
Therefore, only the 2014 data could be used for this party. A scale was created by taking 
the average score on these three variables. A higher score on this scale indicates more 
restrictive views. The scale is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.983. For interpretation 
purposes, the variable was centred on the mean.
Information on ethnic minority support in 2012 was collected from the websites, 
statutes, internal regulations of the political parties and other party documents (See 
Appendix A for a detailed overview). First, no explicit references to quota were found. 
However, a striving for the participation of ethnic minorities (or similar terminology) in 
party positions was mentioned in party documents of the Labour Party (PvdA) and the 
Green Party (GL). Furthermore, the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Green Party (GL) 
had an ethnic minority network in 2012. Therefore, the Labour Party (PvdA), the Green 
Party (GL), and the Christian Democrats (CDA) were considered to be supportive of ethnic 
minorities (1). The other parties, which had no quota, targets or ethnic minority network, 
obtained a score of 0. 
To measure the inclusiveness of the selectorate, we used a scale as suggested by Rahat 
and Hazan (2001). The categories of the scale were slightly adjusted for the Dutch case: 
Selectorates are most exclusive when only one person decides about the candidate list, 
and most inclusive when all party members can decide about this list. For each party we 
coded who decided about the final version of the candidate list in 2012. The coding was 
based on the information in a report of Voerman, Lucardie and Marchand (2004) and was 
checked and complemented with information from the statutes, and internal rules and 
regulations of the parties (See Appendix A for a detailed overview). We note that only 
the formal procedures regarding the selectorate were included.7 Four categories were 
distinguished; first, only the party leadership decides about the candidate list (most 
exclusive), second, a party agency decides about the candidate list, third, party members 
present on a party congress decide about the candidate list, and last, all party members 
decide on the candidate list. Descriptive statistics and information about the party 
characteristics for each party are presented in Appendix A.
2.5 | Results
2.5.1 | Analytical strategy
To test our hypotheses, we started with an examination of the composition of the 
candidate lists and the MPs elected for the House of Representatives. Second, the extent 
to which party characteristics are related to the share of ethnic minorities on each party’s 
candidate list was analysed. Third, multiple regression analyses were performed to test the 
effects of party characteristics on the relative list position of individual candidates and on 
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the likelihood to be placed in safe list positions. Last, the possible association between the 
share of ethnic minorities on the candidate list and among MPs was investigated.8
2.5.2 | Descriptive results
In total, 11% of the candidates and 12% of the MPs have an ethnic minority background. 
Figure 2.1 shows that ethnic minorities eligible to vote (aged 18 years or above and with 
Dutch citizenship) are underrepresented on the candidate list and in the House of 
Representatives. An examination of Dutch ethnic minority groups shows that there are 
differences in the level of representation for each group. Except for Dutch citizens with 
a Turkish or Moroccan background, all ethnic minority groups are underrepresented. 
Western ethnic minorities make up 4.7% of the population, but only 2.3% of the 
candidates and 2.7% of the MPs are ethnic minorities with a Western background. 
Furthermore, we find a substantial difference between the share of ethnic minorities that 
belong to the other non-Western group of the population (3.0%) and among politicians 
(1.3% of the candidates and 0.7% of the MPs). There is also a large difference between 
ethnic minorities from former colonies in the population (5.7%) and on the candidate lists 
and in the House of Representatives (2.4% and 2.0%, respectively). 
figure 2.1 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship of the total Dutch populationa 
and the share of ethnic minorities among candidates and MPs in 2012 
Note: a  This refers to the population of 18 years or older
Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2016a, 2016b; Van der Zwan, 2017; own calculations.
The representation index is often used to indicate the extent to which ethnic minorities 
are descriptively represented and is comparable across countries. A higher score on 
this index indicates better representation. Calculating the representation index for the 
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descriptive representation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands in 2012, we find that the 
representation score is 0.73 for all ethnic minorities and 0.79 for non-Western minorities.9 
Although this is not as high as the 1.08 score that Bloemraad (2013) found for the 
Netherlands in 2006, it is higher than most other countries reported in her study, where 
the representation index ranged from 0.00 (France, 2007) to 0.48 (Canada, 2006). In other 
studies, representation scores are lower as well, such as in Germany, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain (Ruedin, 2013b; Zapata-Barrero, 2017). 
2.5.3 | Ethnic minority candidates on parties’ candidate lists
A Poisson rate regression model was used to examine the association between party 
characteristics and the share of ethnic minority candidates on the candidate lists. By using 
the share of ethnic minority candidates, the length of the candidate list is taken into account. 
The results in Table 2.2 show that the restrictiveness of parties’ issue positions on 
migration and integration is significant and is negatively related to the share of ethnic 
minority candidates (b=-0.188). As expected in Hypothesis 1a, parties with more restrictive 
positions on migration and integration nominate fewer ethnic minorities for the candidate 
list. Hence, the first hypothesis is supported. Furthermore, ethnic minority support within 
parties is significant and positively related to the share of ethnic minority candidates on 
the list (b=0.859). This provides support for Hypothesis 1b, arguing that parties providing 
ethnic minority support nominate more ethnic minorities for the candidate list. However, 
the effects of the inclusiveness of the selectorate are not as expected and non-significant. 
Hence, Hypothesis 1c that parties with less inclusive selectorates nominate more ethnic 
minorities for the candidate list is not supported. 
table 2.2 | Poisson rate regression of the share of ethnic minority candidates on the candidate list of 
11 parties (N=531)
B
Intercept -1.611
(1.205)
Restrictiveness -0.188*
(0.099)
Ethnic minority support 0.859**
(0.411)
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)
- Party leader 0.092
(0.874)
- Party delegates -0.446
(1.031)
- Party members congress 0.287
(0.936)
Note: A control variable for the orthodox Christian parties (SGP and CU) was included (not shown), including 
this variable significantly increased the fit of the model. Standard errors in parentheses. **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
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2.5.4 | Relative list position 
Table 2.3 shows the effects of party characteristics on the list position of ethnic minority 
candidates and Table 2.4 gives the results for safe list positions. Due to the low number 
of ethnic minorities (e.g. the other non-Western group includes only seven ethnic 
minority candidates), we only distinguished between Dutch, Western, and non-Western 
background in the multiple regression analysis. Moreover, for parsimonious reasons, the 
interaction effects of the party characteristics were included in separate models.10 
Only individual characteristics were included in the null model in Table 2.3. This model 
shows that ethnic background, gender, and age are not related to the relative list position 
of candidates. Similarly, these individual characteristics do not significantly affect the 
likelihood to be placed in a safe list position (Model 0 in Table 2.4). This means that if 
ethnic minorities are included on the lists, they, on average, are not placed in lower or 
unsafe list positions.
The interaction variable of the restrictiveness scale and ethnic minority background 
was added in Model 1 in Table 2.3. We find that when a party is more restrictive on migration 
and integration, native Dutch candidates have a higher position on the candidate list, and 
both Western and non-Western ethnic minority candidates a lower position on the list. 
This effect is only significant for non-Western ethnic minority candidates (b=0.557-5.469=-
4.912). This supports Hypothesis 2a, but only for candidates with a non-Western ethnic 
background: the more restrictive political parties’ views on migration and integration, the 
lower the relative list position of non-Western ethnic minority candidates. 
Model 2 shows that the effects of parties’ ethnic minority support by ethnic minority 
background are not significant. Hence, there is no support for the hypothesis that the 
more ethnic minorities are supported within the party, the higher the relative list position 
of ethnic minority candidates (H2b).
The last party characteristic is the inclusiveness of the selectorate. Model 3 shows 
that the results regarding inclusiveness are mixed for all ethnic groups and do not reach 
significance. Therefore, our hypothesis that in parties with a less inclusive selectorate, 
ethnic minority candidates are placed in higher list positions is not supported (H2c).
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table 2.3 | Linear regression of candidates’ relative list position on individual and party 
characteristics (N=531)
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B B B B
Intercept 51.763*** 51.154*** 51.612*** 50.659***
(5.745) (5.760) (5.873) (6.304)
Individual characteristics
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Western background 0.854 1.375 3.660 -0.766
(7.511) (7.553) (10.008) (15.115)
- Non-Western background 5.014 -1.725 9.362 13.275
(4.753) (6.142) (7.945) (10.434)
Gender (male=ref.)
- Female 3.085 3.429 3.241 3.323
(2.707) (2.733) (2.752) (2.758)
Age -0.074 -0.065 -0.072 -0.063
Party characteristics
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.130)
Restrictiveness 0.557 0.211 0.480
(0.622) (0.629) (0.944)
Restrictiveness × Western background -2.461
(3.418)
Restrictiveness × Non-Western background -5.469*
(2.901)
Ethnic minority support -0.076
(3.161)
Support × Western background -6.495
(15.234)
Support × Non-Western background -6.150
(9.988)
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)
- Party leader -0.492
(5.556)
- Party delegates 1.021
(3.533)
- Party members congress 0.585
(4.741
Party leader × Western backgrounda 11.881
(26.042)
Party delegates × Western background 3.958
(18.947)
Party delegates × Non-Western background -15.623
(12.139)
Party members congress × Western background -9.273
(23.069)
Party members congress × Non-Western background 6.310
(14.631)
R² 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.015
Note: a An interaction effect for party leader and non-Western background could not be estimated because 
there were no ethnic minority candidates with a non-Western background in parties where the party leader 
decided about the candidate list. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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2.5.5 | Safe list positions
Model 1 in Table 2.4 presents the odds ratio (OR) of 1.122 for the main effect of restrictiveness. 
This indicates that for native Dutch candidates the chance to be placed in a safe list 
position versus the chance to be placed in an unsafe list position is higher when parties 
are more restrictive on migration and integration. The direction of the interaction effects 
suggests that those with a Western as well as those with a non-Western background are 
less likely to be placed in safe list positions when parties are more restrictive. However, the 
interaction effects are not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a stating that when parties 
have more restrictive views the likelihood to be placed in safe list positions is lower, 
cannot be supported.11
In Model 2 in Table 2.4, we see a negative and significant interaction effect for non-
Western ethnic minority candidates (b=-0.145+-1.811=-1.956; OR=0.164). In contrast to our 
expectation, when there is no ethnic minority support the likelihood to be placed in safe 
list positions is larger for candidates with a non-Western ethnic minority background. 
There is no significant interaction effect for candidates with a Western background. 
This means that we do not find the expected results for the hypothesis that when ethnic 
minorities are supported within the party, ethnic minority candidates would be more 
likely to be placed in safe list positions (H3b).
The results in Model 3 show that when party leaders, party delegates, and a party 
members’ congress decide about the candidate list the likelihood to be placed in a safe list 
position is smaller than when all party members decide about the list. Our results show 
one exception: when party leaders decide about the list, ethnic minority candidates with 
a Western background have a larger likelihood to be placed in safe list position compared 
to when all party members decide about the candidate list. This is not in line with our 
expectations, and we do not find support for Hypothesis 3c that the inclusiveness of the 
selectorate would be related to safe list positions for ethnic minority candidates.12
 
descriptive representation and the role of party characteristics in the Netherlands
55
table 2.4 | Logistic regression analysis of candidates’ safe list position on individual and party 
characteristics (N=531)
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B OR B OR B OR B OR
Intercept -0.817* 0.430 -0.875** 0.417 -0.833* 0.435 -1.098** 0.334
(0.438) (0.442) (0.448) (0.494)
Individual characteristics
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Western background 0.416 1.515 0.450 1.568 0.615 1.849 0.613 1.846
(0.528) (0.532) (0.690) (1.031)
- Non-Western background -0.291 0.750 -0.469 0.626 0.839 2.314 1.057 2.877
(0.379) (0.528) (0.546) (0.723)
Gender (male=ref.)
- Female 0.213 1.238 0.291 1.337 0.283 1.327 0.282 1.326
(0.202) (0.206) (0.208) (0.212)
Age -0.005 0.996 -0.004 0.996 -0.004 0.996 0.008 1.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Party characteristics
Restrictiveness 0.115** 1.122 0.087* 1.091 0.078 1.082
(0.047) (0.048) (0.073)
Restrictiveness × Western background -0.187 0.829
(0.243)
Restrictiveness × Non-Western background -0.247 0.781
(0.238)
Ethnic minority support -0.145 0.865
(0.245)
Support × Western background -0.471 0.624
(1.105)
Support × Non-Western background -1.811** 0.164
(0.840)
Inclusiveness (All party members=ref.)
- Party leader -0.570 0.565
(0.415)
- Party delegates -0.026 0.975
(0.255)
- Party members congress -1.450*** 0.235
(0.439)
Party leader × Western backgrounda 0.267 1.306
(1.769)
Party delegates × Western background -0.244 0.783
(1.296)
Party delegates × Non-Western background -1.988** 0.137
(0.915)
Party members congress × Western backgroundb -19.621 0.000
(23194.369)
Party members congress × Non-Western back-
ground
-0.743 0.476
(1.326)
Nagelkerke R² 0.007 0.024 0.039 0.093
Note:  a An interaction effect for party leader and non-Western background could not be estimated because there were 
no ethnic minority candidates with a non-Western background in parties where the party leader decided about the 
candidate list. b This large effect and the large standard error are probably caused by the very low number of Western 
minority candidates in parties where the party decide about the candidate list on a party congress. Standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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2.5.6 | Ethnic minority candidates and MPs by party
In the final part of our study, we examined whether the share and the list position of 
ethnic minority candidates are related to the share of ethnic minorities in the House of 
Representatives. Table 2.5 shows that parties with the lowest share of ethnic minority 
candidates have less ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and less ethnic 
minority MPs (The Christian SGP and CU, and the Party for the Animals (PvdD)) and that 
parties with the highest share of ethnic minority candidates also have a higher share of 
ethnic minorities in safe list positions and ethnic minority MPs (the Democrats 66 (D66), 
the Green party (GL) and the Labour Party (PvdA)). Some parties stand out, such as the 
Elderly party (50Plus) and the Christian Democrats (CDA). Both parties have ethnic minority 
candidates on the list, but no ethnic minorities with a seat in the House of Representatives. 
For the 50Plus party their low number of seats (2) offers an explanation. The Christian 
Democrats (CDA) did not place ethnic minorities in safe list positions, which seems to 
indicate that ethnic minorities have lower list position than native Dutch candidates. A 
possible explanation is that the Christian Democrats (CDA) obtained the lowest number 
of seats ever in the 2012 elections (13 compared to 21 in the 2010 elections). Overall, not 
unexpected, the percentages indicate that a higher share of ethnic minority candidates 
is related to a higher share of ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and ethnic 
minority MPs. This is supported by the strong positive and significant correlations of 
0.718 between the percentage of ethnic minority candidates and the percentage of ethnic 
minorities in safe list positions, and of 0.736 between the percentage of ethnic minority 
candidates and ethnic minority MPs.
table 2.5 | The number of seats, share of ethnic minority candidates and the share of ethnic 
minorities in safe list positions and among MPs, by party
Party % ethnic minority 
candidates
% ethnic minorities 
in safe list positions
Seats % ethnic 
minority MPs
SGP 0.0 0.0 3 0.0
CU 4.0 0.0 5 0.0
PvdD 4.0 0.0 2 0.0
PVV 4.1 5.3 15 6.7
50Plus 5.9 0.0 2 0.0
VVD 6.7 6.7 41 4.9
SP 8.9 10.0 15 20.0
CDA 14.0 0.0 13 0.0
D66 16.0 33.3 12 25.0
GL 21.4 20.0 4 25.0
PvdA 24.3 20.0 38 21.1
Pearson correlation with % 
ethnic minority candidates
0.718*** 0.736***
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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2.6 | Conclusion and discussion
With a focus on the influence of political parties on the descriptive representation of ethnic 
minorities, this study systematically tested the role of parties’ policy positions, parties’ 
ethnic minority support, and parties’ selection methods. We studied how parties affect 
both the nomination of ethnic minorities and their list positions. Moreover, we extended 
the research on ethnic minority representation to understand representation of non-
Western and Western minorities. The latter is uncommon, since the representation of this 
group is relatively low and there are few cases to study. This contrasts the representation 
of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands, who are well represented. 
Our findings show that political parties’ issue positions on migration and integration 
affect both ethnic minority representation and minorities’ list position. Parties that have 
more restrictive views on migration and integration not only nominate fewer ethnic 
minority candidates, but also place non-Western ethnic minority candidates in lower list 
positions. That might seem a straightforward finding, but it underlines that parties with a 
more positive view on migration and integration not only express this in their programme 
but also descriptively, sending out a direct signal of inclusion. This is an important finding 
we expect to be of relevance in other Western countries and different electoral systems as 
well.
There was no clear support for the role of the other two party characteristics under 
study. Although ethnic minority support at the party level was related to a higher number 
of ethnic minority candidates, we did not find the expected association of ethnic minority 
support with Western and non-Western ethnic minority candidates’ position on the 
candidate list. As shown by previous studies, the influence of ethnic minority networks 
may change over time (Mügge, 2016). Ethnic minority networks were influential in the 
1990s, particularly for ethnic minority women. It seems that ethnic minority networks have 
become less powerful in the current political context. Previous research has also shown 
that targets or quotas do not always work similarly for different minority groups. National 
level quotas have been successful for the political representation of women but were not 
always related to higher levels of ethnic representation (Celis et al., 2014; Ruedin, 2013b). 
We did not find any evidence that more inclusive selectorates have a better balanced 
candidate list in terms of ethnic background. Following the conceptual framework of 
Hazan and Rahat (2006) we argued that parties with less inclusive selectorates are more 
likely to create a balanced candidate list and, consequently, will have more representative 
candidate lists. An explanation for our unexpected findings may be that the differences in 
selection methods between Dutch political parties are not substantial enough to yield an 
effect. Cross-national research on the representation of ethnic minorities on candidate 
lists could provide more clarity on this issue. 
Our study showed that, in line with earlier research, non-Western minorities in the 
Netherlands were relatively well represented in 2012 (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016). The 
ethnic groups with the highest levels of representation, Turkish and Moroccan minorities, 
are the groups most often the subject of (critical) debate in the Netherlands. Although 
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this explains the focus on these groups in earlier studies, our findings showed that not all 
ethnic minority groups were well represented, and there is no reason to expect different 
results in other countries. Hence, this study could be a starting point to examine Western 
minorities in more detail. 
A limitation of this study is that we only examined descriptive representation and 
did not look into the extent to which the interests of ethnic minorities – substantive 
representation – are represented (Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967; but see Aydemir & 
Vliegenthart, 2016). Moreover, candidates with a non-Dutch background (both Western and 
non-Western) may vary in their identification with that non-Dutch background, which we 
were (unfortunately) unable to address. This is an interesting outlook for future research, in 
particular in the Dutch case where a minority-oriented party ‘DENK’ won two seats in the 
national elections of 2017.
This contribution has highlighted the relevance of both ethnic minority representation 
on national candidate lists and the role of political parties for ethnic minority representation 
in multi-party systems like the Netherlands. Parties’ issue positions matter, but their 
strategies to incorporate ethnic minorities may not always have the desired effects. 
Notes
1  The official publication of the candidate lists for the Dutch parliamentary 
elections of 2012 was used to get an overview of the candidates, see: https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2012-16691.html.
2  We asked the candidates four questions: ‘What is your date of birth?’, ‘Which country 
were you born in?’, ‘In which country was your father born?’, and ‘In which country was 
your mother born?’.
3  In 95% of the cases the same country of birth of the candidate was coded. The 
candidates’ father’s country of birth matched in 92% of the cases and the country of 
birth of the mother in 90% of the cases. When the three coders did not code the same 
country of birth, the most mentioned country of birth was chosen. 
4  The government collapsed on the 21 April 2012. The elections took place on the 21 
September and parties could submit candidate lists for these elections to the Electoral 
Council (Kiesraad) until the 31 July 2012.
5  Because the Dutch system is very proportional, this is likely to give a good indication of 
the expected number of seats each party could win.
6  As a robustness check the analyses were also run without the candidates of whom 
information about the year of birth is missing, this did not change the outcome of the 
hypotheses tests.
7  When ethnic minorities are part of the party board – the most influential people 
within the party – this could also affect ethnic minority representation on candidate 
lists. Therefore, we looked into ethnic representation in party boards but found little 
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variation in 2012. Only in two parties (PvdA and CDA) an ethnic minority member was 
part of the party board.
8 Additional robustness checks are presented in Appendix A.
9  This is calculated by dividing the % of ethnic minority MPs by the % ethnic minorities 
with Dutch citizenship in the population (Bloemraad, 2013). For 2012, this is 12/16.5=0.73 
for the general ethnic minority population and 9.3/11.8=0.79 for non-Western 
minorities.
10  The different party characteristics are probably related: whether a balanced candidate 
list is strived for is likely to depend on parties’ standpoints, especially in the case 
of ethnic minority representation. Furthermore, ethnic minority support within 
parties probably goes along with more positive issue positions on migration and 
integration. Moreover, we anticipate that in parties with positive views on migration 
and integration, exclusive selectorates are better able to create a balanced candidate 
list. However, based on Spearman rank correlations, we decided to only include 
restrictiveness in all interaction models rather than to include all party characteristics 
in one model (we found a correlation of -0.363 between restrictiveness and ethnic 
minority support and -0.383 between restrictiveness and inclusiveness; the correlation 
between ethnic minority support and inclusiveness was -0.162).
11  We also examined the effect of party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic 
minority candidates and on the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position. There is 
no significant interaction effect for party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic 
minority candidates, nor on the likelihood to be placed in a safe list position. See Tables 
A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A for more details.
12  In addition, multilevel models were estimated as a robustness check. Some of the 
effects do not reach significance once multilevel methods are applied. However, the 
effect sizes do not change substantially. See Appendix A for more details.
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part ii
The vote choice of 
ethnic minorities

chapter 3
Political representation and  
the vote choice of ethnic minorities  
in the Netherlands*
*This chapter is currently under review at an international journal. The chapter is co-
authored by Marcel Lubbers. The authors jointly developed the idea for this paper. Roos van 
der Zwan wrote most of the text and conducted the analysis. Marcel Lubbers contributed 
to the manuscript.
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3.1 | Introduction 
Voters of non-Western origin strongly support left-wing political parties in many Western 
countries. This is found over and again in empirical research describing the vote choice 
of ethnic minorities; for example, in the UK (Martin, 2016), France (Tiberj & Michon, 
2013), Germany (Schmidtke, 2016) and the Netherlands (Heelsum et al., 2016; Tillie, 1998). 
Scholars have considered several explanations for the vote choice of ethnic minorities 
(Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bird et al., 2011; Sanders et al., 2014; Tillie, 1998). 
These explanations mainly focus on the individual level in which socioeconomic position 
is considered one of the most relevant explanations for left-wing party support (Bergh 
& Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011). Studies on individual level explanations, 
however, often fail to combine individual level characteristics with the influence of party 
characteristics, which may be important for ethnic minority voters. Therefore, this study 
proposes the significance of ethnic minority group-relevant party level characteristics as 
explanations for ethnic minorities’ vote choice. 
This study aims to understand whether ethnic minorities’ vote choice depends on 
political parties’ substantive and descriptive representation. Substantive representation 
is about what is represented, the degree to which the interests of a specific group are 
represented (Pitkin, 1967; Ruedin, 2013b). While there are a variety of interpretations, this 
study considers the party standpoint on ethnic minority-specific interests as substantive 
representation.1 Descriptive representation is about who represents: the degree to which 
characteristics of the electorate are resembled by representatives (Bloemraad, 2013; 
Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967). 
Research on the influence of substantive and descriptive representation has often been 
examined with voter turnout as the outcome variable rather than vote choice (e.g. Fairdosi 
& Rogowski, 2015; Rocha, Tolbert, Bowen, & Clark, 2010; Washington, 2016). In previous 
research on vote choice, descriptive and substantive representation has received some 
attention (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Dawson, 1995; Martin, 
2016; Washington, 2016; Zingher & Farrer, 2014), though usually not simultaneously and 
not in competition with other explanations of ethnic minorities’ vote choice. Our research 
question is: 
 ‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining 
vote choice among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands?’
Scarcity of data in which ethnic minority groups are well represented often complicates the 
testing of explanations for the vote choice of ethnic minorities and constrains comparative 
research (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bloemraad, 2013; Saggar, 2000; Sobolewska, 2005). By 
combining four Dutch data sets, including respondents with ethnic minority backgrounds, 
we examine vote choice with a substantial number of ethnic minorities. Moreover, with 
these data we can separately test both classic and group-specific explanations for the 
vote choice of non-Western and Western ethnic minority groups. Like many European 
countries, the Netherlands has a proportional representation (PR) system. A distinct 
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feature is that the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities is relatively high in 
comparison with other Western countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Ruedin, 2013b; Van 
der Zwan, Lubbers, & Eisinga, 2018). Furthermore, since levels of descriptive representation 
of ethnic minorities vary considerably between political parties, the Dutch context offers 
an interesting site to investigate the role of substantive and descriptive representation in 
ethnic minorities’ vote choice. The vote choice of ethnic minorities has been studied quite 
elaborately for certain cities in the Netherlands, however, this study is one of the first to do 
so for national level elections (Heelsum et al., 2016; Teney et al., 2010; Tillie, 1998).
3.2 | Theoretical framework 
3.2.1 | Explaining vote choice
The literature on voting behaviour has provided a wide range of explanations for vote 
choice. Explanations include sociodemographic factors, party identification, policy issues, 
evaluation of party performance and campaigning strategies (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 
1957; Evans, 2000; Jansen, Evans, & De Graaf, 2013; Miller & Shanks, 1996). Sociological 
models consider voting as rooted in non-policy-issues, such as class, ethnicity or other 
sociodemographic factors (Adams et al., 2005; Miller & Shanks, 1996). In line with these 
sociological models, the strength of ethnic communities, their social capital and ethnic 
affinity voting have also been considered as explanations for ethnic minorities’ vote 
choice (Bird et al., 2016; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; McDermott, 1998; Michon & Vermeulen, 
2013; Tillie, 1998). Spatial models in the tradition of Downs (1957), on the other hand, 
argue that voters are rational and self-interested actors who try to maximise their utility 
at each election. They focus on issue salience and/or on the distance between the policy 
preferences of voters and parties (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Downs, 1957; Van der Brug, 
2004; Zingher & Farrer, 2014). 
This article contributes to the existing literature on ethnic voting by combining 
sociological and political models of vote choice. Theorising and testing for the role of 
substantive and descriptive representation simultaneously, we propose that ethnic 
minority status and the identification with that status matter in voting behaviour and 
we expect that vote choice is affected by what the parties offer with respect to ethnic 
minority-specific interests. However, we do so in relation to the socioeconomic position 
of ethnic minority voters and the political parties’ substantive economic position – as 
the economic perspective turned out to be highly relevant to understanding the voting 
behaviour of ethnic minorities (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Heath et al., 2013). 
3.2.2 | Substantive representation 
We examine two issue positions for political parties that we believe to be relevant in ethnic 
minorities’ vote choice. First, parties’ positions on socioeconomic issues are considered. 
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Voters’ socioeconomic position is a well-established explanation for vote choice and 
for ethnic minorities’ left-wing party support in particular (Bird et al., 2011; Elff, 2009; 
Evans, 2000; Jansen et al., 2011), but there is an ongoing discussion about the relevance 
of socioeconomic predictors in vote choice for ethnic minority voters (Bergh & Bjørklund, 
2011; Heath et al., 2011; Sanders et al., 2014). Indeed, social-democratic parties seem to be 
a sensible choice for ethnic minority voters because ethnic minorities more often have a 
lower socioeconomic status and those parties generally represent the interests of citizens 
in lower socioeconomic positions (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Knutsen, 2013; Marcos-
Marne, 2017; Messina, 2006; Saggar, 2000). Nevertheless, it remains unknown whether it 
is the parties’ actual issue position deemed relevant for ethnic minorities that affect their 
vote choice. Since many social-democratic parties have been bypassed in their economic 
left-wing position by socialist and green parties, which do not seem to profit as strongly 
as social-democratic parties from the ethnic vote, it is relevant to test for the role of 
parties’ positions. We test whether parties’ issue positions are a determinant for the vote 
choice of ethnic minorities. Given the existing literature on ethnic voting, however, we 
propose to do so in relation to individual voter characteristics. Following Downs (1957), we 
argue that ethnic minorities vote for parties with economic positions in accordance with 
their own socioeconomic position. In this study, we focus on a broad range of parties that 
ethnic minority voters can choose from. We expect that: For ethnic minorities in a lower 
socioeconomic position, the more a party’s programme is right-wing on economic issues, 
the less likely they will be to vote for that party; and for ethnic minorities in a higher 
socioeconomic position we anticipate the reverse outcome: The more a party is right-wing 
on economic issues, the higher the likelihood they will vote for that party (H1).
With our focus on substantive representation, our message is that ethnic minority 
voters may not only vote for parties because of their economic positions, but also because 
of their position on minority rights (Heath et al., 2011; Marcos-Marne, 2017; Messina, 
2006; Weldon, 2006). In the Netherlands, the social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA) has 
been the most popular party among ethnic minorities and it is one of the first parties 
that supported ethnic minorities within and outside the party since the 1980s (Ensel, 
2003). The first networks for ethnic minorities were established during those years and 
the first Member of Parliament (MP) of non-Western origin elected in 1984 was a Labour 
Party member. Moreover, in later years the Labour Party (PvdA) explicitly stated its support 
for a multicultural society (De Boer, Lucardie, Noomen, & Voerman, 1999). Recently, the 
Labour Party (PvdA) seems to have taken a less explicit multicultural position. It also 
lost its popularity among ethnic minorities and two of its Turkish origin members even 
left the party recently and founded a minority-oriented political party. Considering 
these developments, it is especially interesting to examine the influence of substantive 
representation on ethnic minorities’ vote choice. 
We expect that political parties that are more restrictive and represent ethnic minority 
interests to a lesser extent will be less likely to receive votes from ethnic minorities. 
Particularly, we expect to find this outcome among those who strongly identify with 
their ethnic minority group. Identification is relevant over and beyond ethnic minority 
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background since people do not always identify with their ethnic background and do 
not automatically share the same interests (Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Lee, 2008). 
Identification with an ethnic group is related to group consciousness and feelings of 
shared group interests. For those who do identify with an ethnic group, ethnic minority 
group interests may be more important than self-interests (Bird et al., 2011; Dancygier & 
Saunders, 2006; Dawson, 1995). Ethnic minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification 
may therefore cast a vote for the dominant party among the ethnic minority group out of 
group solidarity. In that case, group interests might be more important for vote choice than 
self-interests. We formulate the hypothesis that: The stronger the ethnic identification 
among ethnic minorities, the stronger the negative effect of restrictive parties’ positions 
on migration and integration issues on the vote choice of ethnic minorities (H2). 
3.2.3 | Descriptive representation 
In addition to substantive matters, the presence of ethnic minority candidates may be 
decisive for ethnic minority voters (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Bloemraad & 
Schönwälder, 2013; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016; Zingher & Farrer, 2014). Descriptive 
representation differs in that it is concerned less with substantive ideas and more with 
from whom a party’s ideas are delivered. In the literature on ethnic voting, it is argued 
that voters prefer candidates with whom they have shared characteristics such as ethnic 
background (Bird et al., 2016; McDermott, 2009). Hence, from this argument we derive that 
parties with ethnic minority candidates on their candidate list should be more popular 
among ethnic minority voters. There are several reasons why ethnic minority voters 
would prefer parties with ethnic minority candidates on the list. First, an ethnic minority 
candidate on a party’s candidate list is recognition of the ethnic minority group (Wolfinger, 
1965). Second, ethnic minority candidates share the same language and culture, and 
third, have a similar migration experience (Barreto, 2007). In addition, voters may expect 
that such parties, through their ethnic minority candidates, will better represent their 
interests (Landa et al., 1995). Overall, they share experiences and this may increase group 
consciousness (Bird et al., 2016; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013). Last, ethnic minority 
voters may be mobilised by candidates with the same ethnic background (Fisher et al., 
2015; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013). Because left-wing parties are more likely to nominate 
ethnic minority candidates it could be an additional explanation for the left-wing support 
among ethnic minority voters (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Landa et al., 1995; Marcos-Marne, 
2017; Sobolewska, 2005). 
We expect that the more ethnic minorities placed on a candidate list, the more 
appealing a party becomes for ethnic minority voters. However, in PR-systems like the 
Netherlands, the position on the candidate list may also be important (Marcinkiewicz, 
2014). An ethnic minority candidate placed at the top of the list is more appealing to voters 
than an ethnic minority candidate placed at the bottom of the list. Again, we expect that 
descriptive representation only matters when it is a salient issue for ethnic minority 
voters. Accordingly, this should specifically matter for those with strong levels of ethnic 
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identification (Kranendonk & Vermeulen, 2018; Lee, 2008). Summarising, we predict that: 
The stronger the ethnic identification among ethnic minorities, the stronger positive the 
effect of the percentage of ethnic minority candidates on a candidate list on vote choice 
(H3a) and the stronger positive the effect of the list position of ethnic minority candidates 
on a candidate list on vote choice (H3b).
3.3 | Data and measurements 
To study a substantial number of ethnic minorities with different ethnic backgrounds, 
four data sets were used to examine their vote choice. Moreover, the data sets combined 
provide sufficient variation to study specific vote choice, which is more informative than 
left-wing and right-wing party choice alone. The four data sets are: Migrants’ Welfare State 
Attitudes (MIFARE), the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse study (NELLS), the Immigrant 
Panel and Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM), and the Longitudinal Internet Studies for 
the Social Sciences (LISS; Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf, Kalmijn, 
Kraaykamp, & Monden, 2010b; Korte & Dagevos, 2011).2 We chose to combine different 
survey data sets because data sets with representative numbers of ethnic minority 
respondents are limited.
Combining different data sets has limitations and advantages. In our case, the 
limitations are that the surveys were collected in different ways at different time points: 
NELLS and SIM used face-to-face interviews, MIFARE offered the choice between paper 
or online questionnaires and LISS Immigrant Panel collected data with monthly online 
questionnaires. Moreover, the survey data were collected between 2009 and 2015. To 
consider the time aspect and the differences for each survey a control variable for the 
survey was included in the analyses. 
Despite these limitations, we are confident that the data sets we pooled are sufficiently 
similar to provide reliable outcomes. First, we focused on regularly used variables for 
which similar questions were used (sociodemographic variables, ethnic identification 
and vote choice). Second, all data sets paid specific attention to the sampling of minority 
groups. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents a comparison between the age and gender of 
ethnic minorities included in the merged data set and in Dutch register data.
The four surveys sampled different ethnic minority groups, which was one reason 
to use these particular surveys. The MIFARE data were collected among native Dutch 
and immigrants from the following ten countries: China, UK, Japan, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey and the United States. Only immigrants born in one of 
those countries and a resident until at least the age of 16 were sampled (aged 18 to 75; 
Bekhuis et al., 2018). We used the first wave of the NELLS data, which included respondents 
with a native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, Western and other non-Western background. 
Both first- and second-generation migrants aged 15 to 45 were sampled (De Graaf et al., 
2010). The SIM data included respondents originating from Turkey, Morocco, Suriname 
and the Dutch Antilles aged 15 years and older (Korte & Dagevos, 2011). Last, for the LISS 
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Immigrant Panel, respondents aged 15 and older with a native Dutch, Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese, Antillean, Indonesian, Western or other non-Western background were 
sampled. By combining these surveys we could test whether our hypotheses hold for 
broader groups of Western and non-Western ethnic minorities. Since the four surveys 
differ regarding the focus of ethnic origin groups, there are also some differences in the 
background characteristics for each survey. More detailed information and descriptive 
statistics for each survey are presented in Appendix B.
3.3.1 | Ethnic background
We aim to understand the role of substantive and descriptive representation among ethnic 
minority members. Hence, native Dutch and those with a missing value on ethnic minority 
background were excluded from the data. Ethnic minorities are not a homogenous group 
in the Netherlands and differ not only in ethnic background, but also possibly in interests 
and vote choice as well. We therefore distinguished between ethnic minorities with a non-
Western (reference category), Western and former colony background. We refer to Table B.4 
in Appendix B for the descriptive statistics of this variable. We also provide information on 
Moroccan and Turkish minorities, who are part of the non-Western group in the analyses, 
to present more detailed differences in the descriptive statistics. 
table 3.1 | Measurement of vote choice by data set
Survey Question Parties (abbreviations)a
MIFARE Regardless of whether you are allowed to vote in the Nether-
lands, for which party would you vote if the Dutch national 
elections (Tweede Kamerverkiezingen) were held next week?
Socialist Party (SP)
GreenLeft (GL)
Labour Party (PvdA)
Party for Freedom (PVV)
Democrats 66 (D66)
Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA)
People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy (VVD)
NELLS Which political party do you prefer? 
SIM (If you were allowed to vote) Which party would you vote for?
LISS For which party would you vote if the Dutch national elections 
would be held today?
Note: a Parties from economically left to right; scale based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, & Degen, 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
3.3.2 | Vote choice
Respondents were asked which party they would vote for to measure vote choice. The 
questions differed slightly for each survey (see Table 3.1). Despite the differences they all 
measured vote intentions rather than, for example, actual voting behaviour.3 The following 
parties were included (from economic left-wing to right-wing): The Socialist Party (SP), the 
Green party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the anti-immigrant party PVV, the social-liberal 
D66, the Christian Democratic CDA and the liberal economic right-wing VVD. Because we 
were specifically interested in party choice and the role of party characteristics (regardless 
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of whether the respondents are allowed to vote), we excluded those with a missing value 
on the dependent variable (N=257) and those respondents who answered other, won’t vote 
or don’t know (N=3888).4 
3.3.3 | Individual-specific variables 
In all surveys ethnic identification was measured with a similar item. The exact wording 
of the questions is presented in Table B.6 in Appendix B. The items were standardised 
and then merged into one variable. A higher score on this variable indicates stronger 
identification with the ethnic minority group. 
Income, employment status and educational level were used to measure 
socioeconomic status. First, income was measured as the monthly net household 
income and included six categories: less than €999, €1000-1999, €2000-2499, €2500-
2999 and more than €3000 a month. To measure employment status a distinction was 
made between students and between employed (reference category) and unemployed 
respondents. Respondents’ highest educational level was measured in six categories 
ranging from no education to university degree. Degrees attained abroad were recoded 
into a comparable degree in the Dutch educational system. Income and educational level 
were included as interval variables and were both centred on the mean.
Gender and age were included as individual-level control variables. Age was included 
in five-year categories in the SIM data, therefore, the age variable in the other surveys was 
coded in a similar manner. This resulted in twelve categories, which are included as an 
interval variable in the analyses.
3.3.4 | Substantive representation
This study operationalises parties’ issue positions as substantive representation. To 
measure parties’ positions on economic issues and migration and integration issues, the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey was used (Bakker et al., 2015).5 Experts on Dutch politics were 
asked to rate the position of political parties on the economic left-right scale (ranging 
from very left (0) to very right (10)). Furthermore, they were asked to rate each party’s 
position on immigration policy, the integration of immigrants and asylum seekers and the 
position towards ethnic minorities. These scales ranged from strongly positive (0) about 
immigration, integration or ethnic minorities to strongly negative (10). To measure the 
party positions on ethnic minorities’ non-economic interests, we used a scale with the 
average score on the three variables on immigration, integration and ethnic minorities 
(Cronbach’s alpha was 0.982). For the NELLS, SIM and LISS data, experts’ opinions from 
2010 were used and for the MIFARE, the opinions from 2014 were used. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
show parties’ issue positions. 
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figure 3.1 | Party positions on economic issues
Source: Bakker et al., 2015.
figure 3.2 | Party positions on migration and integration issues
Source: Bakker et al., 2015.
3.3.5 | Descriptive representation
To measure descriptive representation, we collected data from the Dutch parliamentary 
elections of 2010 and 2012 (Van der Zwan, 2017). We collected information for all candidates 
on each of the seven party’s candidate list, details on the data collection can be found in 
Appendix B. For each of these parties we have information about the number of ethnic 
minority candidates on their list and their list position. We followed the definition of 
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Statistics Netherlands for ethnic minority background: those who were born abroad and 
for whom at least one parent was born abroad were considered an ethnic minority; and 
everyone born in the Netherlands but for whom at least one parent was born abroad. For 
each ethnic group (Moroccan, Turkish, other non-Western, Western, former colonies) we 
calculated the share of minorities for the total candidate list of each party. 
figure 3.3 | Share of ethnic minority candidates on the list, by party
Source: Van der Zwan, 2017
figure 3.4 | Mean relative list position ethnic minority candidates, by party
 
Source: Van der Zwan, 2017
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We measured the position of ethnic minority candidates on the list as the mean relative 
list position of ethnic minority candidates for each party. First, the individual relative list 
position was calculated as T-P where T stands for the total number of positions available 
on a candidate list and P for the position of a candidate on the list. Each candidate was 
given a value between 0 to 1 where 0 is the lowest position on the candidate list and 1 is 
the highest position on the list (party leader). Next, for each party the mean relative list 
position for ethnic minority candidates from each ethnic minority group was calculated. 
To get an idea of the descriptive representation, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the share of all 
ethnic minority candidates and the mean relative list positions of all ethnic minority 
candidates for each party.
3.3.6 | Missing values 
Our merged data set included 5,557 respondents of which 1,563 had missing values. We 
excluded respondents with invalid values on gender and age (1%). Multiple imputation 
was used for the missing data on variables with higher levels of missing values, which 
were: income (16.1%), educational level (3.4%), employment status (3.5%) and ethnic 
identification (7.1%). In total, 1,508 missing values were imputed, which left a total of 
5,502 respondents. Multiple imputation is known as a reliable method to manage missing 
data and to reduce bias to a larger extent than when respondents with missing values are 
simply deleted (see: Allison, 2000; Lall, 2016; Rubin, 1996). Appendix B shows descriptive 
statistics.
3.4 | Results
3.4.1 | Analytical strategy
This study investigates what determines party choice. More specifically, it investigates the 
influence of substantive and descriptive representation, which are party characteristics, 
on party choice of ethnic minorities. Moreover, we study whether the influence of party 
characteristics is dependent on voter characteristics. In order to study the influence 
of both voter and party characteristics, we use discrete choice models, which are an 
extension of multinomial logit models and also referred to as conditional logit models. 
With multinomial logit models, it is only possible to examine the influence of voter 
characteristics on party choice. However, we are particularly interested in the influence 
of party characteristics. Therefore, we use conditional logit regression analyses, which 
allows us to measure the influence of both voter characteristics and party characteristics 
on party choice (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998).6 
Similar to other multinomial logit models, conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis 
is a model with nominal outcomes. In this study, these outcomes are party choices and we 
include characteristics of these party choices. These dependent variable characteristics 
T-1
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are referred to as alternative-specific variables and are used to predict the outcome that 
is chosen (Long & Freese, 2006). The data are prepared in a long format, which means that 
for each individual respondent in the data there is a row for each party. With seven parties 
of interest here, this results in (5,502*7=) 38,514 observations in the analyses. Due to the 
data structure, all voter characteristics must be estimated for each party separately. For 
instance, CL models estimate the effects of a voters’ income on the choice for the Christian 
Democrats (CDA), Socialist Party (SP) and all the other parties. These so-called individual-
specific effects are all relative to the reference category, which is the Labour Party (PvdA). 
In this contribution, CL models estimate the log-odds (and odds ratios) for the different 
party choices. 
The CL models are run separately for non-Western and Western minorities. Although 
we do not have specific expectations about differences between ethnic groups, it is quite 
possible that the results differ for non-Western and Western minorities. Tables 3.2 and 
3.3 show the results for the individual-specific variables, i.e. the voter characteristics. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the effects for alternative-specific variables, i.e. the party 
characteristics and the extent to which the influence of the alternative-specific variables 
depends on individual-specific variables. We start with some descriptive statistics before 
we continue with the multivariate analysis. 
figure 3.5 | Vote share by party and ethnic group
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
3.4.2 | Descriptive statistics
Figure 3.5 shows which parties the respondents intend to vote for by ethnic group. In both 
2010 and 2012 elections, the economically right-wing Liberal Party (VVD) and the Labour 
Party (PvdA) won the most seats. Clearly, among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands 
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the Labour Party (PvdA) is more popular than the Liberal Party (VVD). Almost half the 
respondents would vote for this party. The economically most left-wing parties (SP, GL) and 
the social-liberal D66 are also popular among ethnic minority voters. More economically 
right-wing parties, such as CDA and VVD, are especially popular among those with another 
non-Western (i.e. other than Turkish, Moroccan or former colony background) and Western 
ethnic background.
3.4.3 | Multivariate analyses
Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the logits and odds ratios (OR) estimations. The results 
in the null model (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) are in line with what one would expect. Most of the 
alternative-specific constants (ASCs) are negative and significant, indicating that ethnic 
minorities from non-Western and Western origin prefer the Labour Party (PvdA) over 
most other parties. Only for ethnic minorities of Western origin do we find no significant 
differences between a choice for the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Liberal Party (VVD) and 
the Green Party (GL). Furthermore, looking at the control variables in Table 3.2, we point 
here to the finding that ethnic minorities with a former colony background are generally 
more likely to vote for parties other than the Labour Party (PvdA) in comparison with other 
non-Western minorities. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also show that among ethnic minorities one unit increase in income 
significantly increases the odds to vote for the liberal and economically right-wing 
parties VVD or D66 in comparison with the Labour Party (PvdA). Regarding educational 
level, the results show for each contrast positive and significant effects except for the 
anti-immigrant party PVV. Moreover, there are no significant differences for the Christian 
Democrats (CDA) and Socialist Party (SP) in comparison with the Labour Party (PvdA) for 
Western minorities. This result means that for all other parties, when the educational level 
of ethnic minorities increases by one unit, the odds of voting for that party in comparison 
with the in Labour Party (PvdA) increases (holding everything else constant). Overall, we 
can conclude that ethnic minorities with a lower socioeconomic status (lower income 
and educational level) are more likely to vote for the Labour Party (PvdA) when compared 
with other parties, which is in line with previous research. The null model also includes 
the effects of ethnic identification.7 Among non-Western minorities, we find that the 
more these minorities identify with their own ethnic group, the odds to vote for a party 
relative to the Labour Party (PvdA) are smaller. We find this relation for all parties except 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) and the Green Party (GL). For the anti-immigrant 
party (PVV) and the Liberal Party (VVD) when compared with the Labour Party (PvdA), we 
find the strongest effects. Hence, even when considering socioeconomic status, ethnic 
identification seems to be an important predictor for voting for the Labour Party (PvdA) 
among non-Western minorities, but not among Western minorities.  
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Table 3.4 presents the effects of substantive and descriptive representation on the vote 
choice of non-Western minorities. Regarding parties’ economic issue positions, the main 
effect is negative and significant (b=-0.262), indicating that the more economically rightist 
views a party has, the less likely non-Western minorities vote for such parties (effect not 
shown, presented in Table B.7 in Appendix B). In order to test if ethnic minority voters vote 
for parties with an economic issue position that aligns with their own socioeconomic 
position, we include interactions between party and voter characteristics. Model 1 shows 
the interaction effect between parties’ positions on economic issues and voters’ income. 
The results in Model 1 show that the extent to which the influence of parties’ economic 
issue positions depends on non-Western minorities’ income and is positive and significant 
(b=0.096). At the highest level of income, the predicted effect is (-0.262+2.232*0.096=)-
0.047 and at the lowest income level the effect is (-0.262+-1.768*0.096=)-0.432. Thus, 
the effect of right-wing party economics issue positions on vote choice is more strongly 
negative for those with the lowest incomes. Even though we do not clearly find among 
minorities with the highest income that the likelihood increases to vote for a party with 
a more economic right-wing issue positions (the effect was predicted to be positive for 
those with the highest socioeconomic position), the results are in line with Hypothesis 1. 
In addition to income, we expected that the influence of parties’ economic issue 
positions would depend on voters’ employment status and educational level. Even 
though the main effect of economic standpoints remains significant, the effects of 
economic standpoints and employment status and educational level are not significant. 
These effects are therefore not included in Table 3.4, but they can be found in Table B.8 in 
Appendix B. 
For Western minorities, the results in Table 3.5 do not show a significant effect of 
parties’ economic issue positions on vote choice, neither do we find significant interaction 
effects between economic standpoints and income, employment status or educational 
level. The effects of parties’ economic positions and employment status and educational 
level can be found in Table B.9 in Appendix B. Overall, we find support for Hypothesis 1 on 
the role of parties’ economic standpoints in vote choice conditioned by socioeconomic 
position only for non-Western minorities’ income.
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table 3.4 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice among non-Western minorities; 
substantive and descriptive representation 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Alternative-specific variables B OR B OR B OR B OR
Economic issue positions 
(L-R)a
-0.262*** 0.770***
(0.029) (0.022)
Economic pos. x Income 0.096** 1.101**
(0.048) (0.053)
Migration issue positions 
(P-R)b
-0.280*** 0.755***
(0.029) (0.022)
Migration pos. x Ethnic identifica-
tion (EI)
-0.166 0.847
(0.137) (0.116)
% Ethnic minority candidates by 
group
0.049*** 1.051***
(0.008) (0.008)
% Ethnic minority candidates by 
group x EI
0.008 1.008
(0.008) (0.008)
List position ethnic minority 
candidates by group
0.610*** 1.840***
(0.111) (0.204)
List position ethnic minority
candidates by group x EI
0.034 1.035
(0.087) (0.090)
Individual-specific variables
Income_CDA 0.067 1.069
(0.061) (0.065)
Income_SP 0.029 1.029
(0.045) (0.047)
Income_VVD 0.298*** 1.348***
(0.055) (0.074)
Income_PVV 0.115* 1.122*
(0.064) (0.072)
Income_GL 0.023 1.024
(0.049) (0.050)
Income_D66 0.172*** 1.188***
(0.047) (0.056)
Ethnic identification_CDA 0.224 1.251 -0.043 0.958 -0.072 0.931
(0.266) (0.333) (0.078) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067)
Ethnic identification_SP -0.069 0.933 -0.144** 0.866** -0.158*** 0.854***
(0.104) (0.097) (0.059) (0.051) (0.054) (0.046)
Ethnic identification_VVD 0.166 1.181 -0.256*** 0.774*** -0.284*** 0.753***
(0.404) (0.477) (0.074) (0.057) (0.067) (0.050)
Ethnic identification_PVV 0.593 1.809 -0.203** 0.816** -0.228*** 0.796***
(0.722) (1.307) (0.084) (0.069) (0.079) (0.063)
Ethnic identification_GL -0.501 0.606 -0.079 0.924 -0.072 0.930
(0.346) (0.210) (0.058) (0.054) (0.059) (0.057)
Ethnic identification_D66 -0.506** 0.603** -0.182*** 0.833*** -0.208*** 0.813***
(0.241) (0.145) (0.065) (0.054) (0.063) (0.052)
N 31,815
Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, ethnic identification, ethnic background, age, gender, and survey are 
included, for clarity, only the variables included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models can be found in Table 
B.8 in Appendix B. a Left-Right b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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table 3.5 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice of Western minorities; substantive and 
descriptive representation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Alternative-specific variables B OR B OR B OR B OR
Economic issue positions (L-R)a -0.032 0.968
(0.064) (0.062)
Economic pos. x Income -0.002 0.998
(0.065) (0.064)
Migration issue positions (P-R)b -0.087 0.917
(0.061) (0.056)
Migration pos. x Ethnic 
identification (EI)
0.264 1.302
(0.187) (0.244)
% Ethnic minority candidates 
by group
0.299*** 1.349***
(0.088) (0.118)
% Ethnic minority candidates
 by group x EI
0.064* 1.066*
(0.034) (0.036)
List position ethnic minority 
candidates by group
1.149** 3.156**
(0.495) (1.563)
List position ethnic minority 
candidates by group x EI
0.118 1.126
(0.176) (0.198)
Individual-specific variables
Income_CDA -0.034 0.966
(0.215) (0.208)
Income_SP -0.162 0.851
(0.185) (0.157)
Income_VVD 0.207 1.230
(0.317) (0.390)
Income_PVV -0.091 0.913
(0.113) (0.103)
Income_GL 0.076 1.079
(0.107) (0.115)
Income_D66 0.309* 1.363*
(0.182) (0.249)
Ethnic identification_CDA -0.420 0.657 0.121 1.129 0.148 1.160
(0.397) (0.261) (0.144) (0.162) (0.170) (0.197)
Ethnic identification_SP -0.228 0.796 -0.0564 0.945 -0.080 0.924
(0.144) (0.115) (0.123) (0.117) (0.134) (0.124)
Ethnic identification_VVD -0.827 0.437 -0.199* 0.819* -0.070 0.932
(0.524) (0.229) (0.117) (0.096) (0.136) (0.127)
Ethnic identification_PVV -1.586 0.205 -0.145 0.865 -0.106 0.899
(1.020) (0.209) (0.116) (0.100) (0.148) (0.133)
Ethnic identification_GL 0.710 2.033 -0.0156 0.984 0.048 1.049
(0.511) (1.039) (0.117) (0.115) (0.138) (0.145)
Ethnic identification_D66 0.535 1.708 0.0178 1.018 0.039 1.039
(0.363) (0.621) (0.112) (0.114) (0.112) (0.116)
N 6,699
Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, ethnic identification, ethnic background, age, gender, and survey are 
included, for clarity, only the variables included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models can be found in 
Table B.9 in Appendix B. a Left-Right b Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.
chapter 3
82
The second hypothesis on substantive representation focused on parties’ positions 
on migration and integration. The main effect of parties’ positions on these issues for 
non-Western minorities is negative and significant (b=-0.281; see Table B.7 in Appendix 
B), implying that a party’s more restrictive immigration position declines the likelihood 
that ethnic minorities vote for such a party. Hypothesis 2 states that for ethnic minorities 
with higher levels of ethnic identification, the effect of parties’ restrictive standpoints 
on migration and integration on vote choice is more strongly negative than for those 
with lower levels of ethnic identification. In Model 2 in Table 3.4, the interaction between 
parties’ migration and integration standpoints and the level of ethnic identification 
among non-Western minorities are included. However, the main effect does not interact 
significantly with ethnic identification.8 
For Western minorities, the main effect of parties’ positions on migration and 
integration is not significant. Neither do we find significant interaction effects between 
parties’ standpoints on these issues and ethnic identification among Western minorities 
in Table 3.5. For this group, parties’ substantive issues on migration and integration do 
not seem to affect their vote choice. Our third hypothesis is refuted. For non-Western 
minorities, this result is mainly caused by the Labour Party (PvdA) taking a centre-position 
on the migration and integration issues. 
The last hypotheses predicted that descriptive representation affects the vote choice 
of ethnic minorities. For non-Western minorities, the main effect shows that the higher 
the percentage of ethnic minority candidates of the ethnic group on a parties’ candidate 
list, the higher the likelihood to vote for that party (b=0.051; Table B.7 in Appendix B). In 
Model 4 in Table 3.4, the interaction between parties’ share of ethnic minority candidates 
with voters’ level of ethnic identification is not significant. For Western minorities, the 
main effect of descriptive representation on vote choice is positive and significant as well 
(b=0.291; Table B.7 in Appendix B). Moreover, Model 3 in Table 3.5 shows that for this group 
the interaction between descriptive representation and ethnic identification is positive 
and significant (b=0.064). This finding means that a higher percentage of ethnic minority 
candidates of an ethnic group on the list increases the likelihood to vote for that party. 
For those with higher levels of ethnic identification, this effect on vote choice is more 
strongly positive than for those with lower levels of ethnic identification, which is in line 
with our expectation. Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 3a for Western but not for 
non-Western minorities. 
Last, we tested the influence of the list position of ethnic minority candidates on 
vote choice. The main effect of list position is positive and significant for non-Western 
minorities (b=0.611; Table B.7 in Appendix B). This effect suggests that the higher the 
relative list position of ethnic minority candidates, the more likely ethnic minorities would 
vote for that party. Moreover, we expected that this effect would be more strongly positive 
for those with high levels of ethnic identification. In Model 4, we do not find a significant 
interaction effect with ethnic identification for non-Western minorities. For Western 
minorities, the main effect is also positive and significant (b=1.139; Table B.7 in Appendix 
B). However, Model 4 in Table 3.5 shows that the interaction with ethnic identification is 
not significant for Western minorities. Hence, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3b.
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3.4.4 | Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we repeated all analyses for each data set separately (except for the 
LISS because the number of respondents was too low). We ran separate analyses for non-
Western minorities, since only for non-Western minorities there was enough variation to 
do so. The effects for the individual-specific variables (Model 0; see Table B.11 in Appendix 
B) do not differ substantially. Regarding the alternative-specific interactions, we find that 
the effects in the NELLS and SIM models are similar to the effects in the general model 
(see Tables B.12–B.14 in Appendix B). An interesting finding is that for the NELLS models, 
unemployed voters are significantly less likely to vote for parties with issue positions 
that are economically more right-wing. For both the NELLS and the SIM models lower 
educated voters are significantly less likely to vote for parties with issue positions that 
are economically more right-wing. This finding for the NELLS and SIM models, which 
includes mainly Moroccan, Turkish and former colony minorities, is consistent with our 
first hypothesis. 
Whereas the findings on parties’ migration standpoints and its interaction with 
voters’ level of ethnic identification are robust across the data sets, the findings on 
descriptive representation slightly differ. The NELLS model on descriptive representation 
shows support for Hypothesis 3a that the stronger the ethnic identification among ethnic 
minorities, the stronger positive the effect of the percentage of ethnic minority candidates 
on a candidate list on vote choice. In the MIFARE model the interaction effect is not 
significant whereas it is negative and significant in the SIM model. The differences may be 
explained by the differences between the ethnic origin groups included in the data sets. 
This robustness check suggests that Hypothesis 3a holds in particular among Turkish and 
Moroccan minorities. Overall, the effects in the MIFARE models are somewhat different 
and reach significance less often. This makes sense since the MIFARE data includes non-
Western groups hardly studied before. A closer look at the political behaviour of these 
groups (e.g. Japanese, Chinese and Filipinos) shows that different mechanisms may be at 
work here and that lumping together ethnic minorities irrespective of their background is 
problematic. 
3.5 | Conclusion and discussion 
This study examined the extent to which substantive and descriptive representation play 
a role in explaining the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Contributing to the literature 
on ethnic voting, we were the first to test the influence of parties’ substantive and 
descriptive representation in relation to voters’ socioeconomic position and their ethnic 
identification. 
In line with earlier findings, we find strong support for the Labour Party (PvdA) among 
ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, we also want to stress that the large support for left-
wing parties was not found among all ethnic groups. There is variation among Western 
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minorities some of whom lean towards the Labour Party (PvdA) whereas others are 
supportive of (centre-)right parties. 
The main aim of this study was to explain vote choice and we have shown that both 
substantive and descriptive representation are determinants of ethnic minorities’ vote 
choice. Moreover, how these party characteristics influence vote choice differs between non-
Western and Western minorities. First, political parties more right-wing on economic issues 
and more restrictive on minority rights are less popular among non-Western minorities 
whereas parties with a higher share of ethnic minority candidates and parties with ethnic 
minority candidates with higher positions on the candidate list are more popular among 
this group. Furthermore, non-Western minorities with higher incomes are more likely to 
vote for parties more right-wing on economics, which is in line with rational choice theories 
of voting. However, we do not find more evidence that the influence of either substantive or 
descriptive representation depends on non-Western voters’ ethnic identification. 
Second, for Western minorities, substantive representation does not seem to play a 
one-directional role in their vote choice, but descriptive representation is relevant among 
this group. Parties’ share of Western origin candidates increases the likelihood of receiving 
a vote from minorities with a Western background. We also found evidence that the 
representation of ethnic minority members matters more for Western minorities who 
identify stronger with their ethnic group. The importance of ethnic identification for vote 
choice, also in relation to descriptive representation, is in line with Lee’s (2008) idea that 
only an ethnic background is not enough for shared political interests.
An overarching finding is that even though the Labour Party (PvdA) is not the most 
left-wing party on economics nor the most permissive party on migration and integration 
issues most ethnic minorities prefer this party. A possible explanation is that it is not so 
much substantive representation that affects the vote choice of ethnic minorities, but 
that the norm among ethnic minority groups to vote for a certain party or the historical 
connections with that party are important. 
In the past, the Labour Party (PvdA) explicitly stated support for the multicultural 
society and it has supported ethnic minorities, those of non-Western origin in particular, 
since the 1980s (Ensel, 2003). Although difficult to prove, historical ties between ethnic 
communities and specific parties may be the missing piece of the puzzle in explaining the 
vote choice of ethnic minorities. Since ethnic communities have proven to be important 
in ethnic minorities’ political participation at the local level in the Netherlands, it would 
be interesting to study their influence on vote choice at the national level. At the same 
time, the Labour Party’s possible shift to a more centrist position on the substantive 
representation scale, may have opened opportunities for ethnic minority-specific 
interest parties. That the association we found between substantive representation and 
vote choice was not moderated by ethnic identification is a possible indicator of ethnic 
minorities becoming dissatisfied with their representation by the Labour Party (PvdA) and 
contributing to the rise of parties like DENK in the Netherlands.
The relevance of substantive and descriptive representation in the vote choice of ethnic 
minorities has been found in the Dutch PR-system. Many other Western countries have a 
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PR-system, and we may expect to find similar results in these countries. Nevertheless, the 
results may be less easy to generalise to countries with a majoritarian system. Particularly, 
the influence of descriptive representation might be different in systems with a first-past-
the-post system. Rather than the share of ethnic minority candidates at the party level, 
the ethnic background of candidates in the districts in which ethnic minorities live, might 
play a larger role. Future studies on the current topic are therefore recommended. 
Many unanswered questions remain about the vote choice of ethnic minorities, partly 
due to a scarcity of data. Because of this scarcity, we combined different data sources. 
Although we empirically controlled for the survey and therefore for all differences 
between these data sets, we acknowledge that pooling of different data sets is not the 
ideal method. Nevertheless, our approach provided the opportunity to include more and 
strongly differing ethnic minority groups and this study highlights why ethnic minorities 
cannot be considered as a homogenous group: Not all ethnic minorities support left-
wing parties. Moreover, our analyses show that the effects of substantive and descriptive 
representation on vote choice varies between Western and non-Western minorities. This 
study also illustrates that a further study on a broad range of ethnic minorities is needed 
to better test the political model and to move beyond socioeconomic disadvantaged 
ethnic minorities. Larger scale data should address the more detailed country of origin 
dependency of these explanations.
This study contributed to the field by testing for the role of substantive and descriptive 
representation together with and in relation to socioeconomic position and ethnic 
identification in ethnic minorities’ vote choice. The findings of this study suggest that 
parties that want to attract ethnic minority voters would do well to pay attention to ethnic 
minorities’ substantive interests as well as to nominate candidates with varying ethnic 
origins. 
Notes 
1  We do not claim that parties’ issue positions exactly match with what parties do once in 
government. It is nevertheless a good indication of voters’ perceptions of parties’ issue 
positions. Moreover, it is an indication of the extent to which parties are concerned 
with the interests of the ethnic minority electorate (Chaney, 2015; Heath et al., 2013).
2  In this paper we make use of data of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social 
Sciences (LISS) panel administered by CentErdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). 
More information about the LISS panel can be found at: www.lissdata.nl. 
3  Minorities with a Turkish background were included in all four surveys. We examined 
whether the party choice of Turkish minorities differed between the surveys. Although 
party choice is not completely similar between the surveys, the order of the preferred 
parties is comparable (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B).
4  In each survey, approximately 30% of the respondent answered other, won’t vote 
or don’t know except for the MIFARE data in which almost 59% of the respondents 
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are in this category. Most of the MIFARE respondents stated they don’t know what 
they would vote for. An explanation for this large proportion may be that only first-
generation migrants were interviewed. For all surveys, first generation migrants were 
more likely to report other, won’t vote or don’t know than the second generation.
5  We also considered the Manifesto Project Dataset. However, the placement of the 
parties on several economic left-right scales and a migration and integration scale 
did not correspond to existing insights on Dutch political parties. For instance, on one 
of the left-right economics scales, the PVV was the most right-wing party while it is 
generally known to be a more leftist economic-oriented party.
6  The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-assumption) has to 
be met in order to use CL models. The Hausman test showed that the IIA-assumption 
was violated. Nevertheless, we choose to use CL models because in studies on voter 
choice the IIA assumption is not notably relevant nor restrictive (Dow & Endersby, 
2004). Moreover, several studies have shown that the results of CL models are very 
comparable to models that relax the IIA assumption (Cushing & Cushing, 2007; 
Dahlberg & Eklöf, 2003; Train, 2003).
7  Although ethnic identification may function as a mediator, estimations showed that 
the inclusion of ethnic identification did not significantly alter the other estimates. 
Therefore, we decided to present the model including ethnic identification.
8  Bivariate associations show a slightly negative association between parties’ positions 
on migration and integration and vote share. Ad hoc, we therefore included a quadratic 
term of migration and integration standpoints. This robustness check, presented in 
Table B.10 in Appendix B, shows that the interaction term between the quadratic term 
of parties’ positions on migration and integration issues and ethnic identification is 
significant. This implies that the influence of parties’ migration and integration issue 
positions is more strongly negative for non-Western minorities with higher levels of 
ethnic identification.
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4.1 | Introduction 
Canada is known as a multicultural society that warmly embraces immigration and 
ethnic diversity (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010) and where the inclusion of newcomers into 
citizenship and political representation has been successful (Bloemraad, 2013; Howe, 
2007). Indeed, Canada is one of the few Western countries in which parliament fully 
reflects the diverse ethnic identities of its population (Adams, 2008; Adams & Griffith, 
2017). While no federal party takes the support of ethnocultural minorities for granted, it is 
nevertheless clear that the centrist Liberal Party has consistently been the party of choice 
among visible minority voters in Canada (White, 2017). This is a distinctive dynamic, as 
minorities in other Western countries tend to support left-wing political parties (Heelsum 
et al., 2016; Martin, 2016; Schmidtke, 2016; Tiberj & Michon, 2013). This raises questions 
about the determinants of visible minorities’ vote choice in Canada and the extent to 
which this can be explained by minority group-specific explanations. In this article, we 
specifically study the influence of parties’ substantive and descriptive representation on 
visible minorities’ vote choice. We use the term ‘visible minorities’ here since this is the 
term is most commonly used in Canadian scientific and public contexts, referring to non-
Aboriginal people who are non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour.1
There are several differences between Canada and other Western countries that make 
Canada an interesting case to study visible minorities’ vote choice. First, immigration and 
integration are not especially controversial topics in national political debates in Canada 
(Black & Hicks, 2008; Marwah et al., 2013). Whereas many countries have anti-immigration 
parties as well as parties with more permissive views on immigration, Canadian parties do 
not differ considerably in their views on immigration (Ambrose & Mudde, 2015; Marwah et 
al., 2013). Previous studies suggest that specific interests on immigration and integration 
cannot explain the strong support for the Liberal Party (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2010; Blais, 2005; 
White, 2017). Nonetheless, other substantive issues in the party platform may affect vote 
choice, such as economic and social issues (Heath et al., 2011; Messina, 2006). Therefore, we 
test the role of a broader range of parties’ issue positions on visible minorities’ vote choice. 
Second, Canada is known for its relatively high level of visible minority representation 
in parliament (Bloemraad, 2013). It seems that the first-past-the-post system in Canada, 
combined with the specific regions where visible minorities settle, make the minority vote 
influential. Additionally, it is relatively easy for newcomers to gain citizenship and thus to 
gain voting rights (Bird, 2005). These factors ensure that political parties cannot neglect 
visible minority voters (Marwah et al., 2013), which could explain the high level of visible 
minority representation; however, what role descriptive representation actually plays in 
visible minorities’ vote choice is unknown. For this reason, we study how the number of 
minority candidates in each party affects the likelihood to vote for that party. 
This study contributes to the literature by testing the effects of both substantive and 
descriptive representation simultaneously on visible minorities’ vote choice. Pitkin (1967) 
famously distinguishes between substantive ‘acting for’ representation, which means 
acting on behalf of and looking after the specific interests of the groups one represents, 
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and descriptive ‘standing for’ representation, which considers whether an assembly 
of representatives resembles, in microcosm, the demographic characteristics of the 
society it aims to represent. Importantly, we also argue that the effect of substantive and 
descriptive representation on minority vote choice may differ between visible minorities, 
depending on their own positions on these issues. Our research question is: 
 ‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining 
vote choice among visible minorities in Canada?’
4.2 | Canada’s political system and political parties
Before outlining our theoretical framework, study design, and findings, a brief discussion 
of the context of the Canadian federal electoral and party system is in order. Canada 
uses the first-past-the-post, single member plurality (SMP) electoral system for national 
elections. This means that all parties can nominate one candidate in each electoral district 
(or ‘riding’), with the candidate with the most votes in a riding winning a seat in the House 
of Commons. In each of the eight federal elections held between 1993 and 2015, between 
295 to 338 ridings were contested.2
Yet in defiance of Duverger’s Law, which predicts that SMP systems will tend to 
produce two and only two parties, Canada has had a multi-party system since at least 
the 1930s, with various incarnations over that time (Carty et al., 2000; Johnston 2018). The 
point of departure of our study, the 1993 election, marked the introduction of Canada’s 
fourth party system. In that election, the prevailing ‘two-plus’ party system, comprised 
of the historically dominant Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives (PC), and the New 
Democratic Party (NDP), collapsed. Two newer regional parties, Reform and the Bloc 
Québecois, each won over 50 seats. While the Liberal Party formed the government, 
the PC Party lost more than half its vote share from 1988 and all but two of its 156 seats, 
with the sovereignist Bloc forming the official opposition. The period following the 1993 
election saw the Canadian Alliance Party succeed Reform (in 2000) and later merge with 
the remnants of the PC Party (in 2003) to form the new Conservative Party of Canada 
(CPC). This system remained relatively stable through the 2015 federal elections, with four 
national parties (the Liberals, the CPC, the NDP, and the Green Party of Canada) running 
candidates in all electoral districts, with the Bloc only contesting seats in Quebec. In this 
study, we focus on the largest parties: the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the NDP.
4.3 | Theoretical framework  
4.3.1 | Explaining vote choice
Existing literature on the vote choice of visible minorities often uses similar models as 
those used to explain the vote choice of the general population (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & 
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Bjørklund, 2011; Sanders et al., 2014). Some explanations are based on sociological models, 
which focus on explanations such as socio-demographic factors, party identification, 
policy issues, and campaigning strategies (Adams et al., 2005; Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000; 
Miller & Shanks, 1996), while others are based on rational choice models, which consider 
voters as rational and self-interested actors (Downs, 1957). We combine propositions from 
both sociological and rational choice models and argue that voters are rational actors but 
that their vote choice depends on the representation of the interests of the social group(s) 
to which they belong (Andersen & Heath, 2000). People often belong to different social 
groups, and this may explain why voters vote for a certain party, even when this party does 
not represent their self-interests. 
4.3.2 | Substantive representation 
Given the complexity of the visible minority population in Canada, we are sensitive to the 
diversity of opinion among that community – whether on ‘mainstream’ economic issues 
such as taxation and social spending, on social issues concerning women’s and gay rights, 
or on more immigrant- or minority-specific issues. Our study therefore examines the 
extent to which these issue positions matter for visible minorities’ vote choice and how 
important issue alignment between party and voter is for predicting their party choice.
The first aspect of substantive representation under study is the influence of parties’ 
positions on economic issues. Despite ongoing discussion about the waning influence 
of social class (Knutsen, 2013), socioeconomic characteristics remain a relevant predictor 
of vote choice (Elff, 2009; Evans, 2000). The interests of citizens in lower socioeconomic 
positions are generally represented by left-wing parties (Knutsen, 2013; Marcos-Marne, 
2017), which is why the relatively low socioeconomic position of the visible minority 
population in many Western countries is often seen as an explanation for their left-wing 
party support. However, Canada seems an exceptional case, insofar as its emphasis on 
attracting highly-skilled immigrants tends to produce relatively stronger educational 
outcomes and earnings among that population group (Bird et al., 2011). In fact, visible 
minorities in Canada vary widely in socioeconomic standing (Picot & Sweetman, 2012; 
Reitz & Banerjee, 2007), yet few studies have explicitly tested how socioeconomic issue 
positions affect their individual vote choice. We do so here, with the expectation that the 
effect of parties’ economic positions on vote choice depends on minorities’ own positions 
on economic issues. For visible minorities who take more right-leaning positions on 
economic issues, economically right-wing parties are likely to be a more attractive choice, 
while economically left-wing parties are more attractive for minorities with more leftist 
views. Our hypothesis is that, in the case of economically right-wing parties, visible 
minorities with more economically leftist views will be less likely to vote for that party, 
while those with economically more rightist views will have a higher likelihood of voting 
for that party (H1). 
Second, we examine whether parties’ positions on social issues play a role in visible 
minorities’ vote choice. On issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and the role of 
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women in society, visible minorities tend to hold more socially conservative positions 
(Blais, 2005; Harell, 2013; Hyder, 2005; Marwah et al., 2013). Based on these issue positions, 
we would expect visible minorities to be more likely to vote for socially conservative 
parties. Presupposing such a natural constituency, the Conservative Party of Canada has 
strategically used its positions on social issues to attract visible minority voters, especially 
in more recent years. Nevertheless, Blais (2005) has shown that minorities’ opinions 
on social issues have a limited effect on the choice of the Liberal Party. However, he did 
not examine the effect of the Liberals’ and other parties’ substantive positions on such 
issues. We expect that, for more socially conservative visible minorities, the more socially 
conservative a party is, the more likely they will be to vote for that party (H2).
Beyond economic and social issues, visible minority voters may prefer a party that 
supports visible minority rights (Heath et al. 2011; Marcos-Marne 2017; Messina 2006). 
In Canada, the political parties are all relatively supportive of minorities (White, 2017). 
Nevertheless, we expect that issue alignment between party and voters affects vote choice. 
Hence, we argue that political parties that are more permissive of minority issues should 
be more popular among visible minorities, but specifically so among those visible minority 
voters who are themselves supportive of minority rights. We formulate the hypothesis 
that the more supportive visible minority voters are on minority issues, the stronger the 
positive effect of parties’ permissive positions is on minority issues on vote choice (H3). 
4.3.3 | Descriptive representation 
In the literature on ethnic voting, it is argued that voters may prefer to be represented by 
those with shared characteristics, such as a visible minority background. However, while 
there is some evidence in experimental studies and in low-information non-partisan 
elections that ‘ethnic affinity’ effects may be at work in evaluating and selecting visible 
minority candidates (Besco, 2012; Bird et al., 2016; McGregor, Moore, Jackson, Bird, & 
Stephenson, 2017), no such effects have been found to operate in actual Canadian elections 
at the federal level (Murakami, 2014). There may be two reasons for this: first, the effects 
of candidate characteristics appear to be washed away by much stronger party effects on 
vote choice; second, it becomes harder to detect such effects if parties run competing 
visible minority candidates in the same riding, as is frequently the case in Canada.
Still, the effects of descriptive representation on voter choice at the party level 
have not been examined. That is, even if we cannot find affinity effects in vote choice 
at the constituency level, visible minorities may still prefer parties with a higher level of 
descriptive representation. We would therefore expect that the more visible minorities 
a party nominates, the more appealing a party becomes for visible minority voters. 
However, similar to our previous hypotheses, we anticipate that this effect will be 
strongest among those visible minority voters who have positive views of minorities. In 
summary, we predict that the more supportive visible minority voters are on minority 
issues, the stronger the positive effect of the percentage of visible minority candidates is 
on vote choice (H4).
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4.4 | Data and measurements  
Several data sources were used to test our hypotheses. First, eight waves of the Canadian 
Election Survey (CES) were used to measure minorities’ voting preferences: 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, and 2015 (Fournier et al., 2015). This is a rich data set, and 
pooling all these waves gave us the opportunity to study visible minorities’ vote choice. 
Unfortunately, the number of visible minority respondents is too low to examine changes 
in visible minorities’ vote choice over time. Such analyses would not provide reliable 
estimates. To take into account changes over time, we therefore control for election year.
The CES data includes a campaign survey conducted during the campaign period 
immediately prior to the elections and a post-election survey. The goal of these surveys was 
to obtain a representative sample of the adult population of Canadian citizens aged 18 years 
or older, across the ten Canadian provinces. In this study, we only focus on visible minorities 
(whether born in Canada or abroad), and therefore only the 1,548 respondents who identified 
as non-white and non-Aboriginal are included. In Appendix C, more information can be 
found on the ethnic identification and country of birth of the respondents.
4.4.1 | Vote choice
We combined two variables to measure vote choice. In the post-election survey, 
respondents were asked which party they voted for during the last federal elections. We 
combined this variable with the question: ‘Which party do you think you will vote for?’ 
For respondents who had a missing value on the question referring to the party they 
voted for during the elections, we used their answer on the question referring to the party 
they thought they would vote for. Considering our specific focus on vote choice and our 
link to party positions, we excluded remaining respondents with missing values on this 
variable (N=416, 26.9%; including non-voters). Furthermore, respondents that preferred 
Bloc Québécois or the Green Party of Canada were excluded because there were very few of 
them (N=38, 2.5%). Hence, we only focused on the three largest parties: the Liberal Party, 
the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the various iterations of the Conservatives.3 After 
this selection, there were 1,132 visible minority respondents left. Appendix C provides more 
detailed information about the respondents with missing values on vote choice. 
4.4.2 | Individual-specific variables 
Recall that we hypothesise that minorities’ viewpoints on economic (H1), social (H2), 
and minority issues (H3) will impact on vote choice. For economic issues, we used two 
variables, the first of which was: ‘How much should be done to reduce the gap between the 
rich and the poor in Canada?’ The second economic item related to government welfare 
spending. A higher score on these variables indicates economically more rightist views.
Second, we used two variables to measure respondents’ views on social issues. 
The first variable measured their opinion about gender roles; respondents were asked 
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whether society would be better off if fewer women worked outside the home. A higher 
score indicates that respondents’ think society is better off if fewer women work outside 
the home. The second variable measured opinions on gay rights, with the three answer 
categories being: in favour of gay rights (reference category), oppose gay rights, and don’t 
know. 
Third, to measure views on minority issues, two questions were asked: ‘Do you think 
Canada should admit more, about the same, or fewer immigrants as now?’ and how much 
respondents think should be done for racial minorities. Respondents with a higher score 
on these variables are seen as being less supportive of minority rights. This measurement 
may not be the best to test our hypothesis on descriptive representative, since we do not 
have the ideal attitudinal measures – for example, ‘there should be more minorities in 
parliament’ – across all years of the CES. Nevertheless, we consider our measure to be a 
proxy for such attitudinal measures and argue that they can be used in this first exploration 
of the effects of descriptive representation and issue position on vote choice. The precise 
wording of the questions to measure visible minorities’ viewpoints are presented in Table 
C.4 in Appendix C. 
Finally, we included several control variables. In this sense, educational level, income, 
and employment status were used to measure individual socioeconomic status. First, 
respondent’s household income in the prior year was used to measure income and 
included eight categories ranging from less than $20,000 (0) to more than $80,000 (8). 
A second indicator of socioeconomic status was employment status, distinguishing 
between students, the employed (reference category), the unemployed, and the non-
employed. This last category included retired and disabled people, as well as those caring 
for a family. The respondent’s highest educational level was included as a continuous 
variable. We also controlled for gender and age. 
4.4.3 | Substantive representation
Our second data source was the Comparative Manifesto Project Dataset (CMP; Volkens et 
al., 2017a), which is one of the most extensive and frequently used data sets on political 
parties’ issue positions, including the results of coding election programmes in more than 
50 countries since 1945 (Lowe, Benoit, Slava, & Laver, 2011; Volkens et al., 2017b). For our 
analysis, we used the data for all Canadian elections since 1993. 
We are specifically interested in the issue positions of political parties regarding 
economic, social, and minority issues. Therefore, we constructed an economic and a 
social dimensional scale with items from the CMP that were as close as possible to the 
items from the CES. Logit scales were used to estimate the issue positions, which take the 
manifesto size into account and thus convert data into a ratio scale. The following formula 
was used: log R+0.5 (Lowe et al., 2011). The scores for the Conservatives in 1993, 1997, and 
2000 were based on the mean scores for the Reform Party of Canada and Progressive 
Conservative party of Canada. Appendix C presents detailed information about the CMP 
and the coding of the variables. 
L+0.5
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Since the existing literature does not provide many suggestions on how to measure 
parties’ positions on minority issues with CMP data (Ruedin & Morales, 2013), we 
measured parties’ minority viewpoints and estimated parties’ issue positions on minority 
issues using Wordscores, which can automatically identify and count words, an especially 
useful feature when studying party positions over time. Previous studies have shown that 
Wordscores provides relatively reliable estimates (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Lowe et al., 2011; 
Ruedin & Morales, 2013). 
Wordscores treats the words in party programmes as data containing information 
about parties’ relative issue positions. To be able to estimate these issue positions, we 
need a set of texts for which issue positions on a certain dimension are known (‘reference 
texts’). The Wordscores programme extracts data from the reference texts by counting 
words and uses this information to estimate parties’ issue positions for another set of 
texts (‘virgin texts’). Our reference text was derived from an expert survey conducted from 
2002 to 2003 (Benoit & Laver, 2006). In this survey, 104 Canadian political experts were 
asked to place federal Canadian parties on a scale running from 1 to 20, from positions 
supporting full integration of immigrants and asylum seekers to returning immigrants 
to their countries of origin. The scores of the NDP, the Liberal Party, the Canadian Alliance, 
and the Progressive Conservative Party from this survey were used to estimate the parties’ 
issue positions in other years. This results in a variable with scores ranging between 1 and 
15, with a higher score indicating more permissive issue positions on immigration and 
integration. More information about Wordscores is provided in Appendix C. 
4.4.4 | Descriptive representation
In addition to parties’ substantive representation, we also tested how descriptive 
representation affects voters’ party preferences. Several researchers have collected data 
on the share of visible minority candidates in each party between 1993 and 2015 (Black, 
2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002). Although different researchers collected 
these data, they built on each other’s work, and their methods have been rather similar. 
The researchers followed the definition of visible minorities used by Statistics Canada. To 
determine who is a visible minority, a last name analysis was used by means of surname 
dictionaries. Additionally, biographies were used for photographs and other relevant 
references (for more information on the data collection, see Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; 
Tossutti & Najem, 2002).
4.4.5 | Missing values 
First, from the 1,132 respondents with valid values on vote choice we excluded those with 
invalid values on educational level, employment status, denomination, and age (N=75). 
Among the 1,057 remaining visible minority respondents, there were several variables 
with many respondents that had missing values, for which we used multiple imputation 
techniques. Multiple imputation is a reliable method for handling missing data that 
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reduces bias to a higher degree than the application of list wise deletion (see Allison, 
2000; Lall, 2016; Rubin, 1996). Data were imputed for income (9.7%) and for respondents’ 
opinions on social, economic, and migration issues, which included how much should be 
done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (30.5%); welfare spending (19.0%); 
gender role attitudes (18.4%); gay rights (22.0%); the admission of immigrants (24.6%); 
and how much should be done for minorities (21.7%). In total, 1,057 visible minorities were 
analysed. Tables C.6 and C.7 in Appendix C present the descriptive statistics. 
4.5 | Results
4.5.1 | Analytical strategy
The outcome variable under study is visible minorities’ vote choice, meaning that we 
have a multi-category dependent variable. We therefore use a Multinomial Logit (ML) 
model to estimate our results. However, we are specifically interested in the influence 
of substantive and descriptive representation – which are party characteristics – on vote 
choice and in the extent to which alignment between voters’ and parties’ issue positions 
affect vote choice. To be able to estimate the effects of such party characteristics on vote 
choice, an extension of the ML model is used, commonly referred to as a conditional 
logit model but also known as a discrete choice model (Long & Freese, 2006). Whereas 
multinomial logit models can only estimate the influence of voter characteristics on party 
choice, conditional logit regression models enable us to measure the influence of both 
voter characteristics and party characteristics on party choice (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998). 
Characteristics of the dependent variable are referred to as alternative-specific variables, 
and voter characteristics are referred to as individual-specific variables.4 The data are 
prepared in a long format, which means that, for each individual respondent in the data, 
there is a row for each party. We study three parties, which results in (1,057*3=) 3,171 
observations in the analyses. Due to the data structure, all individual-specific variables 
must be estimated for each party separately. For instance, CL models estimate the effects 
of a voters’ economic issue position on a choice for the Conservatives and the NDP. These 
individual-specific effects are all relative to the reference category, which is the Liberal 
Party.
In this contribution, CL models estimate the log-odds and odds ratios for party choice. 
Moreover, CL models estimate whether party choice is conditional on characteristics of 
the party (parties’ issue positions and the percentage of visible minority candidates). 
Table 4.1 presents the results for the individual-specific variables, which indicates the 
influence of vote characteristics on vote choice, while Table 4.2 outlines the alternative-
specific variables, which demonstrates the influence of substantive and descriptive 
representation on vote choice. Additionally, the interaction effects show whether parties’ 
and voters’ issue alignment affect vote choice. We begin by examining some descriptive 
statistics before continuing with the multivariate analysis. 
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figure 4.1 | Descriptive resultsa
a  Vote share by party (%) b  Economic issue positions, by party 
 
Source: Fournier et al., 2015. Source: Volkens et al., 2017b.
c  Social issue positions, by party  d  Minority issue positions, by party 
   
Source: Volkens et al., 2017b. Source: Party manifestoes, 1993–2015.
 
a The figures present averages from the period 1993–2015. 
4.5.2 | Descriptive results
Figure 4.1a shows, in accordance with previous studies, that the Liberal Party is, by far, 
the most popular among visible minorities, with about 60% supporting the party. After 
the Liberals, about 23% support the Conservatives and about 18% support the NDP. In 
Figures 4.1b–d, we present parties’ positions on economic, social, and minority issues, 
as drawn from their manifestoes. On economic issues, the NDP is the most left wing, 
followed by the Liberals and the Conservatives. Figure 4.1c shows that the Conservative 
Party is the most socially conservative, which would make it the most attractive party on 
this domain. Finally, the NDP has the most permissive position on immigration, whereas 
the Conservatives are the most restrictive on this issue.
Figure 4.2 presents the level of descriptive representation within the three parties, 
based on the share of visible minority candidates in each party. On average, the Liberal 
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Party has the highest share of visible minority candidates on its list (9.5%), followed by 
the NDP (8.2%) and the Conservatives (6.3%). These descriptive figures provide a first 
indication of the substantive and descriptive representation in each party. The Liberals’ 
positions on economic issues and levels of descriptive representation may have gained 
them support among visible minorities. Nevertheless, on socially conservative issues, the 
Conservative party may be the preferred choice. The conditional logit analyses can offer 
more insight into the effects of substantive and descriptive representation when voter 
socio-demographics are also considered.
figure 4.2 | Descriptive representation by party, 1993 – 2015a  
Note:  a This figure presents averages over 1993–2015. 
Source: Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002. 
 
4.5.3 | Multivariate analyses
Model 0 in Table 4.1 shows that the Liberal Party is the most popular among visible 
minorities, which is in line with Figure 4.1a. The alternative-specific constants for both 
the Conservatives and the NDP are negative and significant, indicating that the odds of 
voting for the Conservatives or the NDP, when compared to the Liberal Party, are smaller. 
The results in Model 0 also show visible minorities’ positions on economic, social, and 
minority issues and reveal that visible minorities who have more economically rightist 
views, more socially conservative issue positions, and more restrictive views on minority 
issues are more likely to vote for the Conservatives in comparison with the Liberals. No 
significant differences are found between the NDP and the Liberal Party. Furthermore, 
we find that socioeconomic characteristics have no significant influence on vote choice. 
Similar results of socioeconomic characteristics are found in a model without voters’ 
issue positions (Table C.10 in Appendix C presents this model). Although this corresponds 
with previous research in Canada, this is a highly interesting finding in the broader ethnic 
voting literature. 
visible minorities’ vote choice in canada
101
table 4.1 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voter characteristics
Model 0
Conservatives NDP
B OR B OR
Alternative-specific constants (ASC; Liberal=ref.) -1.258*** 0.284*** -2.235*** 0.107***
(0.312) (0.089) (0.400) (0.043)
Economic issues positions (L-R)a
Less government spending to reduce 
gap between rich and poor
0.176* 1.192* -0.189 0.827
(0.098) (0.117) (0.121) (0.101)
Less government welfare spending 0.212** 1.237** -0.119 0.888
(0.083) (0.102) (0.104) (0.093)
Social issue positions (P-C)b
Traditional gender role attitudes 0.019 1.019 -0.112 0.894
(0.091) (0.093) (0.097) (0.087)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
- Oppose 0.708*** 2.030*** -0.099 0.906
(0.251) (0.509) (0.252) (0.228)
- Don’t know 0.127 1.135 -0.052 0.949
(0.237) (0.269) (0.243) (0.230)
Minority issue positions (P–R)c
Admit fewer immigrants 0.266* 1.305* -0.167 0.846
(0.150) (0.196) (0.170) (0.144)
Less should be done for racial minorities 0.205* 1.228* 0.011 1.011
(0.105) (0.129) (0.11) (0.115)
Control variables
Income 0.029 1.029 -0.003 0.996
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Student (employed=ref.) -0.581* 0.559* -0.213 0.808
(0.323) (0.180) (0.319) (0.257)
- Unemployed 0.053 1.054 0.298 1.347
(0.348) (0.367) (0.369) (0.496)
- Non-employed 0.017 1.017 -0.117 0.890
(0.287) (0.291) (0.324) (0.288)
Educational level 0.018 1.018 0.053 1.055
(0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.050)
Age -0.007 0.993 -0.009 0.991
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Gender (male=ref) 0.066 1.069 -0.0171 0.983
(0.166) (0.178) (0.179) (0.176)
Survey year (1993=ref.)
- 1997 -0.250 0.779 0.070 1.072
(0.305) (0.238) (0.468) (0.502)
- 2000 -1.330*** 0.264*** -1.741 0.175
(0.448) (0.118) (1.068) (0.187)
- 2004 -0.172 0.842 1.296*** 3.656***
(0.334) (0.281) (0.412) (1.506)
- 2006 -0.131 0.877 1.176*** 3.240***
(0.327) (0.287) (0.417) (1.350)
- 2008 0.006 1.006 1.356*** 3.879***
(0.337) (0.339) (0.430) (1.669)
- 2011 0.723** 2.061** 2.023*** 7.562***
(0.316) (0.650) (0.408) (3.085)
- 2015 0.256 1.291 1.255*** 3.509***
(0.337) (0.435) (0.431) (1.512)
N 3,717
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a Left-Right; b Progressive-Conservative c Permissive-
Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.2 presents the effects of substantive and descriptive representation on vote 
choice. We find that the main effect of parties’ economic issues position on vote choice 
is positive and significant (b=0.082; not shown, see Table C.8 in Appendix C). This effect 
indicates that the more economically rightist views a party has, the more likely it is that 
visible minorities’ will vote for that party. Model 1 in Table 4.2 shows interactions between 
parties’ and voters’ economic issue positions. The interaction effects are not significant. 
Hence, we find that economic issue positions have an influence on the vote choice of 
visible minorities; however, there is no evidence for Hypothesis 1: visible minorities 
who are economically more right-leaning are not more likely to vote for economically 
right-wing parties, nor are those who are economically more left-leaning more likely 
to vote for economically left-wing parties.5 This remarkable finding can be interpreted 
by the popularity of the Liberal Party, both among visible minorities with economically 
right- and left-wing views, whereas the Liberal Party holds an centrist position on the 
economic domain. The main effect of parties’ positions on social issues shows that visible 
minorities are more likely to vote for more socially conservative parties (b=0.121; Table C.8 
in Appendix C). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the influence of parties’ social issue positions 
is dependent on voters’ social issue positions. The interaction effects in Model 2 in Table 
4.2 highlight that visible minorities that oppose gay rights are significantly more likely to 
vote for socially conservative parties. The results partly support Hypothesis 2, that visible 
minorities who are more socially conservative are more likely to vote for a party that is 
more socially conservative. This is found for gay rights but not for traditional gender role 
attitudes. 
The last aspect of substantive representation to be tested are parties’ positions on 
minority issues. Again, the main effect is significant (b=0.254; Table C.8 in Appendix 
C), indicating that parties that are more restrictive on minority issues are more popular 
among visible minority voters. However, Model 3 in Table 4.2 does not show any significant 
interaction effects. There is no evidence that if visible minorities are more supportive on 
minority issues, they will be more likely to vote for parties with permissive positions on 
minority issues. Neither do we find that visible minorities’ own positions on minority 
issues influence the effect of parties’ issue positions on visible minorities’ vote choice 
(H3).
The fourth hypothesis relates to descriptive representation. There is no significant 
effect of the share of visible minority candidates on a parties’ list on visible minorities’ 
vote choice (Table C.8 in Appendix C). Moreover, Model 4 in Table 4.2 demonstrates that 
none of the interaction effects between parties’ levels of descriptive representation and 
visible minorities’ positions on minority issues are significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 that the 
more supportive visible minority voters are on minority issues, the stronger the positive 
effect of visible minority candidates is on vote choice, is not supported.  
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table 4.2 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; substantive and descriptive representation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Alternative-specific variables B OR B OR B OR B OR
Economic issue positions (L-R)a 0.082*** 1.085***
(0.018) (0.019)
Economic pos. x Less government spending 
to reduce gap between rich and poor
-0.003 0.997
(0.016) (0.016)
Economic pos. x Less government welfare 
spending
0.016 1.016
(0.015) (0.016)
Social issue positions (P-C)b 0.097* 1.102*
(0.054) (0.060)
Social pos. x Traditional gender role 
attitudes
-0.011 0.989
(0.032) (0.032)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
Social pos. x Oppose 0.164** 1.178**
(0.0792) (0.093)
Social pos. x Don’t know 0.0698 1.072
(0.0806) (0.086)
Minority issue positions (P-R)c 0.258*** 1.295***
(0.041) (0.053)
Minority pos. x Admit fewer immigrants 0.007 1.007
(0.025) (0.025)
Minority pos. x Less should be done for 
racial minorities
0.009 1.009
(0.017) (0.017)
% Visible minority candidates 0.073 1.076
(0.056) (0.060)
% Visible minority candidates x Admit 
fewer immigrants
0.031 1.032
(0.038) (0.039)
% Visible minority candidates x Less should 
be done for racial minorities
-0.007 0.993
(0.022) (0.021)
Individual-specific variables 
Economic issues positions (L-R)
Less government spending to reduce gap 
between rich and poor _CON
0.304*** 1.356***
(0.115) (0.156)
Less government spending to reduce gap 
between rich and poor _NDP
-0.146 0.864
(0.133) (0.115)
Less government welfare spending_CON 0.120 1.127
(0.114) (0.129)
Less government welfare spending_NDP -0.061 0.941
(0.117) (0.110)
Social issue positions (P-C)
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON 0.112 1.118
(0.131) (0.146)
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP -0.095 0.909
(0.106) (0.097)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
- Oppose_CON -0.373 0.689
(0.279) (0.192)
- Oppose_NDP -0.274 0.760
(0.273) (0.207)
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4.6 | Conclusion and discussion 
This study has questioned the extent to which substantive and descriptive representation 
can account for visible minorities’ vote choice in Canada. Canada is an interesting case to 
study visible minorities’ vote choice because the minority population is highly diverse in 
terms of ethnic background and socioeconomic outcomes; immigration and multicultural 
integration are not considered as problematic either by the general population or by 
politicians; and descriptive representation in the House of Commons is relatively high. 
With this study, we have contributed to the existing literature on ethnic voting in Western 
countries and tested whether, despite the unique Canadian context, determinants of 
minorities’ vote choice in Canada are similar to findings in other Western countries. 
The Liberal Party is the most popular party among visible minorities in Canada. 
Furthermore, it is a remarkable finding that individual socioeconomic factors have little 
influence on vote choice. These results are in line with those of previous studies in Canada 
(White, 2017) but are contrary to findings in other Western countries (Bergh & Bjørklund, 
2011; Heath et al., 2013, 2011). 
One of the main findings of this study is that substantive representation has an 
influence on visible minorities’ vote choice in the Canadian context, but that this influence 
was not found for descriptive representation. Generally, economically right-wing and 
socially conservative parties are more popular among visible minority voters. Since the 
NDP is both the most economically left wing, the most progressive on social issues, and the 
least popular among visible minorities, this is not a surprising finding. However, another 
interesting outcome is that, overall, we did not find strong evidence that the effect of 
parties’ issue positions on vote choice differs between minorities depending on their own 
issue positions. We only found evidence for parties’ social positions effect on vote choice to 
be conditional on minorities’ own issue positions on gay rights. This may indicate that gay 
rights are a salient issue that plays a role in visible minorities’ vote choice.
- Don’t know_CON -0.411 0.663
(0.323) (0.214)
- Don’t know_NDP -0.240 0.787
(0.258) (0.203)
Minority issue positions (P–R)
Admit fewer immigrants_CON 0.319** 1.375** 0.297* 1.345*
(0.155) (0.214) (0.171) (0.230)
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP -0.149 0.862 -0.223 0.800
(0.203) (0.175) (0.153) (0.123)
Less should be done for racial minori-
ties_CON
0.233** 1.263** 0.290** 1.337**
(0.112) (0.142) (0.117) (0.157)
Less should be done for racial minori-
ties_NDP
0.0248 1.025 0.146 1.157
(0.114) (0.117) (0.093) (0.107)
N 3,171
Note: In all models, socioeconomic position, age, gender, and survey year are included, for clarity, only the variables 
included in the interaction terms are presented. Full models are presented in Table C.9 in Appendix C. a Left-Right;  
b Progressive-Conservative c Permissive-Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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An unanticipated finding was that visible minorities are relatively likely to vote for parties 
that have more restrictive positions on immigration. This finding can also be interpreted 
by the lack of support for the party with the least restrictive position on immigration: the 
NPD. The puzzle for Canada is thus: why is the most economically left-wing party, which 
claims to be the most permissive to immigration, not the most popular among visible 
minorities? Possible explanations may be that immigration policy is not so relevant for 
visible minorities, many of whom belong to second or older generations, or that, for the 
Canadian visible minority population with higher levels of education and higher status, 
self-interests prevail over presumed visible minority group interests. Previous research 
has already shown that minorities do not necessarily hold positive attitudes towards 
other minority groups (Van der Zwan, Bles, & Lubbers, 2017). However, we did not find 
that the influence of parties’ economic issues positions is conditional on minorities’ own 
economic views, a finding that would have been in line with the idea that self-interests are 
important in voting. Rather than self-interests or group interests, the historical ties of the 
Liberal Party with the visible minority population and socialisation within visible minority 
communities, may have resulted in a group norm to vote for the Liberal Party. 
In Canada, the Liberal Party descriptively outnumbers the party that is substantively 
considered to represent the immigrant interests best. Yet, descriptive representation 
does not seem to be an important predictor of visible minorities’ vote choice. Considering 
that descriptive representation was found to affect the vote choice of minorities in the 
Dutch PR system, the Canadian electoral system may be a possible explanation for this 
finding. In each riding, parties can nominate one candidate. Hence, voters can vote for the 
candidate nominated by the party of their choice. Even though voters may be aware of the 
visible minority background of candidates in their riding, they may not know how many 
visible minority candidates each party nominated across the country. Another reason may 
be that the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice differs between groups. 
If the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice was measured for specific 
visible minority groups rather than for visible minority groups in general – similar to 
Chapter 3 – we may have found an effect.
Studying minority groups often comes with data limitations. Because of the limited 
number of visible minorities in the CES data, we could not distinguish between different 
visible minority groups and we could not examine variation in vote choice over time. It 
would be interesting to examine the extent to which vote choice differs between, for 
example, South Asian and Black minorities. Moreover, it is possible that vote choice 
and predictors for vote choice have changed between 1993 and 2015. Nevertheless, 
the popularity of the Liberal Party is rather robust, since it was the most popular of the 
three parties under study in each wave of the CES. Third, the measurement of parties’ 
standpoints on immigration is not ideal and must be interpreted with caution. Data 
scarcity makes it difficult to cross-check the findings on parties’ minority standpoints. 
More data about both different minority groups and parties’ issue positions is therefore 
needed to test the relationship between issue positions and vote choice among visible 
minorities more specifically.
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The outcomes of this study contribute to existing research on the ethnic vote in Western 
countries. First, testing a minority-specific explanation for vote choice among minorities 
has shown that it is relevant to consider parties’ issue positions. Nevertheless, the 
generalisability may be limited for descriptive representation. The influence of descriptive 
representation on visible minorities’ vote choice may differ depending on the electoral 
system. Further work needs to be carried out to fully understand how descriptive 
representation affects vote choice for different minority groups and in different political 
systems. Second, this study contributes to Canadian research on visible minorities’ vote 
choice. Like previous studies, we found that socioeconomic position is not an important 
predictor of visible minorities’ vote choice (Blais, 2005; Thomas, 2012; White, 2017). It is 
still not clear why this is different in Canada when compared to other Western countries. 
However, economically rightist and socially conservative party standpoints appeal to 
minority voters. This deserves more attention in future studies. It will also be important to 
delve deeper into the effect of party leaders’ descriptive representation on vote choice in 
future Canadian federal elections, given that the NDP’s leader since 2017, Jagmeet Singh, 
is a visible minority. 
Notes 
1  In Canada, the term ‘visible minority’ as defined by the Employment Equity Act refers 
to any non-Aboriginal person who is non-Caucasian in race or non-White in colour 
(Statistics Canada, 2008).
2  The federal electoral order is reviewed every 10 years to reflect changes in the Canadian 
population. The last redistribution of the ridings took place in 2013, resulting in an 
increase from 308 to 338 ridings. 
3  Because they were active at different elections, it is not possible to include each of 
these parties separately in the analyses. That is why the ‘Conservatives’ refer to the 
different Conservative parties: the Reform Party, the Canadian Alliance, the Progressive 
Conservative Party and the Conservative Party of Canada.
4  To use CL models the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA-
assumption) has to be met. The Hausman test shows that the IIA-assumption was 
violated. Since the  IIA assumption is not notably relevant nor restrictive in vote choice 
research, we nevertheless choose to use CL models (Dow & Endersby, 2004). Moreover, 
previous research has shown that CL models estimate comparable outcomes as models 
that relax the IIA assumption (Cushing & Cushing, 2007; Dahlberg & Eklöf, 2003; Train, 
2003).
5  For a better comparison between Chapters 3 and 4, we ran an additional analysis. We 
tested whether the influence of parties’ economic issue positions depends on voters’ 
socioeconomic position rather than on their economic views. As shown in Table C.11 
Appendix C there is no evidence that the effect of parties’ economic issue positions 
depends on voters’ socioeconomic position. 
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5.1 | Introduction 
Ethnic affinity voting indicates that political party candidates with an ethnic minority 
background receive larger vote shares in areas with a larger ethnic minority population 
(Bird et al., 2016; Matson, Fine, & Florida, 2006; McDermott, 1998). With an increasing 
ethnic minority electorate, the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates has gained 
importance for political parties in Western countries. The expectation that these 
candidates win votes among the ethnic minority population has been advanced as one of 
the main possible motivations (Dancygier, 2017). To date, however, the conditions under 
which ethnic affinity effects are particularly strong are unknown: They may depend on 
the political party the candidate represents or candidate characteristics other than their 
ethnic background, such as gender. Our aim is therefore to assess the conditions under 
which ethnic minority candidates receive larger vote shares in the Dutch parliamentary 
election of 2017. We use the proportion of votes each individual candidate on each party’s 
candidate list received within polling stations to investigate ethnic affinity effects.
Affinity effects have been found in majoritarian systems, second-order elections, 
such as local elections (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 2007; Teney et al., 2010) and 
experimental studies with fictionalised majority and minority candidates (Besco, 2015; 
Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConnaughy et al., 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-
Brown, 2006). In the European context, however, it remains unclear whether ethnic affinity 
voting exists in political contexts in which voters can choose between multiple candidates 
on parties’ candidate lists in national level elections. Moreover, evidence for the ethnic 
affinity thesis is difficult to demonstrate. In existing studies, it often remains implicit 
whether people vote for a candidate or for the party to which the candidate is affiliated 
(Bird et al., 2016; Matson et al., 2006; McDermott, 1998). We study if evidence for the ethnic 
affinity thesis can still be found when we disentangle candidate and party choice, and we 
will assess whether ethnic affinity effects differ across political parties.
This study is innovative for three reasons. First, we examine differences in ethnic 
affinity voting between twelve political parties in the Netherlands. Previous research 
demonstrated that especially left-wing parties are successful in attracting the ethnic vote 
(Martin, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Tiberj & Michon, 2013; Van der Zwan, Lubbers & Eisinga, 
2018). It is therefore likely that especially ethnic minority candidates of left-wing parties 
are popular in areas with many eligible voters with an ethnic minority background. Second, 
we will examine the extent of ethnic affinity voting within parties between candidates of 
different ethnic origins. Since political integration varies between ethnic origin groups, 
we will study both general ethnic affinity voting and specific co-ethnic affinity voting 
(Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). Our emphasis lies on the largest non-Western minority 
groups in the Netherlands, Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean minorities, which 
will be discussed in further detail below. Hence, we test whether ethnic minority candidates 
attract more votes when minority group sizes are larger and whether candidates with a 
specific ethnic background attract more votes when this particular ethnic group is larger. 
Third, in some Western countries, including the Netherlands, ethnic minority women have 
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been well represented on candidate lists. Nominating ethnic minority women is a party 
strategy to try to maximise the representativeness of the candidate list (Bird, 2005; Celis 
& Erzeel, 2017; Mügge, 2016). This does not necessarily mean, however, that female ethnic 
minority candidates receive higher vote shares in areas with more co-ethnic minorities. We 
study if candidate gender influences ethnic affinity voting. 
Ethnic affinity voting is examined in the Dutch political context. The Dutch national 
election of 2017 provides a particular interesting context for our study. The Netherlands is 
known as one of the few countries in which the share of the non-Western ethnic minority 
electorate is similar to the share of non-Western minority Members of Parliament (MPs; 
Bloemraad, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Van der Zwan et al., 2018). Moreover, most of the Dutch 
parties – from the left-wing as well as the right-wing – have ethnic minority candidates 
on their candidate list. What is specific about the election of 2017 is the electoral success 
of several new parties – e.g. DENK, which specifically targets ethnic minority voters – and 
the implosion of the Labour Party (PvdA), which traditionally attracted many votes among 
the ethnic minority electorate. The downfall of the social-democrats is not unique for the 
Netherlands; other European countries such as France and Austria experienced similar 
downfalls. There is, nonetheless, no other European country (yet) in which a party that 
aimed at voters with an ethnic minority background has won seats in national elections. 
Differences in ethnic affinity voting between left-wing parties and minority-oriented 
parties observed in the Netherlands may become reality in other European countries as well. 
This study tests for affinity voting by assessing the relationship between the 
proportions of votes each specific candidate received within a polling station and ethnic 
group size of the neighbourhood in which the polling station is situated. Using this type 
of aggregated data and looking at these macro-macro relations can result in ecological 
fallacies (Robinson, 1950; Shaw, 1997). In contrast to earlier studies, however, our unit 
of analysis is very detailed (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & Segura, 
2007; Landa et al., 1995; Teney et al., 2010). We used information from 2,121 different polling 
stations, located in 1,089 different neighbourhoods within 20 of the larger cities in the 
Netherlands (including Amsterdam and Rotterdam). In the Dutch parliamentary election 
of 2017, the twelve political parties included in this study nominated 548 individual 
candidates. In each polling station, voters could give their vote to one of these 548 
candidates. We are the first to use such fine-grained geographical data and to distinguish 
general affinity effects from co-ethnic affinity effects. Our approach makes ecological 
fallacies less likely. We will demonstrate below that we can enhance our understanding of 
ethnic affinity voting in the European context.
5.2 | The Dutch political context
The Netherlands has a preferential-list proportional representation (PR) system with 
compulsory candidate voting. Therefore, voters are presented with the candidate lists 
of all parties and from these lists they cast one vote for a single candidate. Most voters 
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vote for the first candidate on the list, which typically expresses general support for the 
party; votes for other candidates are assumed to be preference votes and are often used to 
support a female or an ethnic minority candidate (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & 
Andeweg, 2012). It is uncommon for candidates with a low list position to receive enough 
preference votes to be elected. However, most parties have ethnic minorities on their list, 
including in high list positions. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, for example, 11% of 
the candidates had an ethnic minority background (Van der Zwan et al., 2018). 
The Dutch parliamentary elections of March 2017 were characterised by the emergence 
of several new political parties and the major loss of the Labour Party (PvdA). The Labour 
Party (PvdA) reached its historic low: 38 seats in 2012 to only 9 in 2017. DENK and Artikel 1 
were two new parties that focused on racism and discrimination and were competitors 
to left-wing parties. Two former Labour Party (PvdA) MPs with Turkish origins founded 
DENK in 2015. Sylvana Simons, who has Surinamese origins, then joined the party. After 
an internal conflict, however, she left and established the party Artikel 1 just a few 
months before the elections. Whereas DENK was successful and won three seats during 
the elections Artikel 1 did not win any. The party nevertheless won a substantial part of 
the vote share in Amsterdam and won a seat in the Amsterdam municipality elections of 
2018. In addition, Forum for Democracy (FvD) entered the elections for the first time and 
added more competition on the radical right side of the political spectrum, competing 
with Wilders’ anti-immigrant party (PVV) for votes. Yet, Wilders’ anti-immigrant party was 
the second largest party, after Prime Minister Rutte’s Liberal Party (VVD). 
Another relevant aspect of the Dutch context is the conceptualisation of ethnic 
minority background. The literature contains different views on this concept, based on 
both theoretical and practical concerns (for a more elaborate discussion see Bloemraad, 
2013). The main focus lies on the largest non-Western ethnic minority groups, referred 
to by some as visible minorities (Bloemraad, 2013). Hence, we concentrate on candidates 
with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean background. All candidates have Dutch 
citizenship and belong to the first, second or third generation. These are the largest non-
Western ethnic minority groups in the Dutch context and are relevant considering their 
on average vulnerable position in society. The term ‘ethnic minorities’ thus refers to non-
Western ethnic minorities in this research. 
5.3 | Theoretical framework 
5.3.1 | General ethnic affinity voting
The assumption that voters have the tendency to vote for candidates who are similar to 
themselves, i.e. someone who belongs to the same social group, is referred to as the affinity 
thesis (Bird et al., 2016; McDermott, 1998). The affinity thesis concerns various social 
groups, but has primarily been researched for gender and ethnic background (Barreto, 
2007; Bird et al., 2016; Brians, 2005; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; Philpot & Walton, 
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2007; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982). A shared language, culture or migration experience, for 
instance a shared identity, are reasons to vote for someone from one’s own social group 
(Barreto, 2007; Bird et al., 2016). Moreover, voters might expect that candidates similar to 
themselves have the same interests and will therefore be a good representative (Landa 
et al., 1995). In that sense, affinity voting is closely related to descriptive representation 
(Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation refers to the 
proportional representation of marginalised groups in society. The emphasis lies on the 
similarity between the characteristics of marginalised groups and their representatives.
Marginalised groups often have similar experiences, for example with discrimination. 
This experience is called linked fate and could be a reason for ethnic minorities to vote for 
ethnic minority candidates (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Besco, 2015; Bird et 
al., 2016; Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Dawson, 1995). Ethnic affinity voting can thus be 
used to strengthen the position of ethnic minorities in society. As has been suggested in 
earlier research, ethnic voting most likely refers to candidates who are easily identifiable 
as an ethnic minority group member, e.g. for non-Western ethnic minorities (Bird et al., 
2016). Formulating a general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we expect that the larger the 
ethnic minority population in a neighbourhood, the larger the proportion of votes an 
ethnic minority candidate receives (H1).1
The extent to which general ethnic affinity voting effects exist may differ between 
neighbourhoods. Even though individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics are important predictors for political preferences (Adams et al., 2005; 
Downs, 1957; Evans, 2000), the place where one lives also shapes these preferences (David 
& Van Hamme, 2011; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004; Miller, 1978). There is a long history of 
electoral geography research on how the neighbourhood affects political preferences (Cho, 
Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a; Johnston et al., 2000, 2004). The main 
thesis in the electoral geography literature is that the larger the proportion of a certain 
social or ethnic group in a neighbourhood, the greater the impact of this groups’ political 
preferences on the political preferences of co-residents. Ethnic communities are more likely 
to be organised and active in neighbourhoods with a large ethnic minority population. In 
such neighbourhoods, political preferences may be influenced by mobilisation through 
social connectedness and ethnic networks (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 
2008a; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). This process is referred to as the mobilisation hypothesis 
and would imply that affinity effects are more likely to be observed in neighbourhoods 
with sizeable ethnic groups and in which the relationship between minority group size 
in the neighbourhood and vote share among minority candidates is non-linear. Our 
second hypothesis is: General ethnic affinity effects increase when the ethnic minority 
population in a neighbourhood becomes larger (H2).
5.3.2 | Party-dependent ethnic affinity voting
Our third expectation is that ethnic affinity voting differs between parties. Parties have 
different strategies for the inclusion of ethnic minority candidates and this may affect 
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ethnic affinity voting. Dancygier (2017) states that parties may opt for a strategy of 
exclusion, symbolic inclusion or vote-based inclusion. Which strategy they choose depends 
on the size of the ethnic minority electorate. When the ethnic minority electorate is small, 
parties lack incentives to nominate ethnic minority candidates. For countries in which the 
ethnic minority electorate is larger, symbolic inclusion is a strategy for parties to express 
their inclusive image. Vote-based inclusion means that parties include ethnic minority 
candidates not only for symbolic reasons, but also to nominate those candidates who can 
attract the ethnic minority vote, for instance, because of their ties to the ethnic community. 
Political parties may choose a vote-based inclusion strategy when the ethnic minority 
electorate is large enough to affect electoral outcomes (Dancygier, 2017). Left-wing parties 
have traditionally been more supportive of minority rights, nominated larger numbers of 
ethnic minority candidates and enjoyed more success in attracting the ethnic vote than 
right-wing parties (Martin, 2016; Messina, 2006; Sanders et al., 2014). Even so, right-wing 
parties nominate ethnic minority candidates as well, which may be a strategy for parties 
to express inclusivity. We expect these candidates to be less successful in attracting the 
votes from the ethnic minority electorate. If right-wing parties attract ethnic votes, they 
may attract votes from ethnic minority voters who are more assimilated and who do not 
necessarily vote for the ethnic minority candidates affiliated with that party. Moreover, 
these ethnic minorities may have left neighbourhoods with larger concentrations of co-
ethnics. We therefore expect to find stronger ethnic affinity effects for candidates from 
left-wing parties than right-wing parties. However, the competition for the ethnic vote has 
increased since the emergence of minority-oriented parties in the Netherlands. We expect 
that candidates of minority-oriented parties (DENK and Artikel 1) have stronger ties to the 
ethnic community and will be more successful in attracting the ethnic vote than left-wing 
parties. We predict that general ethnic affinity effects are stronger for minority-oriented 
parties than for left-wing parties, which in turn are stronger than for right-wing parties (H3).
5.3.3 | Co-ethnic affinity voting
Considering the differences between ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, we expect 
that ethnic affinity voting takes place especially within ethnic minority groups. Moreover, 
since the level of integration varies between ethnic minority groups, the strength of ethnic 
affinity effects are similarly likely to vary (Fisher et al., 2015; Leighley, 2001). Research on 
the political participation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands shows that minorities 
with a Turkish background are politically the most active, followed by those of Moroccan, 
Surinamese and Antillean origins (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004). This level of 
participation can partly be explained by the strength of the ethnic community and ethnic 
identification (Leighley, 2001; Tillie, 2004). Ethnic minorities are mobilised through their 
ethnic community, which results in, among others, higher levels of turnout (Fennema & 
Tillie, 1999). We expect that ethnic group mobilisation also affects ethnic affinity voting 
and that for ethnic minorities with the most cohesive ethnic community, the candidate’s 
ethnic background is more important than for minorities with a less cohesive ethnic 
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community. In addition to the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we formulate a co-
ethnic affinity hypothesis: The larger the co-ethnic population in a neighbourhood, the 
larger the proportion of votes a co-ethnic candidate receives (H4a), and co-ethnic affinity 
effects are stronger for candidates with a Turkish background than for candidates with 
a Moroccan background, which in turn are stronger for candidates with a Surinamese or 
Antillean background (H4b).
5.3.4 | Gender-dependent ethnic affinity voting
Existing research on voting for women or ethnic minority women show mixed results 
on whether (ethnic minority) women receive higher or lower vote shares than (ethnic 
minority) men (Bird et al., 2016; Celis & Erzeel, 2017; Philpot & Walton, 2007). A preference 
for either male or female candidates could be based on existing stereotypes about men and 
women in relation to ideas about a politician’s appropriate qualities (Bird et al., 2016; Black 
& Erickson, 2006; Sanbonmatsu, 2016). We anticipate that voting for female candidates 
differs between ethnic groups based on differences in prevalent gender role attitudes in 
these groups. We cannot test voters’ gender role attitudes directly, but previous research 
has shown that some ethnic groups are more conservative and have more traditional 
views on gender roles than others (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2009). We anticipate 
that minorities from more conservative ethnic groups are more likely to vote for male 
candidates, assuming that they see women as less qualified politicians. Minorities with 
a Turkish or Moroccan background, who are often Muslim, hold more conservative gender 
role attitudes (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2009; Dancygier, 2017; Röder & Mühlau, 2011). 
Minorities with a Surinamese or Antillean background generally hold more progressive 
gender role attitudes; their gender role attitudes are more progressive than the gender role 
attitudes of Turkish and Moroccan minorities, but also of native Dutch (Arends-Tóth & van 
de Vijver, 2009). We thus expect that the larger the population holding more conservative 
gender role attitudes in neighbourhoods, the larger the share of votes for male ethnic 
minority candidates whereas this holds to a lesser extent for female ethnic minority 
candidates. In neighbourhoods with a larger population holding more progressive gender 
role attitudes, there may be no difference in ethnic affinity voting between male and 
female candidates, or it might be even stronger for female ethnic candidates than for male 
ethnic candidates. We hypothesise that: Ethnic affinity effects among candidates with a 
Turkish or Moroccan background are stronger for men than for women (H5a); and ethnic 
affinity effects among candidates with a Surinamese/Antillean background are equal for 
women and men, or stronger for women than for men (H5b). 
5.4 | Data and measurements 
To test our hypotheses, we combined three data sources. First, election results from 
polling stations were used from the Dutch national parliamentary elections of March 
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2017. Second, we collected information about the background characteristics of political 
candidates on parties’ candidate lists (Van der Zwan, 2018). Last, we used neighbourhood 
characteristics from Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c). 
Since most ethnic minorities in the Netherlands live in cities, we expect the most 
variation in terms of the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods in urban areas. We 
selected the largest cities for which information was available at the polling station 
level.2 Data were obtained through the Dutch Electoral Council (Kiesraad, 2017). We have 
information about the number of votes for each candidate on the candidate list in each 
polling station for twenty cities.3
In the Netherlands, all eligible voters receive an invitation by mail to vote, including 
their voting pass and the address of the nearest polling station.4 Although people are not 
obliged to vote there, we nevertheless assume that most voters will vote in their appointed 
polling station, or at least in their own neighbourhood. Polling stations of which we know 
this is not the case were excluded (121), for instance polling stations at train stations, 
universities or hospitals.
5.4.1 | Proportion of votes for candidates 
The proportion of votes for individual candidates was calculated as the number of votes 
for each candidate in a polling station divided by the sum of votes for all candidates in 
that specific polling station. This variable ranged from 0 to 0.68, where 0 indicates that 
the candidate received no votes and where a higher number indicates a larger proportion 
of the votes for the candidates within that polling station. Hence, there was a maximum 
of 68% of the votes for a single candidate in a polling station, which was the case for Geert 
Wilders from the anti-immigrant party PVV in a polling station in Dordrecht. Most voters 
vote for the first candidate on the list, which typically expresses general support for the 
party (Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). Moreover, since not all candidates receive votes in 
all polling stations, there are many zeros in the data. The data are therefore highly skewed; 
in the analytical strategy, we discuss how we deal with the skewness of the data.
5.4.2 | Candidate characteristics 
In addition to the proportion of votes for each candidate, we are interested in other 
candidate characteristics. First, we selected the political parties. There were thirteen parties 
that won at least one seat in the House of Representatives. We excluded the two parties that 
did not nominate any ethnic minority candidate, the Reformed Political Party (SGP) and the 
Party for the Animals (PvdD). The party Artikel 1 did not win any seats but was nevertheless 
included because of its minority-oriented character. In total, we analyse twelve parties of 
which most can be placed into known party families. The economic left-wing parties include 
the Socialist Party (SP), the Green party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the Elderly party 
(50Plus), Artikel 1 and DENK. The social-liberal Democrats 66 (D66) and the economic right-
wing VVD are regarded as liberal parties. There are two Christian parties, the Christian Union 
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(CU) and the more economic and culturally centre-right Christian Democratic (CDA). Last, 
we include the anti-immigrant party PVV and the economically and culturally right-wing 
Forum for Democracy (FvD). All parties must compose a candidate list, which is published by 
the Dutch government.5 Some candidates’ characteristics can be found on these candidate 
lists. The candidate lists for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary elections provides information 
about gender and the list position of the candidate. For the twelve parties included, there 
were 548 unique candidates nominated for the candidate lists. 
The most important characteristic was the candidate’s ethnic background. Since this 
was not available on the official candidate list, we gathered the information about ethnic 
background: Two independent coders used names and photographs to identify non-
Western ethnic minority candidates. For all candidates identified as an ethnic minority 
(90), an additional search was conducted for more specific information about their ethnic 
background. This information was gathered online using small online biographies about 
MPs, and other online resources, such as newspaper articles, social media and personal 
websites. We focused on candidates with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean 
background or other non-Western background belonging to either the first, second or third 
generation immigrants.6 This is a rather common strategy to identify the ethnic background 
of candidates (Bloemraad, 2013). Candidate characteristics can be found in Appendix D.
5.4.3 | Neighbourhood characteristics 
To examine the influence of neighbourhood characteristics on affinity voting, the polling 
stations were linked to the administratively defined neighbourhood characteristics in 
which they were located. In total, we analyse election results from 2,121 polling stations, 
located in 1,089 neighbourhoods.7 Our unit-of-analysis is the share of votes each individual 
candidate received in each polling station. Our original sample thus includes (2,121*548=) 
1,162,308 observations. 
Statistics Netherlands provided information about the share of ethnic groups. The 
total share of non-Western ethnic minorities within neighbourhoods ranged between 0% 
and 86%. We also included the share of each specific ethnic group in the neighbourhood 
in 2017: minorities with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western 
background.8 Appendix D presents a detailed summary of the data.
5.4.4 | Other determinants of ethnic affinity voting
There are several determinants of ethnic affinity voting that we did not theorise, but we 
consider important to include in our analyses. First, votes for the party leader are often 
considered to be votes for the party, at least in the Dutch electoral system (Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2009; Van Holsteyn & Andeweg, 2012). To disentangle party and candidate effects, 
we control for the party leader. Moreover, ethnic affinity effects on the candidate level 
may be simply the result of certain parties being more popular in certain polling stations; 
we therefore include both the main effect of party as well as an interaction term between 
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party and the share of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood into our explanatory model.
Additionally, we control for candidate characteristics known to increase vote 
shares. First, candidates who were also nominated during the previous elections in 2012 
may receive higher vote shares in 2017 (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt, 2011; Andeweg & Irwin, 
2009; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Redmond & Regan, 2015). We also expect the first ethnic 
minority on the list to receive higher vote shares. The first ethnic minority on the list 
was linked to the specific ethnic groups. Thus, for each party, the first candidate with a 
Turkish background was coded as the first ethnic minority but so too the first Moroccan, 
Surinamese/Antillean and other non-Western candidates. This does not include party 
leaders with an ethnic minority background, which is the case for Artikel 1, DENK and the 
Green Party (GL).
Other neighbourhood characteristics other than the share of ethnic groups may 
also influence the popularity of parties and candidates with specific characteristics 
(David & Van Hamme, 2011). Since non-Western ethnic minorities are more likely to live 
in neighbourhoods with a lower socioeconomic status, we control for the socioeconomic 
status of the neighbourhood (Cho et al., 2006; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a; Johnston et al., 
2000, 2004). As an indication of the neighbourhoods’ socioeconomic status, we included 
the average housing value in 2017 (Statistics Netherlands, 2018c). 
Another neighbourhood characteristic we expect to influence affinity voting is the 
presence of a mosque in the neighbourhood, which is a possible fertile place for Muslim 
candidates’ campaigns (Dancygier, 2017). An overview of the mosques in our cities of 
interest was derived from the website moskeewijzer.nl. Based on these data, we determined 
if a mosque was present in the neighbourhood. Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics of 
the neighbourhood characteristics. 
table 5.1 | Descriptive statistics neighbourhood characteristics (N=1,089)
% Range Mean S.D.
% Ethnic minorities 0 – 86 22.9 17.6
% Turkish minorities 0 – 37 4.1 5.3
% Moroccan minorities 0 – 42 4.5 6.3
% Surinamese/Antillean minorities 0 – 48 6.0 6.4
% Other non-Western minorities 0 – 47 8.2 5.1
Socioeconomic status (x 1000) 53 - 1608 215.0 106.3
Mosques 0 – 1 
- No  89.3
- Yes  10.7
Source: moskeewijzer.nl; Statistics Netherlands, 2018c.
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5.5  | Results
5.5.1 | Analytical strategy 
In our data, 69% of the votes were cast for a first candidate on the parties’ lists. Even 
though all candidates received at least one vote in at least one polling station, most 
candidates did not receive votes in every polling station. In total, 83.4% of the observations 
in our data are zeros. As shown in Figure 5.1, the distribution of vote share among non-
zero observations is heavily skewed. In principle, the original distribution – including zero 
observations – could be fitted by a zero-inflated beta regression model. In these models, 
the probability that an observation is zero is estimated and, simultaneously, the mean 
value is estimated for observations that are non-zero, considering the skewness among 
these observations. This is very similar to running a separate logistic regression (among 
all observations) predicting a zero-vote share and running a beta regression among the 
sample of observations with a vote share larger than zero that predicts the mean value 
among these observations.9 We decided to test our hypotheses among observations with 
a vote share larger than zero. We therefore deleted observations with a vote share of zero, 
leaving us with a working sample of 193,393 observations in which all 548 candidates are 
represented. We present the results from beta regression models. Within this sample the 
candidate vote share ranged from 0.01 to 0.68.10 For reasons of parsimony, we decided to 
only present and discuss the results pertaining to the beta regression models in our main 
text. Results for the zero-inflated beta regression models are available upon request.11 
figure 5.1 | Observed distribution of the proportion of votes among non-zero observations
Note: For reasons of clarity only the proportion of votes up to 0.20 are shown.
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After a presentation of descriptive results, we first test the general ethnic affinity 
hypothesis by including in the model to predict candidate’s vote share an interaction 
term between candidates’ ethnic background and the share of ethnic minorities in the 
neighbourhood (Model 1 in Table 5.3). In Model 2, we test whether affinity effects are 
stronger in neighbourhoods in which the ethnic minority population is relatively larger 
by including an additional interaction with the quadratic term of minority group size in 
the neighbourhood. The results of Models 1 and 2 are graphically summarised in Figure 
5.3. Thereafter, we examine whether ethnic affinity effects differ between parties by 
including interactions between party, the ethnic background of candidates and the share 
of the ethnic minority population in the neighbourhood. The results of this model are 
summarised in Figure 5.4. In Figure 5.5, we summarise specific co-ethnic affinity effects 
based on the model in which we included interaction effects between candidates’ specific 
ethnic background and the share of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood and party. Last, 
Figure 5.6 summarises the effect of candidates’ gender on ethnic affinity voting. 
In all models, we control for party leader effects, first ethnic minority on the list, re-
nominated candidates, party effects and (varying) party popularity across neighbourhoods 
with different minority populations. In Model 3, in which we examine party-dependent 
ethnic affinity effects, we also control for the socioeconomic status of the neighbourhood 
and the influence of a mosque on ethnic affinity voting by including main effects for these 
variables and interactions with the party variable. The additional analysis shows only 
minor changes in the ethnic affinity effects, which can be found in Table D.4 in Appendix 
D. These controls do not change the evaluation of the hypothesis and are therefore not 
included in the other models. 
5.5.2 | Descriptive results
Table 5.2 presents the number of candidates by ethnic group and for each party. Artikel 
1, DENK, the Christian Union (CU) and the Labour Party (PvdA) have the highest shares of 
ethnic minority candidates. Table 5.2 also shows that not all ethnic groups are represented 
on the candidate list of all parties. For instance, Artikel 1 has no Turkish minority candidate 
and 50Plus only has other non-Western ethnic minority candidates (i.e. no candidates with 
a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean background). We cannot estimate specific co-
ethnic affinity effects for those ethnic groups not represented on a party’s candidate list. 
Table 5.2 shows that 13% (71) of candidates had an ethnic minority background in 
2017. In total, 59.7% of the ethnic minority candidates were men. Table D.3 in Appendix 
D presents an overview of the gender of the candidates by party. Even though most 
candidates are men, the Socialist Party (SP) only has one female Moroccan minority; 
DENK and the Part for Freedom (PVV) only have female Surinamese/Antillean minority 
candidates; and the Labour Party (PvdA) and 50Plus only have female other non-Western 
minority candidates. 
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table 5.2 | Ethnic minority candidates on parties’ candidate lists (N=548)
 
figure 5.2 | Share of ethnic minority groups with Dutch citizenship in the total Dutch populationa 
and the share of ethnic minorities among candidates and MPs in 2017
 
Note: The share of ethnic minority candidates is slightly different if we would only include parties that 
won at least one seat in the parliamentary elections: 10.4% in total, 3.3% for Moroccan minorities, 3.6% 
for Turkish minorities, 1.6% for former colony minorities, and 1.8 for other non-Western minorities. aThis 
refers to the population eligible to vote (20 years or older; data from 18 years or older were not available). 
Source: Netherlands, 2018a, 2018b; Van der Zwan, 2018 (own calculations).
Dutch Turkish Moroccan Surinamese/
Antillean
Other
non-Western
Total
 N % N % N % N % N % N %
Art. 1 12 60.0 0 0.0 1 5.0 5 25.0 2 10.0 20 100
CDA 43 96.0 1 2.2 1 2.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 45 100
CU 44 88.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 4.0 4 8.0 50 100
DENK 2 11.1 9 50.0 3 16.7 2 11.1 2 11.1 18 100
D66 42 84.0 1 2.0 5 10.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 50 100
FvD 29 96.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.3 0 0.0 30 100
GL 45 90.0 3 6.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 1 2.0 50 100
PvdA 59 78.7 4 5.3 7 9.3 3 4.0 2 2.7 75 100
PVV 49 98.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 50 100
SP 40 90.9 3 6.8 1 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 44 100
VVD 77 96.3 1 1.3 2 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 80 100
50Plus 35 97.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.8 36 100
Total 477 87.0 22 4.0 21 3.8 15 2.7 13 2.4 548 100
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Figure 5.2 shows the share of non-Western ethnic minorities with Dutch citizenship in 
the total population with Dutch citizenship. The share of candidates with a non-Western 
ethnic background is 12.6%. This figure shows that, generally, non-Western ethnic 
minorities were overrepresented on candidate lists, but underrepresented in the House of 
Representatives in 2017. Both Turkish and Moroccan minority groups are overrepresented 
whereas former colony and other non-Western minorities are underrepresented on 
candidate lists and not represented in the House of Representatives. 
5.5.3 | Multivariate analysis
Our first step is to examine whether we find general ethnic affinity effects. We aim to 
know whether the share of ethnic minorities increases the share of votes for candidates 
with an ethnic minority background. The general ethnic affinity effect is represented 
by the interaction effect of candidate’s ethnic background with the share of ethnic 
minorities in the neighbourhood. The positive and significant interaction effect 
(b=0.006, Model 1, Table 5.3) shows that when the share of ethnic minorities in the 
neighbourhood increases, the likelihood for ethnic minority candidates to receive a 
larger share of the votes increases when compared with the share of votes candidates 
receive with a native Dutch background. This result supports Hypothesis 1. To ease 
interpretation, we graphically summarised the results of Model 1 (and Model 2) in 
Figure 5.3. For Figure 5.3, we calculated the predicted probabilities for ethnic minority 
candidates in neighbourhoods with varying shares of the ethnic minority population, 
ranging from 0% to 80%. The predicted probabilities presented are based on ethnic 
minority candidates not the party leader, the first ethnic minority on the list nor re-
nominated candidates (though it can be easily calculated from the model for these 
groups as well). The ethnic affinity effects for the candidates are controlled for (varying) 
popularity of political parties. The main effect of being an ethnic minority candidate is 
negative, showing that ethnic minority candidates have a lower vote share than native 
Dutch candidates.
As an example for the calculation of the probabilities presented in Figure 5.3, we 
will discuss the effects for candidates from DENK. The effects in Model 1 were used to 
calculate the logit for ethnic minority candidates from DENK in neighbourhoods with 
no ethnic minority population: -0.392+-6.99+(0.006*0)+(0.028*0)=-7.386. Using this 
logit, we calculated the predicted probability for ethnic minority candidates in these 
neighbourhoods: 1/(1+exp(-7.386))=0.001. The logit for ethnic minority candidates from 
DENK in neighbourhoods with the highest share of ethnic minorities (80%) is: -0.392+-
6.99+(0.006*80)+(0.028*80)=-4.674. The predicted probability for ethnic minority 
candidates in neighbourhoods in which 80% of the population has an ethnic minority 
background is: 1/(1+exp(-4.674))=0.009. These predicted probabilities seem quite small, 
but this is not very surprising because we do not focus on party leaders and when one 
considers the large number of candidates at 548, the vote shares of all 548 candidates add 
up to 100% in each polling station. 
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table 5.3 | Beta Regression models on candidates’ vote share; general ethnic affinity effects
Model 1 Model 2
B B
Ethnic Minority candidate (Dutch=ref.) -0.392*** -0.529***
(0.008) (0.011)
Party 
-     Art 1 -7.706*** -7.760***
(0.027) (0.028)
-     CDA -5.609*** -5.611***
(0.010) (0.010)
-     CU -6.397*** -6.400***
(0.013) (0.013)
-     DENK -6.994*** -7.061***
(0.017) (0.018)
-     D66 -5.260*** -5.262***
(0.007) (0.007)
-     FvD -6.525*** -6.528***
(0.015) (0.015)
-     GL -5.273*** -5.273***
(0.007) (0.008)
-     PvdA -5.727*** -5.733***
(0.008) (0.008)
-     PVV -5.479*** -5.481***
(0.009) (0.009)
-     SP -5.741*** -5.746***
(0.009) (0.009)
-     VVD -5.109*** -5.11***
(0.007) (0.007)
-     50Plus -6.527*** -6.532***
(0.013) (0.013)
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood 0.006*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.001)
Ethnic Minority candidate x % ethnic minorities in neighbourhood^2 -0.0002***
(0.000)
Control variables
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:
-     Art 1 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.001)
-     CDA -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     CU -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     DENK 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     D66 -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     FvD -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
-     GL -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     PvdA 0.000 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
-     PVV 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     SP 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
-     VVD -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000)
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figure 5.3 | Predicted probabilities for general ethnic affinity voting   
Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.3 shows the predicted probabilities based on 
Models 1 (dashed line) and 2 (solid line) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, 
first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party 
popularity in the neighbourhood.
-     50Plus 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Party leader 2.773*** 2.776***
(0.005) (0.005)
First ethnic minority on the list 0.708*** 0.708***
(0.005) (0.005)
Re-nominated candidate 2012 0.217*** 0.218***
(0.004) (0.004)
N 193,393 193,393
Global Deviance -1600333 -1600751
AIC -1600273 -1600689
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.001; ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10.
chapter 5
126
Hence, as shown in Figure 5.3 (dashed line), the predicted probability for ethnic minority 
candidates from DENK is 0.001 in neighbourhoods with no ethnic minority population 
and increases to 0.009 in neighbourhoods with a large ethnic minority population. The 
predicted probability increases more strongly for the first ethnic minority candidate from 
DENK – not the party leader – for whom it increases from 0.001 in neighbourhoods with 
no ethnic minorities to 0.019 in neighbourhoods in which 80% of the population has an 
ethnic minority background. Model 1 and Figure 5.3 show that ethnic minority candidates 
– irrespective of party – indeed receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods with a larger 
ethnic minority population, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
To test the second hypothesis, we included an interaction between candidate’s ethnic 
minority background and the quadratic term of the share of ethnic minorities in the 
neighbourhood. The interaction term denoting the ethnic affinity effect from Model 1 is 
stronger in Model 2 (b=0.019). The interaction with the quadratic term is negative though, 
suggesting a parabola instead of a hyperbola. However, to get a relevant interpretation 
from these logistic regression terms, we calculated the predicted probabilities based 
on the estimates of Model 2 and summarised them in Figure 5.3 (solid line). In line with 
the mobilisation hypothesis, Figure 5.3 shows that in the model with the quadratic term 
(Model 2), ethnic affinity effects are stronger than in Model 1. Ethnic affinity effects appear 
to be stronger for almost every party in neighbourhoods with a substantial ethnic minority 
population, specifically in neighbourhoods in which the share of the population with an 
ethnic minority background is 40% or higher. Once again, the predicted probabilities are 
stronger for the first ethnic minority on the list. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test confirms 
that Model 2 has a significant better fit than Model 1. Hence, these results indeed suggest 
that general ethnic affinity effects are stronger when the ethnic minority population 
becomes larger (H2).
In the first model, we estimated the overall ethnic affinity effect, assuming it to 
have the same gradient for each party (i.e. the logit referring to the ethnic affinity effect 
is constant across parties). To more rigorously test for party-dependent ethnic affinity 
effects, we included a three-way interaction between candidates with an ethnic minority 
background, the share of the ethnic minority population in a neighbourhood and party. 
Figure 5.4 shows the parties for which we found ethnic affinity effects; the full model can 
be found in Table D.4 in Appendix D. We find significant effects for all parties. But for some 
parties these effects are negative, which is not in line with the ethnic affinity thesis. First, 
we find ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates affiliated with Artikel 1, DENK, 
the Labour Party (PvdA), the Green Party (GL), the Socialist Party (SP), the Cristian Union 
(CU), Forum for Democracy (FvD) and the Elderly Party (50Plus). These candidates receive a 
higher proportion of the votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population. 
Only for the (centre)right-wing parties (CDA, VVD, D66, PVV) did we find that when the 
ethnic minority population is larger, the proportion of votes for ethnic minority candidates 
significantly decreases. General ethnic affinity effects are strongest for the minority-
oriented party DENK, but much weaker for Artikel 1. Hence, we find significant ethnic 
affinity effects for candidates from the left-wing parties and no ethnic affinity effects for 
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ethnic minority candidates from right-wing parties. Based on these results we can only 
partly support Hypothesis 3 that general ethnic affinity effects are strongest for candidates 
affiliated with minority-oriented parties, followed by left-wing and right-wing parties.12
figure 5.4 | Predicted probabilities for party-dependent ethnic affinity voting 
Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.4 shows the predicted probabilities based 
on Model 3a (see Table D.4 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, 
first ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party 
popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for ethnic minority candidates all significantly differ from 
those of native Dutch candidates. 
Co-ethnic affinity effects are summarised in Figure 5.5 (see Table D.5 in Appendix D for 
model estimates).13 Since general ethnic affinity effects were only found for DENK and left-
wing parties, we test co-ethnic affinity effects for these parties only. 
Figure 5.5 shows that in neighbourhoods with a larger Turkish minority population, 
the proportion of votes for candidates of Turkish origin is significantly larger for all parties. 
For candidates with a Moroccan background, we find significant ethnic affinity effects 
for candidates from DENK and the Labour Party (PvdA). However, the proportion of votes 
for candidates of Moroccan origin from the Socialist Party (SP) significantly decreases 
in neighbourhoods with a larger Moroccan minority population. For candidates with a 
Surinamese or Antillean background we find ethnic affinity effects for Artikel 1, the Christian 
Union (CU) and the Labour Party (PvdA) but not for DENK. With two exceptions – Moroccan 
origin candidates from the SP and Surinamese/Antillean from DENK – our findings support 
Hypothesis 4a that in a neighbourhood with a larger number of co-ethnics, co-ethnic 
candidates receive higher vote shares. As becomes clear from Figure 5.5, we do not see a 
clear order of affinity voting effects between the ethnic groups. Based on these results, we 
cannot support Hypothesis 4b that ethnic affinity effects are strongest for those with a 
Turkish background, followed by Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean backgrounds.
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figure 5.5 | Predicted probabilities for co-ethnic affinity voting by party 
Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.5 shows the predicted probabilities based on 
Model 4 (see Table D.5 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first 
ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates.13 We also controlled for party, and for party 
popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for Surinamese/Antillean origin candidates from DENK do 
not significantly differ from those of native Dutch candidates. 
The results by which we test Hypothesis 5 are graphically summarised in Figure 5.6 (see 
Table D.6 in Appendix D for model estimates). Figure 5.6 shows that, as expected, for 
Turkish and Moroccan origin candidates from the Socialist Party (SP) and the Labour Party 
(PvdA) there are stronger ethnic affinity effects for men than for women. However, these 
effects do not significantly differ for Turkish origin candidates from the Labour Party 
(PvdA) and for DENK there are strong ethnic affinity effects for the male party leader, but 
not for other male Turkish origin candidates from DENK. Moreover, we find stronger ethnic 
affinity effects for female than for male Turkish origin candidates from the Green Party 
(GL). Thus, we do not find full support for Hypothesis 5a that ethnic affinity effects among 
candidates with a Turkish or Moroccan background are stronger for men than for women. 
Figure 5.6 also shows that ethnic affinity effects are stronger for Surinamese/Antillean 
female candidates than for male candidates from Artikel 1 and the Labour Party (PvdA), 
which is in line with Hypothesis 5b. However, among Surinamese/Antillean female 
candidates from the Christian Union ethnic affinity effects are stronger for men than for 
women. Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5b. 
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figure 5.6 | Predicted probabilities for gender-dependent co-ethnic affinity voting by party 
Note: EMCs refers to ethnic minority candidates. Figure 5.6 shows the predicted probabilities based on 
Model 5 (see Table D.6 in Appendix D) for ethnic minority candidates who are not the party leader, first 
ethnic minority on the list nor re-nominated candidates. We also controlled for party and for party 
popularity in the neighbourhood. The effects for male candidates from DENK and GL do not significantly 
differ from the effect for male native Dutch candidates from DENK and GL. The effect for female Turkish 
origin candidates from the PvdA does not significantly differ from the effect for male Turkish origin 
candidates from the PvdA.  
5.6 | Conclusion and discussion
The aim of this study was to test conditions under which ethnic affinity effects are stronger. 
The Dutch PR system with ethnic minority candidates on almost every parties’ candidate 
list and compulsory candidate voting gave us the opportunity for a detailed study, 
with 193,393 observations, of ethnic affinity voting. Moreover, the Dutch parliamentary 
elections of 2017 with two minority-oriented parties provided a unique context to do so. 
The current study finds evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis, but the extent to which 
chapter 5
130
ethnic affinity effects are found varies depending on candidates’ party affiliation, ethnic 
background and gender. In line with the general ethnic affinity hypothesis, we found that 
in neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, ethnic minority candidates 
receive a larger proportion of the votes. These affinity voting effects are stronger in 
neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, which is consistent with the 
mobilisation hypothesis. Differentiating between parties, we found that ethnic affinity 
effects are most prominent for candidates affiliated with the minority-oriented DENK and 
left-wing parties and weak or absent for (centre)right-wing parties. Evidence from this 
study for the preference for co-ethnic candidates within left-wing parties provides further 
support for the importance of ethnic background in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. 
It may be that minority-oriented and left-wing parties use a vote-based inclusion strategy 
and are therefore more successful in attracting the ethnic vote whereas right-wing parties 
mainly use a symbolic inclusion strategy (Dancygier, 2017). Right-wing parties might 
nominate candidates with an ethnic background on their lists who are not strongly tied to 
their ethnic community. 
In addition to party-dependent ethnic affinity voting, we examined co-ethnic affinity 
voting. Our research found evidence for ethnic affinity effects for all ethnic groups, but 
again, they are party-dependent. A notable finding is that co-ethnic affinity effects are 
particularly strong for candidates of Turkish or Moroccan origin affiliated with DENK. We 
found that ethnic minority candidates predominantly receive support in neighbourhoods 
with a larger concentration of their own ethnic group, even within minority-oriented 
parties. Another interesting finding is the relatively small ethnic affinity effects among 
Turkish and Moroccan origin candidates affiliated with the Labour Party (PvdA). Our 
results suggest that the Labour Party’s electoral loss may indeed be partly due to the loss 
of ethnic minority voters to DENK in neighbourhoods with a larger share of Turkish or 
Moroccan origin population. Ethnic affinity effects for minority-interest party Artikel 1 are 
not as strong as expected among candidates with a Surinamese or Antillean background. 
Last, our study shows that a candidate’s gender influences ethnic affinity voting. 
Some results, however, contrast with our expectations. For Turkish and Moroccan origin 
candidates, co-ethnic affinity effects are stronger for male than for female candidates. 
There is one interesting exception: for the Green Party (GL), we find that co-ethnic affinity 
effects are stronger for Turkish origin female candidates are stronger than for Turkish origin 
male candidates. One possible explanation might be that voters for the Green Party (GL) are, 
in line with what the party stands for, relatively progressive and therefore prefer a female 
candidate from their own ethnic group over a male candidate. Moreover, co-ethnic effects 
are stronger for female candidates than for male candidates from Surinamese/Antillean 
origin, except for those affiliated with the Christian Union (CU). Voters for the Christian 
Party might hold more conservative gender role norms, which may explain why we find 
stronger ethnic affinity effects for male than for female candidates affiliated with this party. 
The generalisability of these results is subject to certain limitations. First, it is 
important to bear in mind that aggregated data do not reflect individual voting behaviour. 
Nonetheless, our level of analysis is so low that the ethnic affinity effects we found are also 
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likely to exist among individual voters. Moreover, the neighbourhood data about the share 
of ethnic minorities do not provide us with information about the citizenship of these 
ethnic minorities. It is very likely that not all ethnic minorities have Dutch nationality 
and are eligible to vote. That the share of eligible ethnic minority voters is possibly lower 
indicates, however, that our result might even underestimate ethnic affinity effects.
Further research should be undertaken to investigate if ethnic affinity effects in 
national elections are present in other Western European countries – including those 
with a PR-system – and under which conditions. This study has shown the relevance 
of examining whether ethnic affinity voting varies between parties and ethnic groups. 
Survey data with information about voters’ candidate preferences could provide more 
definitive evidence about the mechanisms behind ethnic affinity voting. For instance, 
such data could explore the reasons why ethnic minorities vote for a co-ethnic candidate 
and the role ethnic identification and ethnic communities play in that choice. However, 
since ethnic minorities are often underrepresented in surveys, especially those less well 
integrated, the value of aggregated election data should not be underestimated.
Our research has given strong evidence of co-ethnic ethnic affinity voting. With the 
rise of the minority-oriented party DENK, we find that party-dependent ethnic affinity 
voting is particularly strong. For the Labour Party (PvdA), which traditionally attracted the 
ethnic minority vote, ethnic affinity effects are considerably smaller. With the collapse of 
many social-democratic parties, we can expect that ethnic minority candidates from new 
minority-oriented parties will become successful in other European countries as well. 
Notes
1  Our main focus is on ethnic affinity effects for ethnic minority candidates. 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis implies that in neighbourhoods with a larger native 
Dutch population, native Dutch candidates receive larger vote shares as well.
2  For some cities, information at the polling level station was not available on the 
website of the Dutch Electoral Council, for these cities data were obtained via the 
municipalities. 
3  The cities included are: ’s-Hertogenbosch, Almere, Alphen aan den Rijn, Amersfoort, 
Amsterdam, Apeldoorn, Arnhem, Dordrecht Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Haarlem, 
Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Zaanstad, Zoetermeer and Zwolle. 
4  In Dordrecht, voters are not assigned to a specific polling station.
5  The Netherlands has twenty voting districts, which exist mainly for administrative 
reasons. PvdA, 50Plus, SP and CDA have candidate lists that slightly differ between 
districts. We did not include these regional candidates.
6  The Surinamese/Antillean group includes minorities from Aruba. Although native 
Dutch and other non-Western candidates are included in our data, these are not the 
groups of interest in this study and therefore not discussed in the results section. 
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7  Municipalities are responsible for the polling stations, but there are no formal rules 
for the number and location of polling stations. It is therefore possible that multiple 
polling stations are located in the same neighbourhood.
8  For the polling stations for which such information was available, we calculated the 
voter turnout for a polling station by dividing the number of cast votes by the number 
of voters appointed to that polling station. A Pearson correlation shows that the 
correlation between turnout and the share of Turkish minorities in a neighbourhood is 
-0.20: -0.22 for the share of Moroccan minorities and -0.28 for the share of Surinamese/
Antillean minorities. The correlation between turnout and the share of native 
Dutch in a neighbourhood is 0.31. This shows that even though turnout is lower in 
neighbourhoods with larger ethnic minority populations, there are no large differences 
between ethnic minority groups.
9  Fitting an OLS predicting the mean among this sample would lead to biased estimates 
due to the highly skewed nature of this dependent variable (see Figure 5.1).
10  The beta regression models are estimated in R with package gamlss.dist. We used the 
logit link function. Model 3 was rerun using a beta zero-inflated beta regression model 
on the sample including zero observations to check the robustness of our results, 
which can be found in Table D.7 in Appendix D.
11  We recognise that an alternative – or complementary – way to test our hypotheses 
would be to predict whether candidates received at least some votes in each polling 
station (by running a logistic regression on our original sample with a dichotomised 
dependent variable vote share, or by running the zero-inflated beta regression model 
on our original sample).
12  Model 4 gives us insights in affinity voting among native Dutch. The interactions 
between the % of co-ethnics and party show the effects for Dutch candidates (see 
Table D.5 in Appendix D). We learn that native Dutch candidates affiliated with CDA, 
D66, FvD and the VVD receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods with a larger native 
Dutch population. 
13  Since Artikel 1, DENK and the Green Party (GL) have party leaders with an ethnic 
minority background, we also included an additional interaction effect for these party 
leaders. By so doing, we disentangle ethnic affinity effects for the party leader and 
other candidates with the same ethnic background within those three parties. For 
Artikel 1 and DENK, these effects clearly show that the party leaders receive higher vote 
proportions than other candidates with the same background. We cannot compare 
the effect for the party leader of the Green Party (GL), who has Moroccan origins, since 
there are no other candidates of Moroccan origin nominated by this party.
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6.1 | Introduction
Whereas the Netherlands was once famous for its multiculturalism, integration and 
migration have become the topics of hotly contested public and political debates over 
the past decades. The period under investigation in this thesis, in combination with 
the Dutch societal and political contexts, makes it highly interesting for studying the 
political integration of ethnic minorities. Even though parties from across the political 
spectrum nominated candidates from an ethnic minority background in 2010 and 2012, 
the Labour Party (PvdA) was known as the party for ethnic minorities. In 2014, however, the 
minority-oriented party DENK was founded and managed to win three seats in the 2017 
parliamentary elections. Within a period of seven years, the political landscape developed 
in a way quite unique for Europe. Simultaneously, diversity and inclusion have become 
increasingly salient in current debates. Not only have parties like DENK and Artikel 1 
increased the share of ethnic minority candidates that voters can choose from, but there 
have also been initiatives for debates on racist stereotypes and policy measures to reduce 
incidences of discrimination and to increase minority groups in top positions. In this 
context, this thesis investigated ethnic diversity within political parties and the House for 
Representatives. Moreover, it studied whether increased ethnic diversity within parties, 
more specifically on candidate lists, is related to the vote choice of ethnic minority voters. 
This thesis has made several contributions to the literature. First, emphasising 
the importance of party characteristics in descriptive representation, it tested new 
hypotheses on the effects of party characteristics on the nomination of ethnic minority 
candidates. Additionally, looking further than only nomination, it studied the influence 
of party characteristics on ethnic minority candidates’ list position and whether they 
are placed in winnable, i.e. safe, or unwinnable list positions. Second, this thesis has 
contributed to the ethnic voting literature in several ways. I combined theoretical insights 
from the representation literature and the ethnic voting literature to examine how both 
substantive and descriptive representation affect the vote choice of ethnic minorities. 
By means of this, I have expanded upon existing explanations for ethnic minorities’ 
vote choice. Third, this thesis provided a comprehensive assessment of ethnic affinity 
voting. I studied the conditions under which ethnic minority candidates receive larger 
vote shares. In this regard, this is one of the first European studies to have such a detailed 
analysis of ethnic affinity voting at national level elections. Fourth, the collected data, 
in combination with other data sources, provided new possibilities for studying ethnic 
minority representation and ethnic voting. The innovative analytical methods used in this 
study may be applied in future studies of both ethnic minority representation and ethnic 
minority voting. 
The study’s main findings and implication are presented in Section 6.2, while, in 
Section 6.3, the study’s limitations and directions for future research are discussed. 
Section 6.4 describes the implications for the broader context, and the final section in this 
chapter provides a general conclusion for this thesis. 
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6.2 | Research questions and main findings 
6.2.1 | Part 1: The descriptive representation of ethnic minorities
In this section, I begin with a discussion of the main findings of Part 1 and provide an 
answer to the research question. In Section 6.2.2, I outline the most relevant results and 
answer the questions presented in Part 2 of this thesis.
The first question of this thesis sought to determine the extent to which Western 
and non-Western minority groups were represented on national candidate lists and 
in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands and how this was affected by party 
characteristics. In this regard, the research question in Chapter 2 was: 
 ‘To what extent do party characteristics affect the descriptive representation of Western 
and non-Western minority groups on national candidate lists and in the House of 
Representatives in the Netherlands?’ 
To summarise, whereas Turkish and Moroccan minorities are quite well represented on 
the national candidate lists of Dutch political parties and in the House of Representatives, 
minorities with a Western, former colony, or other non-Western background were 
underrepresented in 2012. In Chapter 5, a similar picture emerged for the 2017 national 
elections. It has mostly been the left-wing political parties and the social-liberal D66 that 
have nominated ethnic minority candidates. This study has shown that the extent to which 
ethnic minority groups are descriptively represented differs between ethnic groups and 
between political parties. The share of candidates and MPs with a Western, former colony, 
or other non-Western background is lower than the share of these groups in society. This 
contrasts with Turkish and Moroccan minorities, who were well represented on candidate 
lists and in the House of Representatives, both in 2012 and 2017. The results of Chapter 2 
also indicate that higher shares of ethnic minority candidates on candidate lists are related 
to higher shares of ethnic minority candidates in safe list positions and to a higher share of 
ethnic minority Members of Parliament (MPs). The parties with the highest shares of ethnic 
minority candidates on their lists and in the House of Representatives are the social-liberal 
D66, the Green Party (GL), and the Labour Party (PvdA). 
A second objective of this chapter was to examine if party characteristics have an 
influence on the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. The results of my study 
showed that the nomination of ethnic minorities is indeed related to party characteristics. 
The most important finding was that parties with permissive views on migration and 
integration, which are usually in the interest of ethnic minority citizens, also express this 
descriptively. Regarding list position, I found that non-Western minority candidates in 
particular are nominated for lower list positions than native Dutch candidates in parties 
that are more restrictive towards migration and integration. Moreover, the nomination of 
ethnic minority candidates seems to benefit from ethnic minority support within parties. 
Political parties with some form of support for ethnic minorities within the party nominate 
more candidates from an ethnic minority background. Whereas ethnic minority support 
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seems to increase the chances for nomination, it does not affect the position in which 
ethnic minority candidates are placed; neither does it affect placement in either a safe or 
unsafe list position. The last party characteristic under study was the inclusiveness of the 
selectorate. Contrary to my expectations, I found that the make-up of the selectorate – the 
body responsible for the selection of candidates for the candidate list – is not related to 
the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. 
6.2.2 | Theoretical implications of the findings on the descriptive 
representation of ethnic minorities 
The finding that ethnic minorities are politically underrepresented is consistent with the 
existing literature on other Western countries (Bloemraad, 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska, 
2013; Murray, 2016; Sobolewska, 2013; Zapata-Barrero, 2017). Despite the evidence found 
for the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, this study also concurs with earlier 
observations that, in comparison to other Western countries, levels of descriptive 
representation are relatively high in the Netherlands (Bloemraad, 2013; Ruedin, 2013b). 
Moreover, this study supports evidence from previous observations that the level of 
descriptive representation varies between ethnic groups (Mügge, 2016). The ethnic groups 
with the highest levels of representation, i.e. Turkish and Moroccan minorities, are most 
often the subject of current (critical) debates in the Netherlands. Moreover, the share of 
candidates and MPs from former colonies did not mirror the share in the population in 
2012 and 2017. A striking finding is that no MPs with a former colony background, as one 
of the largest minority groups in the Netherlands, were elected in 2017. Additionally, it 
provides the first assessment of the descriptive representation of Western minorities in 
the Netherlands, showing that Western minorities were clearly underrepresented in 2012. 
This thesis found an association between the substantive representation of ethnic 
minorities’ interests within parties and their level of descriptive representation. While some 
studies found evidence for this link before, this is one of the first studies to find support 
for this association in the European context (Sobolowska, McKee & Campbell, 2018; Minta, 
2009; Bratton & Haynie, 1999). One note of caution is due here, since causality cannot be 
established. It is very likely that it is not one sort of representation leading to the other but 
that both are established simultaneously. The found relationship between substantive and 
descriptive representation is nevertheless an important finding, since it shows that most 
political parties do more than just include – possibly symbolic – ethnic minority candidates. 
For the other two party characteristics under study, I found less evidence in line with 
my expectations. First, even though ethnic minority support within parties was found to 
be related to a higher share of ethnic minority candidates, it did not affect placement in 
certain list positions. This inconsistency with the previous literature may be due to changes 
in the political context. Whereas ethnic minority networks within political parties were 
quite influential in the Netherlands in the 1990s, they are considered to be less influential 
nowadays (Mügge, 2016). Attention within parties has shifted to a broader concept of 
diversity. The idea that support for minority groups within political parties could affect 
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the level of descriptive representation comes from the literature on the representation of 
women (Caul, 1999; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kunovich & Paxton, 2005; Matland & Studlar, 
1996). It is possible that targets or quotas are not as beneficial for ethnic minorities as they 
have been for women (Celis et al., 2014; Ruedin, 2013a). Hence, ethnic minority support 
may have been beneficial for ethnic minority representation in the past, but changes in 
the political discourse, for example by setting up more general diversity networks, may 
have reduced this influence. 
Second, contributing to the literature by studying the composition of selectorates 
rather than the selection methods themselves, I did not find evidence that this affected 
ethnic minorities’ descriptive representation. An explanation for my unexpected findings 
may be that the differences in selection methods between Dutch political parties are not 
substantial enough to yield an effect. 
In summary, the theoretical framework I proposed in the first empirical study of this 
thesis proved partly useful in explaining descriptive representation. Based on my findings, 
I strongly recommend expanding upon my theoretical framework by including other party 
characteristics and propose a deeper investigation of the role that the selectorate plays in 
descriptive representation. I did not find an effect of the inclusiveness of the selectorate 
on descriptive representation, a possible explanation for which is that only formal rules 
were measured. Parties’ selection methods are highly complex and difficult to study. 
Although I provided an overview of the formal selection rules of Dutch political parties, 
there are most likely many informal rules and traditions. A study into the influence of the 
composition of the selectorate that takes into account both formal and informal selection 
rules may shed more light on this issue.  
Additionally, I looked at the composition of the selectorate that had the final say on 
the candidate list. Future research should also examine the influence of the selectorate 
that has the first say about the candidate list. In these studies, it would be interesting 
to derive propositions from theoretical approaches used in labour market research on 
the discrimination of ethnic minorities. More specifically, a test of taste-based theories 
and statistical discrimination theories could produce interesting findings regarding the 
selection process of ethnic minorities (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Zschrinst & Didier, 2016). 
As argued by some scholars in the field, it is possible that selectorates nominate symbolic 
candidates who have an ethnic minority background but are very similar to traditional 
candidates in other aspects (Dancygier, 2017; Durose et al., 2012; van der Zwan & Turner-
Zwinkels, 2017). Further research on these questions would be a useful way to shed light 
onto whether the party strategies that political parties use to deal with the inclusion of 
ethnic minorities are a result of a conscious policy or of unconscious processes based on 
stereotypes (Dancygier, 2017). 
6.2.3 | Part 2: The vote choice of ethnic minorities
The purpose of the second part of this thesis was to examine the vote choice of ethnic 
minority voters. After establishing the extent to which ethnic minorities were descriptively 
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represented in the Netherlands, my aim was to determine the extent to which both 
substantive and descriptive representation affect the party and candidate choice of ethnic 
minority voters. Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the vote choice of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands and Canada,1 while Chapter 5 set out to study the extent to which ethnic 
minority candidates attracted the ethnic vote.
The main goal of Chapters 3 and 4 was to test the influence of substantive and 
descriptive representation on ethnic minorities’ vote choice. Moreover, I tested their 
influence in relation to ethnic minorities’ individual characteristics. The question I aimed 
to answer was: 
 ‘To what extent do substantive and descriptive representation play a role in explaining 
vote choice among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands and Canada?’ 
I tested the same theoretical propositions in two countries with different political systems 
and approaches to multiculturalism. In both countries, I found evidence that parties’ 
issue positions affects vote choice. However, I did not find that descriptive representation 
affected the vote choice of ethnic minorities in Canada. Moreover, the relationship 
between substantive and descriptive representation and vote choice was not always 
dependent on voters’ characteristics, as was theoretically anticipated.
The findings in Chapter 3 showed that, especially among ethnic minorities with 
a Turkish and Moroccan background but also among minorities with a former colony 
background, the Labour Party (PvdA) was popular. I found that ethnic minorities with a 
lower socioeconomic status and with a stronger ethnic identity are more likely to vote 
for the Labour Party (PvdA). I nevertheless want to emphasise that not all ethnic minority 
groups support the Labour Party (PvdA) or other left-wing parties. There is more variation 
in vote choice for minorities with a Western or other non-Western background (i.e. not 
a Turkish, Moroccan, or former colony background). For instance, the vote share for the 
Liberal Party (VVD) and the anti-immigrant party (PVV) among the other non-Western 
minorities and Western minorities is also noteworthy. 
One of the significant findings to emerge from Chapter 3 is that both substantive 
and descriptive representation are relevant among ethnic minorities for party choice. 
The results suggest that the influence of parties’ positions on economic issues and on 
migration and integration issues affect the vote choice of non-Western minorities, but 
that this is not dependent on their individual characteristics. More specifically, parties 
with higher shares of ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive votes from 
ethnic minority voters. The findings reveal the relevance of co-ethnic background: 
the share of candidates with a specific ethnic background, e.g. a Turkish background, 
affects the vote choice of minorities with a co-ethnic background, e.g. Turkish minority 
voters. Moreover, the influence of descriptive representation on vote choice is stronger 
for Western ethnic minority voters who identify stronger with their ethnic groups. It is 
remarkable that this was not found among non-Western minorities. 
In Chapter 4, the objective of the study was to determine how the party choice of 
ethnic minorities is related to parties’ substantive and descriptive representation in the 
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Canadian context. The results of this study show that the centrist Liberal Party was the 
most popular among ethnic minorities in Canada. Almost 60% of minorities stated that 
they would vote for this party. In total, 18% of voters would vote for the left-wing NDP and 
22% for the Conservatives. Although this finding corresponds with the outcomes of other 
studies on the ethnic vote in Canada, it contrasts with research in other Western countries 
where ethnic minorities largely support left-wing parties. 
With regard to representation, the results of Chapter 4 did not show the expected 
effects of substantive and descriptive representation on the vote choice of ethnic 
minorities. Parties that are economically more right-wing, socially more conservative, 
and – in contrast to my expectations – more restrictive on immigration issues are more 
popular among ethnic minority voters in Canada. Moreover, the effects of parties’ issue 
positions on party choice does not differ between minorities depending on their own 
issue positions. These results show that representation does not always affect vote choice 
as expected.
6.2.4 | Possible explanations for the findings in The Netherlands and Canada 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I tested the significance of parties’ substantive and descriptive 
representation as additional explanations for the party choice of ethnic minorities. 
The results suggest that, among non-Western minorities in particular, substantive 
representation indeed seems to be a relevant explanation for minorities’ vote choice in 
the Netherlands. My findings suggest that the preference for certain parties among ethnic 
minorities can partly be explained by their position on economic, social, and minority 
issues. Minorities tend to prefer parties with economically leftist views and permissive 
standpoints on minority issues in the Netherlands, whereas minorities prefer parties with 
more economically rightist views and socially conservative issue positions in Canada. 
In the studies on these two countries, the most popular party among ethnic minorities 
is not always the party theoretically predicted to best represent their interests. This 
discrepancy may explain why I did not find persuasive evidence – in the Netherlands or 
in Canada – for my expectation that the influence of substantive representation would 
be dependent on the characteristics of ethnic minority voters. Many Western countries, 
the Netherlands and Canada included, have one political party that has been particularly 
supportive of migration and integration issues and has been a pioneer in the descriptive 
representation of the ethnic minority electorate. It is therefore likely that the historical 
connections of both the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) and the Canadian Liberal Party with the 
ethnic community have resulted in a norm among ethnic minority voters to vote for these 
parties, which may be due to socialisation within this community. Although difficult to 
prove, historical ties between ethnic minority groups and specific parties could be an 
important explanation for the vote choice of ethnic minorities. 
My findings may be an indication that a group norm is more important than self-
interests or even group interests in voting. If self-interest had been relevant, I would 
have expected the influence of substantive representation to be dependent on voters’ 
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characteristics, especially with regard to economic issues. If group interest had prevailed, 
I would have expected ethnic minorities in the Netherlands to have voted for the Socialist 
Party (SP), the Green Party (GL), or even the social-liberal party (D66) considering their 
issues positions on economic issues and migration and integration issues. However, both 
of these expectations were unfounded. One exception on issue alignment between parties 
and voters is my finding regarding social issue positions in Canada. The results show 
that minorities who oppose gay rights are significantly more likely to vote for socially 
conservative parties. That this was not found for gender role attitudes may be explained 
by issue salience. In this regard, it is possible that gay rights are a particular salient issue 
among ethnic minority voters in Canada.
Another possible explanation for the result that the effects of parties’ issue positions 
are not conditional on voters’ characteristics is that none of the parties fully succeeded in 
representing ethnic minorities’ substantive interests, e.g. by combining minority-specific 
interests and social-conservative issue positions. This may have been one of the reasons 
why DENK was able to win seats in the 2017 Dutch national elections. Whether similar 
developments are possible in other Western countries depends on the electoral system, 
the ethnic composition, and the strength of the ethnic community.
Whereas descriptive representation has an influence on ethnic minorities’ vote 
choice in the Netherlands, it does not in Canada. The difference between the Netherlands 
and Canada may be influenced by the political system. In the Dutch PR system, where 
voters can choose between multiple candidates on a parties’ candidate list, descriptive 
representation may be more visible than in Canada. In the Canadian first-past-the-post 
system, party effects may override candidate effects. Moreover, the ethnic minority status 
of a candidate may be less relevant in ridings where more than one party nominated an 
ethnic minority candidate, which is rather common. 
To conclude, I did not find substantial evidence that the influence of parties’ 
substantive and descriptive representation is conditional on voters’ characteristics. If this 
outcome holds in other contexts than the Netherlands and Canada, and if socialisation 
is indeed important in ethnic minorities’ vote choice, this is consistent with sociological 
theories of voting that emphasise the importance of socialisation and the role that ethnic 
communities play in political integration. 
6.2.5 | Ethnic affinity voting
The final research question in this thesis was: 
  ‘Under which conditions did ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in the 
Dutch parliamentary election of 2017?’ 
Building on Chapters 3 and 4, this study further examined the influence of ethnic 
minority candidates on vote choice. It has, as one of the first studies in this context, 
found evidence for the ethnic affinity thesis at national-level elections in a country with 
a PR-system. Ethnic minority candidates receive higher vote shares in neighbourhoods 
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with a larger ethnic minority population. This study therefore supports the thesis that 
ethnic affinity voting exists in the Netherlands. Ethnic affinity effects are even stronger 
in neighbourhoods with a more substantial ethnic minority population. This finding 
supports the mobilisation hypothesis, which predicts that mobilisation in strong ethnic 
communities affects the vote choice of ethnic minority voters. However, ethnic affinity 
effects vary depending on the parties that candidates are affiliated with, their ethnic 
background, and their gender. One interesting finding was that ethnic affinity effects 
were most prominent for candidates from the minority-oriented party DENK and for left-
wing parties. For (centre)right-wing parties, ethnic affinity effects were weak or absent. 
Ethnic minority candidates mainly attract votes from their own ethnic groups, and ethnic 
affinity effects are generally stronger for male than for female candidates.
6.2.6 | Theoretical implications of the findings on ethnic affinity voting
This study found support for the ethnic affinity thesis and has shown that ethnic affinity 
effects are not only present in majoritarian systems but also in PR systems. This contributes 
to the European literature on ethnic affinity voting, which has largely concentrated on 
either majoritarian systems, experiments, or local elections (Barreto, 2007; Bejarano & 
Segura, 2007; Teney et al., 2010; Besco, 2015; Goodyear-Grant & Tolley, 2017; McConnaughy 
et al., 2010; Philpot & Walton, 2007; Stokes-Brown, 2006). Moreover, the results of this 
study emphasise the importance of taking variations in ethnic affinity effects between 
parties, ethnic groups, and gender into account. In line with the findings from Chapter 
2 that ethnic minority voters mainly support left-wing parties, I found evidence for the 
preference for co-ethnic candidates within left-wing parties. Moreover, the findings from 
Chapter 5 provide further support for the relevance of ethnic background in the vote 
choice of ethnic minorities. Further, the results imply that minority-oriented and left-
wing parties used a vote-based inclusion strategy and were therefore more successful in 
attracting the ethnic vote, whereas right-wing parties mainly used a symbolic inclusion 
strategy (Dancygier, 2017). Right-wing parties may have nominated candidates with an 
ethnic background on their lists that are not strongly tied to their ethnic community. 
Another possible explanation for this finding is that right-wing ethnic minority voters 
in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population do not have a strong ethnic 
identity and/or are less integrated in their ethnic communities and are therefore less likely 
to vote for an ethnic minority candidate. My research also finds evidence for co-ethnic 
affinity voting; ethnic minority candidates mainly seem to attract votes from ethnic 
minority voters from the same ethnic background. Even within parties with the specific 
aim of representing ethnic minority interests, ethnic minority candidates predominantly 
attract votes from co-ethnics. This suggests that, at least for Turkish and Moroccan 
minorities, ties to their own ethnic groups are still very relevant. 
 Finally, this study has found that ethnic affinity effects are generally stronger 
for male than for female candidates. The findings on the influence of gender on ethnic 
affinity effects shows that, in neighbourhoods with a larger share of Turkish or Moroccan 
conclusion
145
inhabitants, male ethnic minority candidates are often preferred over female ethnic 
minority candidates. Although we cannot directly test the effects of gender role attitudes 
on candidate choice, these results suggest that gender role norms affect candidate choice. 
6.3 | Limitations and directions for future research
In this section, I will provide directions for future research, partly based on some of 
the limitations of my thesis. First, this study has drawn attention to the testing of 
hypotheses for non-Western and Western minorities. Moreover, I was able to disentangle 
representation and ethnic affinity vote effects between ethnic minorities of varying 
origins. Notwithstanding this innovation, I was limited by the lack of information on 
ethnic groups. In Chapters 2 and 3, I was able to test the differences between specific 
ethnic groups, including those of Western origin, but I was prevented by data availability 
from doing the same in Chapters 4 and 5. However, grouping together Western minorities 
does not do justice to the variation among Western minorities nor to other non-Western 
minorities. It is unfortunate that current data restricted the examination of group-
specific mechanisms in more detail. One of the reasons for this limitation is that much 
survey research up to now has focused on traditional non-Western groups, whereas the 
difficulty of sampling ethnic minority respondents is another restraint. With the focus 
on ten minority groups from different origins, the MIFARE data used in Chapter 3 made 
an important contribution to including a variety of ethnic minority groups. However, 
social groups that people belong to can be defined by more than just ethnic background. 
For instance, socioeconomic position, religion, gender, and the extent to which people 
identify with their ethnic backgrounds may influence their political behaviour. It was not 
always possible to address these factors. 
In particular, I did not examine the impact of religion on vote choice. While many 
Turkish, Moroccan, and possibly other non-Western minorities are Muslim, Western 
minorities are more likely to be Christian. Among ethnic minority voters, religion and 
ethnic background strongly overlap, which makes it difficult to disentangle these effects. 
However, ethnic minorities that are often Muslim, i.e. those with a Turkish and Moroccan 
background, are more likely to vote for co-ethnic candidates. My results therefore imply 
that co-ethnic voting is not only more prevalent than ethnic block voting, but also than 
religious block voting. Nevertheless, the degree of religiosity – e.g. religious attitudes or 
the strength of religious identification – could be another relevant aspect to include in 
future research on the vote choice of ethnic minorities, as it provides an opportunity to 
better test for the role of the progressive-conservative dimension next to economic and 
minority issue positions. 
An issue that was not addressed in this study was the ethnic self-identification 
of candidates and MPs from an ethnic minority background. For all the candidates and 
MPs in 2010, 2012, and 2017, I identified their ethnic background. Nonetheless, this does 
not necessarily mean that those candidates and MPs feel related to their ethnic groups. 
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Ethnic minority candidates and MPs who do not have ties with citizens with the same 
ethnic origin may differ in their political behaviours from those who do identify with their 
ethnic group. For instance, in the extent to which they wish to represent the interests of 
the ethnic minority electorate or in their appeal to ethnic voters. Even though I do not 
have information about ethnic affinity voting among Western minorities, the findings 
in Chapter 5 suggest that non-Western candidates from right-wing parties were less 
appealing to non-Western minority voters than non-Western candidates affiliated with 
left-wing parties. Further work will have to be conducted in order to determine if this 
finding can be explained by the ethnic identification of ethnic minority candidates. My 
hypothesis is that ethnic minority candidates and MPs with stronger levels of ethnic 
identification have stronger ties to the ethnic community they identify with, attract more 
votes among the ethnic minority electorate, and act more often in the interests of ethnic 
minorities. Based on the findings of my thesis, I predict that this occurs especially among 
co-ethnics.
I tested for the role of the size of ethnic communities in the neighbourhood in Chapter 
5 on ethnic affinity voting, but I was unable to do so in the other chapters. The existing 
literature on ethnic voting has extensively investigated the role of ethnic communities 
and ethnic networks on vote choice at the local level in the Netherlands, and studies have 
found that ethnic communities are important in the political participation of ethnic 
minorities (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Tillie, 2004; van Heelsum, 2016). One of the aims of 
this thesis was to theorise about and test new explanations for minorities’ vote choice. 
Although my findings proved the relevance of these new explanations, the results also 
suggested that ethnic communities may have influenced minorities’ vote choice. The 
findings in Chapter 3 suggested that socialisation and groups norms are important 
factors in the vote choice of ethnic minorities. While Chapter 5 did not specifically test 
the influence of socialisation or group interest, it did examine the influence of living 
in neighbourhoods with a substantial share of ethnic minority inhabitants on vote 
choice. Evidence for the mobilisation hypothesis, i.e. in neighbourhoods with a larger 
non-Western ethnic minority population ethnic minority candidates receive higher 
vote shares, offers valuable insights into the relevance of ethnic communities in vote 
choice. Further work is needed to understand how ethnic communities, socialisation in 
these communities, group norms, and vote choice relate to each other at national-level 
elections. Given my finding that parties with higher levels of descriptive representation 
are more popular among Western minorities with higher levels of ethnic identification, 
future research should also focus on the influence of ethnic communities on the vote 
choice of non-traditional minority groups. 
The paucity of data resources for studying the political representation and vote choice 
of ethnic minorities has also limited this research. Because of this scarcity of data, I 
combined different data sources in Chapter 3 and different waves of the same survey in 
Chapter 4. Pooling different data sets or waves may not be the best approach to investigate 
determinants of vote choice. Moreover, there was some dissimilarity in the data and 
measurements in the study on the influence of substantive and descriptive representation 
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on ethnic minorities’ vote choice in the Netherlands and Canada. Nevertheless, this 
approach provided the opportunity to expand the scope beyond traditional research 
on ethnic minority groups. My findings have raised several questions in need of further 
investigation, e.g. the question as to what extent the influence of substantive and 
descriptive representation works differently depending on the origin groups, in particular 
because of the different voting patterns between ethnic minority groups. This thesis 
also highlights that further work on a broad range of ethnic minority groups is needed to 
better test the political model and not to remain fixed on the socioeconomic position of 
ethnic minorities. Larger scale survey research should be carried out to establish the more 
detailed country of origin dependency of these explanations.
Another data issue is that this study measured substantive representation by looking 
at parties’ issue positions. The measurement of parties’ issue positions that I used may 
not have been specific enough for the ethnic groups under study. Another possibility for 
measuring substantive representation would be to look at the more individual behaviour 
of ethnic minority MPs in the House of Representatives, for example the questions they 
bring up in debates or their voting behaviour on legislation related to ethnic minority-
relevant issues (Aydemir & Vliegenthart, 2016; Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Minta, 2009; Saalfeld 
& Bischof, 2013). However, my main interest was the influence of party characteristics, 
which includes their issue positions, on the vote choice of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, 
although party standpoints do not exactly match with the behaviour of MPs in 
parliament, it is a good indication of voters’ perceptions of parties’ issue positions (Heath 
et al., 2013). Nonetheless, the question remains as to how well informed (ethnic minority) 
voters are about party manifestos, the questions asked by MPs during debates, and other 
expressions of substantive representation. This would be a fruitful area for further work. 
6.4 | Implications for the broader context 
This thesis mainly focused on the Netherlands, with the exception of a study on Canada 
in Chapter 4. As previous research in the field has established, there are many aspects 
that may affect descriptive representation, substantive representation, and vote choice 
among the ethnic minority population; moreover, the extent to which minority groups are 
politically represented and how they vote is time and context dependent. Nevertheless, 
similar results with regard to the political representation and vote choice of ethnic 
minorities may be found in traditional immigration countries in Europe, who share a 
similar history with regard to ethnic minorities and their immigration backgrounds 
and integration into society. What is more, while recent political developments in the 
Netherlands are unique, it is not unlikely that similar developments will also take place 
in other European countries. There are already several European countries where social-
democratic parties have experienced similar downturns as the Labour Party (PvdA) in the 
Netherlands. If ethnic minorities in these countries do not feel represented anymore by 
the parties they traditionally voted for, nor by other established parties, this may create 
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opportunities for minority-oriented parties such as DENK in the Netherlands. Of course, 
the chances of electoral success of such a party are also subject to factors such as the 
openness of the political system to new parties and the strength of the ethnic community. 
There are several similarities between the Netherlands and other European countries 
on the basis of which I expect that my findings can be understood in a broader European 
context, e.g. a diverse ethnic composition of the population, popular anti-immigrant 
party and anti-immigrant sentiment in society, and a PR system with multiple parties. 
Despite differences between European countries, I expect that party characteristics 
are an important explanation for descriptive representation. Notwithstanding these 
similarities, the generalisability of my findings on ethnic minorities’ vote choice may be 
limited for new European democracies, such as Poland and Hungary, and for traditional 
immigration countries with different political systems. Moreover, based on my findings in 
Chapter 4, I expect that the influence of descriptive representation may not be the same 
in majoritarian systems. The mechanisms behind ethnic affinity voting may be different 
in systems where voters cannot choose between different candidates from the same 
political party. I suspect that party preferences trump candidate preferences in countries 
with majoritarian systems. In order to further validate the conclusions of this thesis, my 
studies should therefore be repeated in other Western countries. 
6.5 | General conclusion
This thesis has provided a deep insight into the political representation of ethnic 
minorities and its influence on the vote choice of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. 
The main research question posed in this thesis was as follows: 
  ‘To what extent have ethnic minorities been politically represented, how is this affected 
by political parties, and how does ethnic minority representation affect the vote choice of 
ethnic minorities?’ 
To begin with descriptive representation, I found that the share of some minority groups 
in parliament mirrors the share of ethnic minority citizens in the Dutch population quite 
well, whereas other minority groups are clearly underrepresented. Moreover, political 
parties with supportive positions on integration and migration issues have higher shares 
of ethnic minority candidates on their candidate lists. Even though almost all political 
parties have ethnic minority candidates on their lists in the Netherlands, this is most 
common for left-wing parties. 
Not only are left-wing political parties more likely to nominate ethnic minority 
candidates, they are also more likely to attract the ethnic vote. By combining several 
large-scale surveys, this study found evidence for the popularity of the Labour Party 
(PvdA) among ethnic minority voters in national level elections, while also highlighting 
that there is variation in party choice between ethnic groups. In particular, non-Western 
minority voters and those with low socioeconomic status are likely to vote for the Labour 
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Party (PvdA), which has long been the traditional minority party. Moreover, by theorising 
about additional minority-group-specific explanations, the findings reported here 
show that not only do individual characteristics affect vote choice, but substantive and 
descriptive representation can also play a role in ethnic minorities’ vote choice. T h e 
importance of descriptive representation in vote choice is further demonstrated by the 
finding that ethnic minority candidates attract a larger share of votes in neighbourhoods 
with a larger ethnic minority population. This supports the ethnic affinity thesis, although 
the strength of ethnic affinity voting depends on ethnic group, party, and gender. Once 
again, candidates from left-wing parties are more successful in attracting the ethnic vote 
than those from right-wing parties. These insights contribute to our understanding of the 
consequences of descriptive and substantive representation.
This thesis has shown that the Labour Party (PvdA) has a relatively high share of 
ethnic minority candidates on their candidate lists. However, this party is not the most 
progressive when it comes to economic and integration and migration issues. This 
suggests that, even though this party represents ethnic minorities quite well in descriptive 
terms, considering their issue positions, other parties may be a better choice. This may 
partly explain the popularity of the new minority-oriented party DENK in the most recent 
2017 parliamentary elections. It seems that this party has found the right composition 
of the candidate list in combination with a party programme including issues salient to 
ethnic minority voters. 
There are several lessons that can be learned from this study’s findings. First, this thesis 
has confirmed the significance of differentiation between ethnic groups when studying 
their voting behaviour. Ethnic minority groups are not all represented in the same manner; 
they vote for different parties, and the determinants of their vote choice also vary. It is 
therefore important to pay attention to the representation of the different ethnic groups 
present in the Netherlands. Minorities from a former colony were underrepresented on the 
candidate lists and in the House of Representatives in 2010, 2012, and 2017. What is more, 
no candidates from a former colony background were elected in the 2017 parliamentary 
elections. The representation of specific, marginalised groups is particularly important 
since there is no evidence for ethnic bloc voting and since descriptive representation and 
affinity voting proved especially relevant among co-ethnics. 
Furthermore, political parties should think carefully about the way in which they want 
to represent ethnic minority citizens. In particular, social-democratic parties such as the 
Labour Party (PvdA) may face dilemmas. On the one hand, the Labour Party’s position 
on minority issues has shifted from a supportive to a more centrist position. With the 
increasing salience of immigration and integration, this may have been a strategy to hold 
onto traditional Labour voters. This shifted position, as well as the progressive norms and 
values of these parties on issues such gender and LGBT equality may conflict with the 
attitudes of non-Western minorities, Muslims in particular (Dancygier, 2017). It is therefore 
important to carefully select ethnic minority candidates. Simply selecting a candidate 
with an ethnic minority background may not result in attracting the ethnic vote. Selecting 
someone with a minority background who does not identify with this background or has 
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little in common with potential voters is unlikely to appeal to ethnic voters. On the other 
hand, ethnic minority candidates with strong ties to the ethnic community may perhaps 
not always have the same views as the party the candidate is affiliated with. This was one 
of the reasons why two Labour Party members left the party to found DENK. 
In conclusion, the Netherlands seems to do quite well in terms of political 
representation, at least for some ethnic groups. Moreover, the presence of ethnic minority 
candidates and parties’ representation of minority-specific interests attract ethnic votes. 
This study has shown the importance of both descriptive and substantive representation 
for the vote choice of ethnic minority citizens. Accordingly, diversity and inclusion should 
remain an issue on the party agenda. This is not only beneficial for parties with regard 
to gaining political power, but it is also important for the legitimacy of democracy in 
ethnically diverse societies. 
Notes 
1  In Chapter 4 the term visible minority is used rather than the term ethnic minority. In 
the current chapter I use the term ethnic minorities for reasons of consistency.


 Appendices
appendices
154
Appendix A
table A.1 | Distribution of ethnic groups
Ethnic background N %
Dutch 472 88.9
Western
- Australia 1 0.2
- Belgium 3 0.6
- Croatia 1 0.2
- Germany 2 0.4
- Greece 2 0.4
- Hungary 1 0.2
- Italy 1 0.2
- Serbia 1 0.2
Turkish 14 2.6
Moroccan 13 2.4
Former colonies
- Aruba 2 0.4
- Curaçao 1 0.2
- Indonesia 4 0.8
- Suriname 6 1.1
Other non-Western
- Afghanistan 1 0.2
- Ghana 1 0.2
- Iran, Islamic Republic of 1 0.2
- Iraq 1 0.2
- Liberia 1 0.2
- Palestine, State of 1 0.2
- Tunisia 1 0.2
Total 531 100.0
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table A.2 | Descriptive statistics
table A.3| Party characteristics
N % Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Individual characteristics
Ethnic minority background
- No 472 88.9
- Yes 59 11.1
Relative list position 531 0.00 100.00 50.00 29.50
Safe list position
- Unsafe 383 72.1
- Safe 148 27.9
Gender 
- Male 349 65.7
- Female 182 34.3
Age 531 22.00 77.00 43.74 10.47
Elected in 2012
- No 381 71.8
- Yes 150 28.2
Party characteristics
Restrictiveness migration & integrationa 11 1.96 9.87 5.57 2.20
Ethnic minority support
- No 8 72.7
- Yes 3 27.3
Inclusiveness selectorate
- Party leader 2 18.2
- Party agency 4 36.4
- Party members on a congress 3 27.3
- All party members 2 18.2
Note: a This variable is not centred on the mean in this table.
Party % ethnic 
minority 
candidates
Restric-
tiveness
Ethnic 
minority 
support
Inclusiveness selectorate
 Party lead-
ership (Most 
exclusive)
Party dele-
gates 
Party members 
on a party 
congress 
All party 
members (Most 
inclusive)
SGP 0.0 8.23 0 1  
CU 4.0 5.22 0 2  
PvdD 4.0 3.54 0 3  
PVV 4.1 9.87 0 1  
50Plus 5.9 5.33 0 3  
VVD 6.7 7.34 0 4
SP 8.9 5.04 0 2  
CDA 14.0 6.52 1 2  
D66 16.0 2.71 0  4
GL 21.4 1.96 1 3  
PvdA 24.3 4.47 1 2  
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Coding ethnic minority support and the inclusiveness of the selectorate
To find out the extent to which parties supported ethnic minority party members we 
reviewed four sources (if available): the websites of the political parties, their statutes 
and internal regulations and 2012 annual reports. There was no reference to official 
quotas for any of the parties. For the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Green Party (GL) we did 
find statements in their party documents that they were striving for ethnic minorities/
diversity in party positions (See Table A.4). The Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Green 
Party (GL) had an ethnic minority network in 2012 and the Labour Party (PvdA) had a 
diversity network (which does not only focus on ethnic minorities, but on diversity in 
general). We coded the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Green Party (GL) and the Labour 
Party (PvdA) as having some form of ethnic minority support. 
For inclusiveness, we reviewed the same four sources: the websites of the political 
parties, their statutes and internal regulations and 2012 annual reports were examined. 
A report by Lucardie, Voerman and Marchand (2004) was used as a starting point for 
the collection of these data. Based on all information available, we coded for each party 
who decided about the final version of the candidate list. Specific references to the party 
documents are presented in Table A.5
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table A.4 | Sources ethnic minority support
Party Documents / sources ethnic minority support
CDA Ethic minority network:
Source: Jaarverslag 2012. CDA en gelieerde Organen en Organisaties. 2.4. CDA Kleurrijk, 
2012, p. 17.
Reference to ethnic minority network in annual report 2012 CDA:
“Netwerk. CDA Kleurrijk streeft naar een zo groot mogelijk netwerk binnen de partij. Het 
gaat hier vooral om een digitaal netwerk. In 2012 is dit gegroeid naar circa 500 personen. 
Belangrijkste communicatiewijze is de nieuwsbrief die met een frequentie van vier keer 
per jaar aan de achterban verstuurd wordt en waarin aandacht is voor actualiteiten, 
aankondigingen, activiteiten en waarin telkens een woord van voorzitter Koçak en een 
column van één van de andere kerngroep-leden wordt opgenomen. CDA Kleurrijk is in 
2012 steeds actiever gebruik gaan maken van de eigen website en van sociale media 
(facebook en twitter), om aandacht voor thema’s van diversiteit te vragen.”
PvdA Ethic minority network:
Website PvdA, reference to ‘Netwerk Diversiteit’ 
Source: https://www.pvda.nl/partij/netwerken/netwerk-diversiteit/
Striving for ethnic minorities/diversity in party positions:
Source: Statuten en huishoudelijk reglementen PvdA, Hoofdstuk 1.7 Overige bepalingen, 
2012.
Article 1.32 in statutes 2012, reference to strive for diversity in party positions:
“Artikel 1.32. Evenwichtige vertegenwoordiging
1. Overal waar in de partij besturen, afvaardigingen en dergelijke worden gekozen of kan-
didatenlijsten voor vertegenwoordigende lichamen worden vastgesteld, wordt gestreefd 
naar een gelijke vertegenwoordiging qua sekse en naar een evenwichtige spreiding qua 
leeftijd, regio en diversiteit.”
GL Ethic minority network:
Website GroenLinks, reference to Kleurrijk Platform: 
Source: https://kleurrijkplatform.groenlinks.nl/
Striving for ethnic minorities/diversity in party positions:
Source: Statuten & Huishoudelijke Reglement GroenLinks, 2012, p. 2.
Article 5.2 and 5.3 in statutes and internal regulations 2012, reference to strive for repre-
sentation of migrants in party positions:
“Artikel 5.
2. Uitgangspunt is het bevorderen van deelname aan alle functies die in en namens de 
partij worden vervuld, voor al haar leden ongeacht sekse, seksuele voorkeur, huidskleur, 
nationaliteit, culturele achtergrond, leeftijd of validiteit.
3. Uitgangspunt is tevens een gelijke deelneming van vrouwen en mannen aan alle func-
ties en vertegenwoordigingen van de Vereniging. Uitgangspunt is ook deelneming van 
migranten aan alle functies en vertegenwoordigingen van de Vereniging.”
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table A.5 | Sources inclusiveness selectorate
Party Documents / sources inclusiveness 
SGP Party board determines final candidate list.
Source: 
Algemeen reglement van de Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP), 2008. 
(General regulations)
CU Union congress (local departments, youth department, board association) determine final 
candidate list.
Source: 
ChristenUnie. Jaarverslag ChristenUnie 2012.
(Annual report)
PvdD Candidates are nominated on a congress (open to all party members).
Source: 
Statuten Partij voor de Dieren, 2012.
(Statutes)
PVV The PVV is an association without members. The party leader decides on the candidate list. 
No information can be found on the process. 
50Plus General assembly (open to all party members) determines final candidate list.
Source: 
Huishoudelijke Reglement 50Plus, 2014.
(Internal regulations; did not exist before 2014).
VVD Party members decide about final candidate list.
Source: 
VVD. Jaarverslag 2012. 
(Annual report)
SP Special congress (delegates local departments and party board members) determine final 
candidate list.
Sources: 
Lucardie, P., Voerman, G., and Marchand, A. (2004) Portaal tot het Parlement. Kandidaat-
stelling binnen Politieke Partijen in acht Westerse landen. Den Haag/Groningen: Documen-
tatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen.
Huishoudelijk reglement van de SP, 2009.
(Internal regulations)
CDA Delegates at the party conference formally confirm the candidate list. An advisory list is 
composed by the party board.
Annual report 2012, CDA
Source: 
Jaarverslag 2012. CDA en gelieerde Organen en Organisaties, 2012.
(Annual report)
D66 Party members determine final candidate list.
Gerrit & Voerman, 2004; Statues and internal regulations 2012, D66.
Source: 
D66 Statuten en Huishoudelijke Reglement, 2012.
(Statutes and internal regulations)
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Robustness checks
Some additional analyses were performed. First, we examined the effect of party ideology 
on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates and on the likelihood to be 
placed in a safe list position. In other studies, it is often argued that a more leftist party 
ideology is beneficial for minority candidates (women in particular) because these parties 
are more likely to be in favour of minority rights (Caul, 1999; Wängnerud, 2009). In this 
study a restrictiveness scale is included because this specifically measures the views of 
parties on ethnic minority groups. However, since party ideology is also included in the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) we tested this variable as well. In contrast 
to the findings in Model 1 in Table 2.3, we do not find a significant interaction effect for 
party ideology on the relative list position of ethnic minority candidates with either a 
Western or non-Western background (see Table A.6). In Table A.7 we do not find significant 
interaction effects either.
table A.6 | Effect of ideology (left-right) on relative list position (N=531)
GL Party congress (open for all party members) determine final order candidate list.
Statues and internal regulations 2012, GroenLinks
Source: 
Statuten & Huishoudelijke Reglement GroenLinks, 2012.
(Statutes and internal regulations)
PvdA Conference (delegates of the local departments and the members of the party board) 
determine final order candidate list.
Source: 
Lucardie, P., Voerman, G., and Marchand, A. (2004) Portaal tot het Parlement. Kandidaat-
stelling binnen Politieke Partijen in acht Westerse landen. Den Haag/Groningen: Documen-
tatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen.
Statuten en huishoudelijk reglementen PvdA, 2012
(Statutes and internal regulations)
B
Intercept 51.820***
(5.774)
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Western background 1.388
(7.548)
- Non-Western background 3.349
(5.755)
Gender (male=ref.)
- Female 3.357
(2.745)
Age -0.079
(0.125)
Ideologya 0.393
(0.598)
Ideology x Western background -3.062
(3.285)
Ideology x non-Western background -1.790
(2.823)
R² 0.009
Note: a This variable is centred on the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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table A.7 | Effect of ideology (left-right) on safe list positions (N=531)
In addition, multilevel analyses were estimated as a robustness check. Multilevel analyses 
were estimated for both relative list position as well as safe list positions. The results 
of the multilevel models on relative list positions are very similar to the results of the 
linear models presented in the main article (Table 2.3). The multilevel models on safe 
list positions shows small differences compared to the models presented in Table 2.4, 
however, only the changes in effects of the party characteristics variables are discussed. 
In the multilevel model the main effect of restrictiveness is not significant whereas it 
had a significant effect in Model 1 in Table 2.4. In Model 2 in the multilevel analysis the 
main effects of ethnic background and restrictiveness are not significant anymore. 
Moreover, the main effect of ethnic minority support is negative in the original model 
but positive in the multilevel model. Nevertheless, the interaction effect remains negative 
and significant in both models. Overall, some of the effects do not gain significant 
once multilevel methods are applied. Nevertheless, the effect sizes and the direction of 
the effects do not change substantively.  And although multilevel modelling would be 
appropriate with these data since candidates are nested within parties, it is not certain to 
what extent these multilevel models are reliable as the number of parties (11) is too low to 
be able to estimate parameters reliably. 
 The final robustness check focused on safe list positions. In this robustness check 
we want to examine whether more conservative measures of safe list positions would 
change the results. Additionally, to the measure of safe list positions used in the analyses, 
B OR
Intercept -0.797 0.451
(0.437)
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Western background 0.433 1.542
(0.533)
- Non-Western background -0.300 0.740
(0.463)
Gender (male=ref.)
- Female 0.201 1.223
(0.205)
Age -0.005 0.995
(0.009)
Ideologya -0.021 0.980
(0.045)
Ideology x Western background -0.123 0.884
(0.234)
Ideology x non-Western background 0.014 1.014
(0.225)
Nagelkerke R² 0.009
Note: a This variable is centred on the mean. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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safe list positions are now defined as the lowest number of seats of each party as predicted 
by the opinion polls in the period of May, June and July. However, the analyses based on 
this more conservative definition of safe list positions do not change the outcomes of the 
hypothesis’s tests. 
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Appendix B
table B.1 | Differences and similarities between survey data sets
Survey 
characteristics 
MIFARE NELLS SIM LISS
Year of collection 2015/2016 2009/2010 2010/2011 2010-2014
Ethnic groups Native Dutch, China, 
UK, Japan, Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Spain, Turkey 
and the US.
Native Dutch, Turkish, 
Moroccan, West and 
other non-West back-
ground.
Native Dutch, 
Turkey, Morocco, 
Suriname and the 
Dutch Antilles.
Native Dutch, 
Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese, Antillean, 
Indonesian, Western 
or other non-Western 
background.
Generation First First and second First and second First and second 
Age 18-75 15-45 15> 15>
Sampling 
method
Stratified sample, one 
stratum for native 
Dutch and one for 
each of the migrant 
groups. From each 
stratum a simple 
random sample was 
drawn.
Two-stage stratified 
sampling.
Two-stage stratified 
sampling, separate 
for each group. 
The panel is based 
on a true probability 
sample of households 
drawn from the popu-
lation register. 
Mode of delivery Choice of paper ques-
tionnaire or online 
survey.
Face-to-face interview 
and a self-completion 
questionnaire (on 
paper or online).
Face-to-face inter-
view.
Monthly online ques-
tionnaires.
Language 
questionnaire
Dutch, respondents’ 
mother tongue. 
Dutch. Dutch, Turkish, 
Moroccan Arabic.
Dutch. 
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
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table B.2 | Comparison between background characteristics register and survey data, by ethnic group
Register data 2013 Merged data set Register data 2013 Merged data set
Moroccan background Turkish background
N % N % N % N %
Age 
- 15-24 61,836 24.1 400 26.6 71,593 23.5 300 21.4
- 25-34 61,572 23.9 437 29.1 70,701 23.2 352 25.1
- 35-44 58,945 22.9 457 30.4 72,246 23.7 512 36.4
- 45-54 37,689 14.7 116 7.7 50,633 16.6 149 10.6
- 55-64 18,440 7.2 45 3.0 20,260 6.6 46 3.3
- 65> 18,611 7.2 49 3.3 19,383 6.4 46 3.3
Total 257,093 100.0 1,504 100.0 304,816 100.0 1,405 100.0
Gender 
- Male 189,366 51.3 743 49.4 204,133 51.6 706 50.2
- Female 179,472 48.7 761 50.6 191,169 48.4 699 49.8
Total 368,838 100.0 1,504 100.0 395,302 100.0 1,405 100.0
Former colony background Other non-Western background
N % N % N % N %
Age
- 15-24 106,940 14.3 198 17.9 119,026 22.5 55 10.3
- 25-34 129,632 17.3 217 19.7 143,218 27.1 139 26.1
- 35-44 139,900 18.7 262 23.7 112,157 21.2 192 36.1
- 45-54 159,463 21.3 201 18.2 88,511 16.7 110 20.7
- 55-64 129,188 17.2 132 12.0 45,793 8.7 24 4.5
- 65> 84,562 11.3 94 8.5 19,820 3.8 12 2.3
Total 749,685 100.0 1,104 100.0 528,525 100.0 532 100.0
Gender 
- Male 419,655 48.3 567 51.4 357,765 50.1 158 29.7
- Female 448,322 51.7 537 48.6 357,041 49.9 374 70.3
Total 867,977 100.0 1,104 100.0 714,806 100.0 532 100.0
Western background
N % N %
Age
- 15-24 150,872 15.3 69 7.2
- 25-34 190,283 19.3 263 27.5
- 35-44 174,893 17.7 269 28.1
- 45-54 150,758 15.3 184 19.2
- 55-64 131,269 13.3 91 9.5
- 65> 188,699 19.1 81 8.5
Total 986,774 100.0 957 100.0
Gender 
- Male 569,270 47.6 367 38.3
- Female 626,888 52.4 590 61.7
Total 1196,158 100.0 957 100.0
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011; 
Statistics Netherlands, 2018a.
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figure B.1 | Vote choice of Turkish minorities, by survey
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
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table B.4 | Descriptive statistics
All ethnic groups Non-Western minorities Western minorities
N % Range Mean S.D. N % Range Mean S.D. N % Range Mean S.D.
Data set
- MIFARE 1115 20.3 444 9.8 671 70.1
- NELLS 1904 34.6 1795 39.5 109 11.4
- SIM 2085 37.9 2085 45.9
- LISS 398 7.2 221 4.9 177 18.5
Individual-specific variables
Vote 
- CDA 286 5.2 220 4.8 66 6.9
- PvdA 2598 47.2 2438 53.6 160 16.7
- SP 610 11.1 497 10.9 113 11.8
- VVD 516 9.3 337 7.4 179 17.7
- PVV 288 5.2 155 3.4 133 13.9
- GL 584 10.6 457 10.1 127 13.3
- D66 620 11.3 441 9.7 179 18.7
Income (imputed)a 5502 -1.77 – 
2.23
-0.11 1.45 -1.77 – 
2.23
-0.28 1.38 -1.77 – 
2.23
0.68 1.53
Employment 
status (imputed)
- Student 912 16.6 839 18.5 73 7.6
- Employed 2942 53.5 2342 51.5 600 62.7
- Unemployed 1648 29.9 1364 30.0 284 29.7
Educational level 
(imputed)a
5502 -2.70 
– 2.31
-0.02 1.49 -2.70 
– 
2.30
-0.30 1.37 -2.70 
– 2.30
1.34 1.28
Ethnic identifica-
tion (imputed)
5502 -3.59 
– 1.60
0.00 1.00 -3.59 
– 
1.60
0.04 0.98 -3.59 
– 1.60
-0.17 1.05
Gender
- Male 2541 46.2 2174 47.8 367 38.4
- Female 2961 53.8 2371 52.2 590 61.7
Age 5502 1.00 – 
12.00
5.06 2.71 1.00 – 
12.00
4.87 2.68 1.00 – 
12.00
5.94 2.68
Ethnic background
- Non-Western 3441 62.5 3441 75.7
- Western 957 17.4 957 100.0
- Former colony 1104 20.1 1104 24.3
Note: a This variable was centred on the mean (before applying multiple imputation).
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
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table B.5 | Descriptive statistics alternative-specific variables
table B.6 | Measurement of ethnic identification, by data set
For all candidates, information about their country of birth and the country of birth of 
their parents was collected. In addition to ethnic origin, information was obtained about 
a limited number of background variables including gender, age and position on the 
candidate list. Data were gathered online; small online biographies about MPs (PDC, 2016) 
were used and complemented with other online resources, such as newspaper articles, 
social media and personal websites. If no information about the country of birth of the 
parents was found and if there was no evidence that proved otherwise, such as names, 
we coded the parents as Dutch. We contacted all candidates for whom we could not find 
sufficient information about their ethnic origin. Most of these candidates responded and 
provided the requested details about their ethnic background. For the 46 candidates that 
did not respond the country of birth and that of their parents was coded independently by 
three coders. The coders assumed these candidates and their parents to be Dutch unless 
any evidence proved otherwise. In case the three coders did not all code the same country 
of birth, the most mentioned country of birth was chosen.
N Range Mean S.D.
Economic issue positions 14 1.00 – 8.33 4.78 2.18
Immigration and integration issue positions 14 1.55 – 9.90 5.60 2.50
% ethnic minority candidates (EMCs) 14 0.00 – 13.30 2.72 2.80
Relative list position EMCs 14 0.00 – 0.97 0.43 0.30
Source: Bakker et al., 2015; Van der Zwan, 2017.
Survey Question Answer categories 
MIFARE How strong, would you say, is your sense 
of belonging to the people from (country 
of origin)?
Not at all, weak, moderate, close, very close
NELLS I feel really connected to my ethnic group Agree entirely, agree, neutral, disagree, disagree 
entirely
SIM To what extent do you feel (ethnic group)? Very strong, strong, a little, I don’t, not at all
LISS I feel connected to (ethnic group) Disagree entirely, disagree, neutral, agree, agree 
entirely
Source: Bekhuis, Hedegaard, Seibel, Degen, et al., 2018; De Graaf et al., 2010a; Korte & Dagevos, 2011.
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Appendix C
Background information individual-specific variables 
In this study, visible minority status was defined by a self-identification question. 
Respondents who identified themselves as non-white and non-Aboriginal were selected. 
By doing so, we follow existing Canadian literature on visible minorities. However, it is 
possible that some respondents born abroad identify themselves as Canadian and are 
therefore not included in our sample. Table C.1 gives an overview of the overlap between 
ethnic identification and country of birth. It shows that of those born in Canada, almost 
78% identified as Canadian. It is possible that some of these respondents belong to 
the second generation, but it is not possible to track this down. Among those born in a 
Western country, about 40% identifies as a non-visible minority. Respondents born in 
a non-Western country generally identify as a visible minority, almost 69%. This table 
shows that country of birth and ethnic identification not always overlap, but that the 
majority of the respondents in our sample are born in a non-Western country.   
table C.1 | Country of birth by ethnic identification (%, N=37,466)a
Table C.2 shows that almost 27% of the respondents have a missing value on the 
dependent variable. Table C.3 shows the extent to which the background characteristics 
of these respondents differ from the other respondents. We see that respondents with 
a missing value on vote choice have, on average, a slightly lower educational level and 
income. Moreover, they are more often students or unemployed. Among the respondents 
with a valid value on vote choice, men are slightly overrepresented (55.6%), whereas they 
are underrepresented among the respondents with a missing value (46.4).
Ethnic identification 
Country of birth Canadian Non-visible 
minority
Visible 
minority
Missing 
values
Total
Canada 77.9 14.4 1.2 6.5 100.0
Western country 48.7 42.7 1.3 7.3 100.0
Non-Western 12.8 8.6 68.7 9.8 100.0
Missing values 6.6 4.0 6.0 83.5 100.0
Total 69.3 15.9 4.3 10.5 100.0
Note: a This table is on the data before selecting visible minorities, deleting missing  
values on educational level, employment status, age, and before applying multiple  
imputation. 
Source: Fournier et al., 2015.
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table C.2 | Missing values on vote choicea
table C.3 | Comparison of background characteristics between visible minorities with and without 
missing values on vote choice
In Table C.4 the questions on economic, social, and minority issues in each wave are 
presented. For most of the questions the answer categories were slightly different. If this 
was the case, we standardised the variables and merged them into a single variable. 
N %
Liberal/Conservative/NDP 1132 73.1
Missing values 416 26.9
Total 1548 100.0
Note: a These descriptive statistics are based on the data before deleting missing  values on educational level, 
age, employment status, and before applying multiple imputation.
Source: Fournier et al., 2015.
Liberal/Conservative/NDP a Missing
N % Range Mean S.D. N % Range Mean S.D.
Income 1019 1 – 8 5.05 2.52 345 1 – 8 4.45 2.57
Employment status
- Student 135 11.9 51 12.3
- Employed 769 67.9 271 65.1
- Unemployed 70 6.2 35 8.4
- Other 152 13.4 54 13.0
Missing 6 0.5 5 1.2
Educational level 1125 1 – 11 7.72 2.05 408 1 – 11 7.33 2.03
Gender
- Male 629 55.6 193 46.4
- Female 503 44.4 223 53.6
Age 1110 18 – 90 42.73 15.46 394 18 – 89 40.55 15.10
Note: a These descriptive statistics are based on the data before deleting missing values on educational level, 
employment status, age, and before applying multiple imputation.
Source: Fournier et al., 2015.
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table C.4 | Questions on economic, social, and minority issues
Economic issues
Reduce gap Welfare spending
1993-1997: 
The government must do more to reduce the 
income gap between rich and poor Canadians:
  - Strongly Agree
  - Agree 
  - Disagree 
 -  Strongly Disagree 
2000-2015:
  How much should be done to reduce the gap 
between the rich and the poor in Canada? 
  - Much more 
  - Somewhat more
   - About the same as now
  - Somewhat less
  - Much less
1993-1997: 
If you had to make cuts, would you cut spending 
in the following areas a lot, some, or not at all: 
Welfare:
  - Not at all
  - Some
  - A lot
2000-2015:
And now government spending. Should the 
Federal government spend more, less or about the 
same as now on: Welfare:
  - Spend more
  - About the same
 -  Spend less
Social issues
Gender role attitudes Gay rights
1993-2008:
Society would be better off if more women  
stayed home with their children 
  - Strongly agree 
  - Somewhat agree
  - Somewhat disagree
  - Strongly disagree
2011-2015:
Society would be better off if fewer women  
worked outside the home. Do you:
  - Strongly agree 
  - Somewhat agree
  - Somewhat disagree
  - Strongly disagree
1993-1997:
Homosexual couples should be allowed to get 
legally married:
  - Strongly agree -> Favour
  - Somewhat agree -> Favour 
  - Somewhat disagree -> Oppose
  - Strongly disagree -> Oppose
  - Don’t know -> Don’t know                  
2000: 
Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get 
married.
  - Strongly agree -> Favour
  - Somewhat agree -> Favour 
  - Somewhat disagree -> Oppose 
  - Strongly disagree -> Oppose 
  - Don’t know -> Don’t know
2004-2015:
Do you favour or oppose same-sex marriage, or do 
you have no opinion on this? 
  - Favour same-sex marriage
  - Oppose same-sex marriage
  - Don’t know/no opinion
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Minority issues
Immigration Done for minorities
1993:
Do you think Canada should admit: more immi-
grants, fewer immigrants or about the same as 
now?
  - More immigrants
  - Depends/stay the same
  - Fewer immigrants
1997-2015:
Do you think Canada should admit: more immi-
grants, fewer immigrants or about the same as 
now?
  - More immigrants
  - About the same as now
  - Fewer immigrants
 
1997:
How much do you think should be done for racial 
minorities?
  - More
  - About the same
  - Less 
1993, 2000-2015:
How much do you think should be done for racial 
minorities: much more, somewhat more, about 
the same as now, somewhat less or much less?
  - Much more
  - Somewhat more
  - About the same as now
  - Somewhat less
  - Much less 
Source: Fournier et al., 2015.
Background information Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
The issue positions of legislators, political parties in particular, are of interest to many 
scholars examining party competition. Several data sources have been used to estimate 
these issue positions, including expert surveys, mass surveys and political text (Laver, 
2014; Lowe et al., 2011). All these types of data have their advantages and limitations 
(Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Laver, 2014). In this study we used political text as coded by the 
CMP. Since our study focused on a period from 1993 to 2015, an important advantage of the 
CMP is that they provide time-series data. Furthermore, the focus lies on party manifestos, 
the party issue positions are based on official statements of parties rather than on the 
opinions of experts and/or voters (Dinas & Gemenis, 2010). 
The coding of the manifestos is based on quasi-sentences. The party manifestos are 
divided in quasi-sentences and each quasi-sentence is assigned to one of the 56 categories 
(i.e. topics, such as traditional values). The 56 categories indicate the share of quasi-
sentences on a certain topic calculated as the fraction of the overall number of allocated 
codes per document. This calculation refers to the salience of each category in the party 
programme (Prosser, 2014). The categories are subject to seven domains: external relations 
(e.g. favourable mentions of external security and defence), freedom and democracy (e.g. 
mentions of personal freedom and civil rights), the political system, economy, welfare and 
quality of life, fabric of society (e.g. favourable mentions of traditional values), and social 
groups. 
Combinations of the 56 categories are used to construct to create scales, which give an 
indication of the issue positions of parties. The CMP data are often used for its right-left 
scale (Lowe et al., 2011). Based on aggregating counts of text categories, this scale indicates 
the left-right issue positions of political parties. This scale is constructed by subtracting 
the sum of thirteen left-associated categories from the sum of thirteen right-associated 
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categories (Volkens et al., 2017b). Nevertheless, there have been several criticisms on the 
CMP data (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Laver, 2014) and specifically on the left-right policy 
scale and the scaling methods (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Benoit, Laver, & Mikhaylov, 2009; 
Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006; Gabel & Huber, 2000; Lowe et al., 2011). 
We propose two scales to measure economic left-right issue positions and social issue 
positions, Table C.5 shows the specific categories it includes. We choose items from the 
CMP that were as close as possible to the items from the CES (for more information on the 
items, see the codebook (Volkens et al., 2017a). Figure C.1 and C.2 show the position of the 
Liberal Party, the NDP and the Conservatives. 
table C.5 | Items economic and social issue position scales CMP
Economic issue position scale
Left Right
403 Market Regulation: Positive
409 Keynesian Demand Management
412 Controlled economy 
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive
701 Labour Groups: Positive
401 Free Enterprise: Positive
402 Incentives: positive
407 Protectionism: Negative
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive
702 Labour Groups: Negative
Social issue position scale
Progressive Conservative 
503 Equality: positive
604 Traditional morality: negative
603 Traditional morality: positive
Source: Volkens et al., 2017a.
 
figure C.1 | Economic issue positions (left-right), by year
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figure C.2 | Social issue positions (progressive – conservative), by year
Background information Wordscores
Wordscores can estimate political parties’ issue positions on a policy domain of interest. 
This method treats the words in party programs as data containing information about 
parties’ positions (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003). To be able to estimate these parties’ 
positions, a set of ‘reference texts’ has to be determined a priori. The Wordscores program 
extracts data from these reference texts by counting words and uses this information 
to estimate parties’ issue positions for the other texts (‘virgin texts’). That is why to use 
Wordscores, a first and essential step is to find and select reference texts. Reference party 
manifestos from one election are used to estimate the position of virgin party manifestos 
in other elections in the same country. Therefore, we need a set of reference text which 
issue positions on minority issues are known and reliable. 
This information on issue positions was derived from an expert survey conducted 
in 2002 and 2003 (Benoit & Laver, 2006). In this survey, 104 experts were asked to place 
federal Canadian parties on a scale running from 1 to 20 that contrasted from support for 
full integration of immigrants and asylum-seekers with support for returning immigrants 
to their countries of origin. The exact wording used in the expert survey was:
Immigration:
–   Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into 
Canadian society (1) 
–  Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their 
country of origin (20) 
Based on the expert survey the NDP gets a score of 4.5, the Liberal Party a score of 5.0, 
the Progressive Conservative Party a score of 9.3, and the Canadian Alliance a score of 13.6 
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(Benoit & Laver, 2006). These parties participated in the 2000 federal election; therefore, 
we used the party programs for 2000 as our reference texts and the party programs for all 
other years are our virgin texts. It is important that the reference texts and the virgin texts 
are similar. Following Laver et al. (2003) we assume that party manifestos on Canada at the 
2000 federal election are valid points of reference for the analysis of party manifestos at 
other federal elections in the same country.
In addition to the similarity of the reference and virgin texts, there are several 
guidelines for reference texts. Meeting the guidelines provides more reliable estimates. 
The first guideline is that the reference texts use the same lexicon, in the same context, as 
the virgin text under investigation. Second, that the issue positions of the reference texts 
cover the dimensions of interest. It is recommended to have a selection of reference texts 
that includes extreme positions as well as centre positions. Third, the set of reference texts 
should contain as many different words as possible (Laver et al., 2003). Of these guidelines, 
the second one may be problematic. The scores on immigration policy of the NDP and 
the Liberal Party are relatively close to each other. Although a set of reference texts with 
both centre and extreme positions would be ideal, it is not a prerequisite. Moreover, this 
expert survey is, to our knowledge, the most reliable source of information on positions 
on minority/immigration issues that is available for Canada. 
Laver and Benoit developed a program in Stata to estimate policy positions with 
Wordscores. This program requires all party manifestos prepared as txt files. We removed 
all figures and photos from the manifestos and we did a spelling check on all files.  
Once the files are imported to the Stata program, word frequencies from all the 
manifestos are calculated. The next step is to assign scores to the reference texts. From the 
wordscores in each reference text, text scores in the virgin texts are computed. Each virgin 
text gets a score according to the relative frequency of its appearance in the reference 
texts. In a last step the virgin texts scores are transformed to their original metric to be 
able to locate the positions on immigration of each party at each election. Laver, Benoit 
and Garry (2003) describe this as follows:
 “We use the relative frequencies we observe for each of the different words in each of the 
reference texts to calculate the probability that we are reading a particular reference text, 
given that we are reading a particular word. For a particular a priori policy dimension, this 
allows us to generate a numerical “score” for each word. This score is the expected policy 
position of any text, given only that we are reading the single word in question. Scoring 
words in this way replaces the predefined deterministic coding dictionary of traditional 
computer-coding techniques. It gives words policy scores, not having determined or 
even considered their meanings in advance but, instead, by treating words purely as 
data associated with a set of reference texts whose policy positions can be confidently 
estimated or assumed. In this sense the set of real-world reference texts replaces the 
“artificial” coding dictionary used by traditional computer-coding techniques.” (Laver, 
Benoit & Garry, 2003, p. 313)
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Figure C.3 shows the parties’ positions on immigration policy based on the transformed 
word scores as estimated by the wordscores program. The scores of the Conservatives in 
1993 and 1997 are an average of the estimated word scores for the Reform Party and the PCP. 
For the year 2000, we used the average score for the PCP and the Canadian Alliance. 
figure C.3| Minority issue positions (permissive– restrictive), by year
Source: Wordscore estimates
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table C.6 | Descriptive statistics
N % Range Mean S.D.
Vote choice 
- Liberal 630 59.60
- Conservative 237 22.42
- NDP 190 17.98
Gap between rich and poor (imputed) 1057 -1.20 – 
3.56
-0.10   1.00
Government welfare spending (imputed) 1057 -1.39 – 
1.65
0.05    1.02
Gender role attitudes (imputed) 1057  -1.20 – 
2.52
0.04    1.03
Gay rights (imputed)
- Favour 315 29.83
- Oppose 294 27.81
- Don’t know 448 42.35
Admission immigrants (imputed) 1057  -0.82 – 
1.17
0.01   0.68
Done for racial minorities (imputed) 1057  -1.96 – 
2.67
-0.56  0.94
Income (imputed)a 1057 -4.05 – 
2.95 
-0.05 2.52
Employment status
- Student 128 12.11
- Employed 722 68.31
- Unemployed 68 6.43
- Other 139 13.15
Educational level 1057 1.00 – 
11.00
7.70 2.06
Gender
- Male 587 55.53
- Female 470 44.47
Age 18.00 – 
90.00
42.60 15.26
Survey year 
- 1993 131 12.39
- 1997 145 13.72
- 2000 71 6.72
- 2004 133 12.58
- 2006 142 13.43
- 2008 124 11.73
- 2011 159 15.04
- 2015 152 14.38
Note: a This variable was centred on the mean (before applying multiple imputation).
Source: Fournier et al., 2015.
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table C.7 | Descriptive statistics alternative-specific variables
Alternative-specific variables N Range Mean S.D.
Economic issue positions 24 -4.5 – 3.04 -3.33 5.49
Social issue positions 24 -11.3 – 7.51 -1.22 2.41
Immigration issue positions 24 1.13 – 14.63 6.74 3.63
% visible minority candidates 24 1.80 – 16.90 8.74 3.49
Source: Black, 2013; Griffith, 2016; Tossutti & Najem, 2002; Volkens et al., 2017b; Wordscore  
estimates.
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table C.8 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; main effects substantive and descriptive 
representation
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a
Alternative-specific variables B B B B
Economic issues positions (L-R)a 0.0821***
(0.0174)
Social issue positions (P-C)b 0.121**
(0.0529)
Minority issue positions (P–R)c 0.254***
(0.0404)
% Visible minority candidates 0.0835
(0.0560)
Individual-specific variables
Economic issues positions (L-R)
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor_CON
0.290***
(0.0980)
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor_NDP
-0.130
(0.106)
Less government welfare spending_CON 0.205**
(0.0804)
Less government welfare spending_NDP -0.147
(0.0988)
Social issue positions (P-C)
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON 0.0896
(0.0822)
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP -0.0657
(0.0940)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
Oppose_CON 0.0529
(0.187)
Oppose_NDP -0.593***
(0.224)
Don’t know_CON -0.230
(0.206)
Don’t know_NDP -0.384*
(0.227)
Minority issue positions (P–R) 
Admit fewer immigrants_CON 0.308** 0.252*
(0.149) (0.149)
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP -0.182 -0.229
(0.158) (0.150)
Less should be done for racial minorities_CON 0.227** 0.299***
(0.106) (0.108)
Less should be done for racial minorities_NDP -0.00321 0.146
(0.0972) (0.0922)
Control variables
Income_CON 0.0219 0.0473 0.0365 0.0331
(0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0375) (0.0374)
Income_NDP 0.00210 -0.0211 -0.00962 -0.0134
(0.0392) (0.0394) (0.0389) (0.0383)
Employment status (employed=ref.)
Student_CON -0.771** -0.844*** -0.621* -0.665**
(0.317) (0.314) (0.320) (0.319)
 215
Student_NDP -0.270 -0.306 -0.193 -0.295
(0.311) (0.311) (0.309) (0.306)
Unemployed_CON -0.244 -0.288 0.106 -0.0661
(0.340) (0.337) (0.339) (0.341)
Unemployed_NDP 0.0327 0.0547 0.181 -0.139
(0.355) (0.355) (0.353) (0.349)
Non-employed_CON -0.116 -0.0586 0.131 -0.0101
(0.278) (0.274) (0.278) (0.280)
Non-employed_NDP -0.271 -0.285 -0.209 -0.465
(0.316) (0.321) (0.317) (0.313)
Educational level_CON 0.0325 0.0235 0.0200 0.0293
(0.0413) (0.0405) (0.0423) (0.0421)
Educational level_NDP 0.0589 0.0634 0.0516 0.0599
(0.0452) (0.0453) (0.0448) (0.0435)
Age_CON 0.00153 -0.00297 -0.00760 -0.00424
(0.00697) (0.00699) (0.00706) (0.00708)
Age_NDP -0.00643 -0.00157 -0.00681 -0.000915
(0.00767) (0.00773) (0.00763) (0.00745)
Gender (male=ref.)
Gender_CON -0.170 -0.131 0.0990 -0.0315
(0.157) (0.156) (0.162) (0.163)
Gender_NDP -0.142 -0.216 -0.0690 -0.274*
(0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.165)
Survey year (1993=ref.)
1997_CON -1.435*** -1.293*** 0.344 -0.600**
(0.235) (0.271) (0.286) (0.262)
1997_NDP -1.271*** -1.654*** 0.181 -1.745***
(0.362) (0.349) (0.472) (0.351)
2000_CON -2.080*** -2.091*** -0.379 -1.578***
(0.391) (0.398) (0.451) (0.420)
2000_NDP -3.589*** -3.486*** -2.272** -3.568***
(1.014) (1.016) (1.041) (1.024)
2004_CON -0.903*** -1.275*** 0.114 -1.129***
(0.254) (0.282) (0.299) (0.311)
2004_NDP -0.342 -0.313 2.200*** -0.728***
(0.249) (0.261) (0.512) (0.245)
2006_CON -1.517*** -1.591*** -0.431* -0.638**
(0.264) (0.348) (0.254) (0.274)
2006_NDP -0.889*** -0.649** -0.0716 -0.525*
(0.238) (0.282) (0.271) (0.299)
2008_CON -0.917*** -0.637** -2.781*** -0.775***
(0.246) (0.286) (0.412) (0.250)
2008_NDP -0.261 -0.0811 -1.098*** -0.807***
(0.271) (0.295) (0.255) (0.253)
2011_CON -0.481** -0.469* -0.732*** -0.142
(0.229) (0.268) (0.257) (0.252)
2011_NDP 0.252 0.485* -0.593** -0.0495
(0.230) (0.254) (0.249) (0.239)
2015_CON -1.955*** -1.600*** -1.571*** -0.401
(0.343) (0.433) (0.284) (0.293)
2015_NDP -0.874*** -0.550** -0.790*** -0.407
(0.247) (0.268) (0.250) (0.329)
N 3,171
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a Left-Right; b Progressive-Conservative c Permissive-
Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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table C.9 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; substantive and descriptive representation 
– full model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Alternative-specific variables B B B B
Economic issues positions (L-R)a 0.0820***
(0.0177)
Economic pos. x 
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor
-0.00295
(0.0157)
Economic pos. x Less government 
welfare spending
0.0163
(0.0154)
Social issue positions (P-C)b 0.0974*
(0.0542)
Social pos. x Traditional gender
 role attitudes
-0.0108
(0.0323)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
Social pos. x Oppose 0.164**
(0.0792)
Social pos. x Don’t know 0.0698
(0.0806)
Minority issue positions (P–R)c 0.258***
(0.0409)
Minority pos. x 
Admit fewer immigrants
0.00741
(0.0245)
Minority pos. x Less should
 be done for racial minorities
0.00891
(0.0172)
% Visible minority candidates 0.0731
(0.0560)
% Visible minority candidates x 
Admit fewer immigrants
0.0311
(0.0376)
% Visible minority candidates x 
Less should be done for racial minorities
-0.00662
(0.0216)
Individual-specific variables 
Economic issues positions (L-R)
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor _CON
0.304***
(0.115)
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor _NDP
-0.146
(0.133)
Less government welfare spending_CON 0.120
(0.114)
Less government welfare spending_NDP -0.0611
(0.117)
Social issue positions (P-C)
Traditional gender role attitudes_CON 0.112
(0.131)
Traditional gender role attitudes_NDP -0.0951
(0.106)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
Oppose_CON -0.373
(0.279)
Oppose_NDP -0.274
(0.273)
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Don’t know_CON -0.411
(0.323)
Don’t know_NDP -0.240
(0.258)
Minority issue positions (P–R)
Admit fewer immigrants_CON 0.319** 0.297*
(0.155) (0.171)
Admit fewer immigrants_NDP -0.149 -0.223
(0.203) (0.153)
Less should be done for racial minorities_CON 0.233** 0.290**
(0.112) (0.117)
Less should be done for racial minorities_NDP 0.0248 0.146
(0.114) (0.0928)
Control variables
Income_CON 0.0200 0.0490 0.0371 0.0336
(0.0376) (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0374)
Income_NDP 0.00151 -0.0198 -0.00937 -0.0132
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0383)
Employments status (employed=ref.)
Student_CON -0.773** -0.839*** -0.633** -0.680**
(0.318) (0.314) (0.320) (0.320)
Student_NDP -0.282 -0.298 -0.200 -0.297
(0.311) (0.312) (0.309) (0.306)
Unemployed_CON -0.243 -0.260 0.0959 -0.0582
(0.341) (0.336) (0.339) (0.341)
Unemployed_NDP 0.0158 0.0736 0.173 -0.126
(0.355) (0.356) (0.353) (0.349)
Non-employed_CON -0.114 -0.0484 0.141 -0.0205
(0.279) (0.276) (0.280) (0.280)
Non-employed_NDP -0.270 -0.274 -0.201 -0.469
(0.316) (0.321) (0.318) (0.314)
Educational level_CON 0.0329 0.0182 0.0201 0.0270
(0.0415) (0.0407) (0.0424) (0.0424)
Educational level_NDP 0.0582 0.0601 0.0513 0.0582
(0.0452) (0.0454) (0.0448) (0.0435)
Age_CON 0.00146 -0.00400 -0.00790 -0.00407
(0.00699) (0.00702) (0.00708) (0.00709)
Age_NDP -0.00651 -0.00264 -0.00700 -0.000713
(0.00767) (0.00775) (0.00764) (0.00748)
Gender (male=ref.)
Gender_CON -0.169 -0.101 0.0969 -0.0305
(0.157) (0.157) (0.162) (0.163)
Gender_NDP -0.136 -0.190 -0.0698 -0.274*
(0.173) (0.174) (0.172) (0.166)
Survey year (1993=ref.)
1997_CON -1.444*** -1.314*** 0.356 -0.617**
(0.237) (0.272) (0.286) (0.262)
1997_NDP -1.253*** -1.803*** 0.188 -1.762***
(0.364) (0.361) (0.472) (0.350)
2000_CON -2.053*** -1.984*** -0.363 -1.593***
(0.391) (0.400) (0.452) (0.419)
2000_NDP -3.591*** -3.576*** -2.261** -3.595***
(1.014) (1.018) (1.041) (1.024)
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2004_CON -0.912*** -1.221*** 0.114 -1.122***
(0.256) (0.282) (0.299) (0.313)
2004_NDP -0.345 -0.434 2.188*** -0.719***
(0.251) (0.271) (0.513) (0.246)
2006_CON -1.514*** -1.741*** -0.427* -0.660**
(0.265) (0.359) (0.255) (0.275)
2006_NDP -0.872*** -0.885*** -0.0597 -0.554*
(0.238) (0.313) (0.272) (0.298)
2008_CON -0.915*** -0.355 -2.798*** -0.780***
(0.247) (0.330) (0.414) (0.251)
2008_NDP -0.266 -0.0831 -1.085*** -0.797***
(0.273) (0.302) (0.257) (0.253)
2011_CON -0.476** -0.441 -0.719*** -0.141
(0.229) (0.268) (0.261) (0.254)
2011_NDP 0.252 0.418 -0.564** -0.0412
(0.230) (0.259) (0.255) (0.241)
2015_CON -1.973*** -1.742*** -1.568*** -0.435
(0.346) (0.453) (0.285) (0.296)
2015_NDP -0.868*** -0.688** -0.770*** -0.443
(0.248) (0.280) (0.252) (0.327)
N 3,171
Note: a Left-Right b Progressive – Conservative c Permissive – Restrictive. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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table C.10 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voter characteristics
Model without voters’ issue 
positions 
Model with voters’ issue 
positions
Conservatives NDP Conservatives NDP
B B B B
Alternative-specific constants (ASC; Liberal =ref.) -0.843*** -2.199*** -1.258*** -2.235***
(0.221) (0.351) (0.312) (0.400)
Economic issues positions (L-R)a
Less government spending to reduce gap
between rich and poor
0.176* -0.189
(0.0983) (0.121)
Less government welfare spending 0.212** -0.119
(0.0826) (0.104)
Social issue positions (P-C)b
Traditional gender role attitudes 0.0185 -0.112
(0.0910) (0.0974)
Gay rights (in favour=ref.)
- Oppose 0.708*** -0.0990
(0.251) (0.252)
- Don’t know 0.127 -0.0523
(0.237) (0.243)
Minority issue positions (P–R)c
Admit fewer immigrants 0.266* -0.167
(0.150) (0.170)
Less should be done for racial minorities 0.205* 0.0109
(0.105) (0.114)
Control variables 
Income 0.0454 -0.0128 0.0288 -0.00370
(0.0361) (0.0395) (0.0393) (0.0410)
Student (employed = ref.) -0.722** -0.153 -0.581* -0.213
(0.312) (0.313) (0.323) (0.319)
- Unemployed 0.00973 0.287 0.0530 0.298
(0.332) (0.359) (0.348) (0.369)
- Non-employed 0.142 -0.138 0.0170 -0.117
(0.274) (0.319) (0.287) (0.324)
Educational level 0.0149 0.0524 0.0176 0.0533
(0.0407) (0.0459) (0.0433) (0.0470)
Age -0.00652 -0.00868 -0.00720 -0.00884
(0.00695) (0.00771) (0.00730) (0.00803)
Gender (male=ref) 0.0608 -0.0113 0.0664 -0.0171
(0.159) (0.176) (0.166) (0.179)
Survey year (1993=ref.)
- 1997 -0.185 -0.0307 -0.250 0.0699
(0.285) (0.463) (0.305) (0.468)
- 2000 -1.154*** -1.918* -1.330*** -1.741
(0.428) (1.063) (0.448) (1.068)
- 2004 -0.320 1.275*** -0.172 1.296***
(0.313) (0.400) (0.334) (0.412)
- 2006 -0.272 1.147*** -0.131 1.176***
(0.309) (0.406) (0.327) (0.417)
- 2008 -0.0671 1.288*** 0.00593 1.356***
(0.312) (0.414) (0.337) (0.430)
- 2011 0.549* 1.970*** 0.723** 2.023***
(0.292) (0.395) (0.316) (0.408)
- 2015 -0.0582 1.278*** 0.256 1.255***
(0.306) (0.412) (0.337) (0.431)
N 3,171
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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table C.11 | Conditional logistic regression for vote choice; voters’ socioeconomic position and 
substantive representation
Model 2a Model 2 Model 2b Model 2c
Alternative-specific variables B B B B
Economic issues positions (L-R)a 0.0748*** 0.0766*** 0.0745*** 0.0751***
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0167)
Economic pos. x Income 0.00445
(0.00616)
Economic pos. x Student 0.00731
(0.0491)
Economic pos. x Non-employed -0.00965
(0.0421)
Economic pos. x Education 0.00133
(0.00692)
Control variables
Income_CON 0.0441 0.0207 0.0442 0.0443
(0.0359) (0.0488) (0.0360) (0.0360)
Income_NDP -0.0112 0.0121 -0.0113 -0.0111
(0.0388) (0.0496) (0.0388) (0.0388)
Employment status (employed=ref.)
Student_CON -0.850*** -0.848*** -0.890** -0.850***
(0.313) (0.313) (0.409) (0.313)
Student_NDP -0.235 -0.235 -0.193 -0.234
(0.308) (0.308) (0.417) (0.308)
Unemployed_CON -0.325 -0.329 -0.324 -0.325
(0.335) (0.335) (0.335) (0.335)
Unemployed_NDP 0.0484 0.0472 0.0487 0.0490
(0.351) (0.352) (0.351) (0.351)
Non-employed_CON -0.0772 -0.0787 -0.0239 -0.0782
(0.273) (0.273) (0.356) (0.273)
Non-employed_NDP -0.294 -0.289 -0.338 -0.296
(0.316) (0.316) (0.370) (0.316)
Educational level_CON 0.0299 0.0315 0.0304 0.0230
(0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0541)
Educational level_NDP 0.0602 0.0610 0.0608 0.0674
(0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0585)
Gender (male=ref.)
Gender_CON -0.164 -0.165 -0.163 -0.166
(0.154) (0.154) (0.155) (0.154)
Gender_NDP -0.160 -0.162 -0.160 -0.160
(0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)
Age_CON -0.000929 -0.000903 -0.000973 -0.000947
(0.00686) (0.00687) (0.00686) (0.00686)
Age_NDP -0.00495 -0.00489 -0.00487 -0.00494
(0.00759) (0.00759) (0.00760) (0.00760)
Survey year (1993=ref.)
1997_CON -1.288*** -1.298*** -1.287*** -1.289***
(0.227) (0.227) (0.227) (0.227)
1997_NDP -1.364*** -1.357*** -1.365*** -1.362***
(0.358) (0.358) (0.358) (0.358)
2000_CON -1.889*** -1.896*** -1.892*** -1.891***
(0.383) (0.383) (0.384) (0.383)
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2000_NDP -3.665*** -3.654*** -3.667*** -3.663***
(1.013) (1.013) (1.013) (1.013)
2004_CON -0.884*** -0.895*** -0.893*** -0.882***
(0.250) (0.250) (0.254) (0.250)
2004_NDP -0.333 -0.324 -0.337 -0.331
(0.246) (0.246) (0.247) (0.246)
2006_CON -1.457*** -1.469*** -1.456*** -1.459***
(0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257)
2006_NDP -0.836*** -0.832*** -0.837*** -0.836***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.239) (0.235)
2008_CON -0.851*** -0.834*** -0.854*** -0.849***
(0.240) (0.241) (0.242) (0.240)
2008_NDP -0.283 -0.263 -0.287 -0.280
(0.267) (0.269) (0.268) (0.268)
2011_CON -0.440* -0.445** -0.441* -0.440*
(0.224) (0.225) (0.225) (0.224)
2011_NDP 0.254 0.264 0.251 0.256
(0.228) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228)
2015_CON -1.849*** -1.928*** -1.835*** -1.861***
(0.328) (0.348) (0.332) (0.335)
2015_NDP -0.806*** -0.828*** -0.804*** -0.810***
(0.244) (0.246) (0.249) (0.245)
N 3,171
Note: a Left-Right. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix D
table D.1 | Candidate characteristics (N=548)
N %
Ethnic background
- Turkish 22 4.0
- Moroccan 21 3.8
- Surinamese/Antillean 15 2.7
- Other non-Western 13 2.4
- Dutch 477 87.0
Gender 
- Male 340 62.0
- Female 208 38.0
Party leader 
- No 536 97.8
- Yes 12 2.2
First ethnic minority on the list 
- No 508 92.7
- Yes 40 7.3
Re-nominated candidate 2012
- No 388 70.8
- Yes 160 29.2
table D.2 | Summary of the data
Cities No. of 
neighbourhoods
No. of polling 
stations
No. of 
candidates
Total No. 
of cases
’s Hertogenbosch 52 84 x 548 = 46,032
Almere 35 86 x 548 = 47,128
Alphen aan den Rijn 42 58 x 548 = 31,784
Amersfoort 53 79 x 548 = 43,292
Amsterdam 228 431 x 548 = 236,188
Apeldoorn 48 86 x 548 = 47,128
Arnhem 47 64 x 548 = 35,072
Dordrecht 44 58 x 548 = 31,784
Eindhoven 51 68 x 548 = 37,264
Enschede 42 75 x 548 = 41,100
Groningen 49 112 x 548 = 61,376
Haarlem 62 72 x 548 = 39,456
Leiden 32 40 x 548 = 21,920
Maastricht 34 54 x 548 = 29,592
Nijmegen 34             78 x 548 = 42,744
Rotterdam 69 344 x 548 = 188,512
Utrecht 85 147 x 548 = 80,556
Zaanstad 30 67 x 548 = 36,716
Zoetermeer 15 57 x 548 = 31,236
Zwolle 37 61 x 548 = 33,428
Total 1,089 2,121 x 548 = 1,162,308
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table D.3 | Gender of candidates, by party and ethnic background
Party  Ethnic background Male Female Total
  N % N % N %
Artikel 1 Moroccan 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Surinamese/Antillean 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 100.0
 Other non-Western 1 50.0 1 50.0 2 100.0
 Dutch 5 41.7 7 58.3 12 100.0
CDA Turkish 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Moroccan 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 27 62.8 16 37.2 43 100.0
CU Surinamese/Antillean 1 50.0 1 50.0 2 100.0
 Other non-Western 4 100.0 0 0.0 4 100.0
 Dutch 26 59.1 18 40.9 44 100.0
DENK Turkish 6 66.7 3 33.3 9 100.0
 Moroccan 3 100.0 0 0.0 3 100.0
 Surinamese/Antillean 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0
 Other non-Western 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0
 Dutch 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0
D66 Turkish 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
 Moroccan 3 60.0 2 40.0 5 100.0
 Surinamese/Antillean 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Other non-Western 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 25 59.5 17 40.5 42 100.0
FvD Surinamese/Antillean 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 23 79.3 6 20.7 29 100.0
GL Turkish 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100.0
 Moroccan 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Other non-Western 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 25 55.6 20 44.4 45 100.0
PvdA Turkish 1 25.0 3 75.0 4 100.0
 Moroccan 5 71.4 2 28.6 7 100.0
 Surinamese/Antillean 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100.0
 Other non-Western 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0
 Dutch 31 52.5 28 47.5 59 100.0
PVV Surinamese/Antillean 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 37 75.5 12 24.5 49 100.0
SP Turkish 2 66.7 1 33.3 3 100.0
 Moroccan 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 24 60.0 16 40.0 40 100.0
VVD Turkish 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
 Moroccan 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0
 Dutch 50 64.9 27 35.1 77 100.0
50Plus Other non-Western 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 100.0
 Dutch 25 71.4 10 28.6 35 100.0
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table D.4 | Beta Regression models on candidates’ vote share; general ethnic affinity and party effects
Model 3a Model 3b
B B
Ethnic Minority candidate (Dutch=ref.) -0.3761*** -0.4002***
(0.0084) (0.0082)
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood x ethnic minority candidate for:
- Art 1 -0.0051*** -0.0040***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
- CDA -0.0034* -0.0032*
(0.0018) (0.0018)
- CU 0.0303*** 0.0316***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
- DENK 0.0159*** 0.0174***
(0.0017) (0.0017)
- D66 -0.0017*** -0.0010**
(0.0005) (0.0004)
- FvD 0.0196*** 0.0208***
(0.0024) (0.0024)
- GL 0.0111*** 0.0109***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
- PvdA 0.0081*** 0.0088***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
- PVV -0.0163*** -0.0185***
(0.0030) (0.0030)
- SP 0.0027*** 0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
- VVD -0.0179*** -0.0182***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
- 50Plus 0.0088*** 0.0090***
(0.0027) (0.0027)
Control variables
Party leader 2.7754*** 2.8510***
(0.0046) (0.0045
First ethnic minority on the list 0.7400*** 0.7720***
(0.0054) (0.0053)
Re-nominated candidate 2012 0.2069*** 0.2167***
(0.0040) (0.0040)
Party 
- Art 1 -7.7229*** -8.1460***
(0.0269) (0.0362)
- CDA -5.6101*** -5.3370***
(0.0094) (0.0164)
- CU -6.3690*** -5.9240***
(0.0126) (0.0234)
- DENK -7.0129*** -6.9580***
(0.0167) (0.0279)
- D66 -5.2710*** -5.5060***
(0.0068) (0.0096)
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- FvD -6.5350*** -6.4670***
(0.0151) (0.0258)
- GL -5.2706*** -5.4310***
(0.0075) (0.0105)
- PvdA -5.7351*** -5.8850***
(0.0085) (0.0131)
- PVV -5.4782*** -4.6380***
(0.0090) (0.0177)
- SP -5.7485*** -5.1960***
(0.0092) (0.0170)
- VVD -5.1080*** -5.2620***
(0.0068) (0.0096)
- 50Plus -6.5293*** -5.9820***
(0.0132) (0.0256)
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:
- Art 1 0.0353*** 0.0399***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
- CDA -0.0117*** -0.0143***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
- CU -0.0092*** -0.0133***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
- DENK 0.0181*** 0.0134***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
- D66 -0.0024*** -0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
- FvD -0.0062*** -0.0070***
(0.0005) (0.0006)
- GL -0.0044*** -0.0037***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
- PvdA -0.0003 0.0007**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
- PVV 0.0038*** -0.0017***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
- SP 0.0027*** -0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
- VVD -0.0067*** -0.0057***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
- 50Plus 0.0028*** -0.0009*
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Socioeconomic status neighbourhood for:
- Art 1 0.0011***
(0.0001)
- CDA -0.0013***
(0.0001)
- CU -0.0021***
(0.0001)
- DENK -0.0006***
(0.0001)
- D66 0.0007***
(0.0000)
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- FvD -0.0006***
(0.0001)
- GL 0.0004***
(0.0000)
- PvdA 0.0003***
(0.0000)
- PVV -0.0036***
(0.0001)
- SP -0.0024***
(0.0001)
- VVD 0.0004***
(0.0000)
- 50Plus -0.0025***
(0.0001)
Mosque in neighbourhood for:
- Art 1 -0.3056***
(0.0360)
- CDA -0.0766***
(0.0174)
- CU -0.0496**
(0.0219)
- DENK 0.4150***
(0.0169)
- D66 0.0368***
(0.0113)
- FvD -0.0768***
(0.0287)
- GL 0.0373***
(0.0112)
- PvdA -0.0505***
(0.0141)
- PVV -0.1479***
(0.0147)
- SP -0.0610***
(0.0144)
- VVD -0.0565***
(0.0123)
- 50Plus -0.1531***
(0.0233)
N 193,393 193,393
Global Deviance -1603698 -1612212
AIC -1603616 -1612082
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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table D.5 | Beta Regression models on candidates’ vote share; co-ethnic affinity effects
Model 4
B
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Turkish -0.494***
(0.0149)
- Moroccan -0.1095***
(0.0143)
- Surinamese/Antillean -0.4358***
(0.0266)
- Other non-Western -0.5503***
(0.0316)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish background candidate for:
- CDA 0.0322***
(0.0082)
- DENK 0.0445***
(0.0019)
- D66 -0.0203***
(0.0052)
- GL 0.0111***
(0.0021)
- PvdA 0.0132***
(0.0028)
- SP 0.0271***
(0.0021)
- VVD -0.0028
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan background candidate for:
(0.0043)
- Art 1 -0.0332***
(0.0120)
- CDA 0.0046
(0.0073)
- DENK 0.0768***
(0.0013)
- D66 0.0114***
(0.0014)
- PvdA 0.0121***
(0.0016)
- SP -0.0458***
(0.0054)
- VVD -0.0242***
(0.0039)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese/Antillean background candidate for:
- Art 1 0.0201***
(0.0029)
- CU 0. 0436***
(0.0040)
- DENK -0.0055
(0.0039)
- D66 -0.0160***
(0.0037)
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- FvD 0.0621***
(0.0066)
- PvdA 0.0231***
(0.0019)
- PVV -0.0675***
(0.0107)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Other non-Western background candidate for
- Art 1 0.0118**
(0.0047)
- CU 0.0870***
(0.0019)
- DENK 0.0128***
(0.0038)
- D66 -0.0264***
(0.0066)
- GL -0.0375***
(0.0045)
- PvdA -0.0010
(0.0047)
- 50Plus 0.0249***
(0.0094)
Control variables
Party leader 2.8479***
(0.0047)
Art 1 x Party leader -2.1707***
(0.0548)
DENK x Party leader -1.3238***
(0.0227)
GL x Party leader 0.1487***
(0.0209)
Art 1 x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese x Party leader 0.0759***
(0.0034)
DENK x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish x Party leader 0.0943***
(0.0020)
GL x % co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan x Party leader 0.0110***
(0.0008)
First ethnic minority on the list 0.8518***
(0.0056)
Re-nominated candidate 2012 0.1455***
(0.0043)
Party 
- Art 1 -5.5925***
(0.0526)
- CDA -6.7929***
(0.0266)
- CU -6.6430***
(0.0273)
- DENK -5.6766***
(0.0181)
- D66 -5.7253***
(0.0146)
- FvD -7.1690***
(0.0396)
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- GL -5.4053***
(0.0167)
- PvdA -5.7141***
(0.0151)
- PVV -5.1519***
(0.0201)
- SP -5.6986***
(0.0170)
- VVD -5.9676***
(0.0165)
- 50Plus -6.2799***
(0.0314)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood for:
- Art 1 -0.0078***
(0.0009)
- CDA 0.0116***
(0.0003)
- CU 0.0005
(0.0003)
- DENK -0.0069***
(0.0010)
- D66 0.0050***
(0.0002)
- FvD 0.0051***
(0.0005)
- GL -0.0003
(0.0002)
- PvdA -0.0013***
(0.0002)
- PVV -0.0033***
(0.0002)
- SP -0.0002
(0.0002)
- VVD 0.0092***
(0.0002)
- 50Plus -0.003***
(0.0004)
N 193,393
Global Deviance -1619439
AIC -1619307
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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table D.6 | Beta Regression models on candidates’ vote share; gender-dependent ethnic affinity effects
Model 5
B
Female (Male=ref.) 0.0056
(0.0924)
Ethnic background (Dutch=ref.)
- Turkish -0.3283***
(0.0157)
- Moroccan 0.0759***
(0.0153)
- Surinamese/Antillean -0.3237***
(0.0276)
- Other non-Western -0.3390***
(0.0328)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Turkish background candidate for:
- CDA 0.0405***
(0.0079)
- DENK -0.0039
(0.0108)
- GL 0.0016
(0.0036)
- PvdA 0.0348***
(0.0060)
- SP 0.0386***
(0.0026)
- VVD 0.0193*
(0.0116)
- DENK x female 0.0535***
(0.0110)
- D66 x female 0.0249**
(0.0117)
- GL x female 0.0543***
(0.0114)
- PvdA x female 0.0156
(0.0124)
- SP x female 0.0324***
(0.0112)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Moroccan background candidate for:
- Art 1 -0.0448***
(0.0125)
- CDA 0.0124*
(0.0068)
- DENK 0.0389***
(0.0106)
- D66 0.0148***
(0.0024)
- PvdA 0.0168***
(0.0025)
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- VVD -0.0256***
(0.0039)
- D66 x female 0.0374***
(0.0109)
- PvdA x female 0.0321***
(0.0109)
- SP x female 0.0141
(0.0117)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Surinamese/Antillean background candidate for:
- Art 1 0.0072*
(0.0043)
- CU 0.0746***
(0.0046)
- D66 -0.0183***
(0.0038)
- FvD 0.0695***
(0.0063)
- PvdA 0.0125***
(0.0029)
- Art 1 x female 0.0587***
(0.0099)
- DENK x female -0.0222***
(0.0047)
- CU x female -0.0362***
(0.0138)
- PvdA x female 0.0710***
(0.0110)
- PVV x female 0.0279**
(0.0139)
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Other non-Western background candidate for:
- Art 1 0.0315***
(0.0084)
- CU 0.0902***
(0.0019)
- DENK -0.0287***
(0.0111)
- D66 -0.0400***
(0.0069)
- GL -0.0091**
(0.0042)
- PvdA x female 0.0315***
(0.0117)
- 50Plus x female -0.0020
(0.0163)
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% co-ethnics in neighbourhood x Dutch background candidate for:
- Art 1 x female 0.0359***
(0.0101)
- CDA x female 0.0354***
(0.0105)
- CU x female 0.0483***
(0.0105)
- DENK x female 0.0341***
(0.0105)
- D66 x % female 0.0460***
(0.0105)
- FvD x female 0.0352***
(0.0106)
- GL x female 0.0369***
(0.0105)
- PvdA x female 0.0487***
(0.0105)
- PVV x female 0.0474***
(0.0105)
- SP x female 0.0549***
(0.0105)
- VVD x female 0.0350***
(0.0105)
- 50 x female 0.0458***
(0.0105)
Control variables 
Party leader 3. 0681***
(0.0052)
Art 1 x Party leader -2.3224***
(0.0703)
DENK x Party leader -1.4602***
(0.0241)
GL x Party leader 0.3671***
(0.0300)
Art 1 x % co-ethnics x Party leader 0.0659***
(0.0043)
DENK x % co-ethnics x Party leader 0.1024***
(0.0025)
GL x % co-ethnics x Party leader 0.0069***
(0.0009)
First ethnic minority on the list 0.8917***
(0.0063)
Re-nominated candidate 2012 0.1719***
(0.0048)
Party
- Art 1 -5.8169***
(0.0660)
- CDA -7.2670***
(0.0311)
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 - CU -6.9380***
(0.0308)
- DENK -5.9701***
(0.0200)
- D66 -5.8963***
(0.0190)
- FvD -7.5561***
(0.0428)
- GL -6.0590***
(0.0273)
- PvdA -5.9650***
(0.0204)
- PVV -5.1621***
(0.0206)
- SP -5.6150***
(0.0215)
- VVD -6.3027***
(0.0195)
- 50Plus -6.7055***
% co-ethnics in neighbourhood for:
(0.0376)
Art 1 = ref.
- CDA 0.0134***
(0.0004)
- CU -0.0023***
(0.0004)
- D66 0.0048***
(0.0002)
- FvD 0.0055***
(0.0005)
- GL 0.0038***
(0.0004)
- PvdA -0.0021***
(0.0003)
- PVV -0.0045***
(0.0003)
- SP -0.0053***
(0.0003)
- VVD 0.0131***
(0.0002)
- 50Plus -0.0033***
(0.0005)
Gender x % co-ethnics in the neighbourhood -0.0426***
(0.0105)
Female for:
Art 1= ref.
- CDA 1.0867***
(0.1085)
- CU 0.6401***
(0.1117)
appendices
234
- DENK 0.3109***
(0.0996)
- D66 -0.1204
(0.0956)
- FvD 2.0158***
(0.1443)
- GL 0.8057***
(0.0973)
- PvdA 0.0259
(0.0955)
- PVV -0.7686***
(0.1064)
- SP -0.5211***
(0.0971)
- VVD 0.2411**
(0.0978)
- 50Plus 0.8619***
(0.1130)
N 193,393
Global Deviance -1640777
AIC -1640581
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
Robustness checks
We run several additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, we run 
a beta zero-inflated regression model to show that the results referring to proportion 
of vote share among candidates who received at least some votes are identical to a beta 
regression model in which the zeros are deleted. Table D.7 shows that the results are indeed 
the same. In the beta regression model, we found ethnic affinity effects for the Christian 
Union, DENK, Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Green Party (GL), the Labour Party (PvdA), the 
Socialist Party (SP), and the Elderly Party (50Plus). For candidates from DENK and most of 
the (centre)left-wing parties, the outcomes of the logistic model are consistent with those 
of the beta regression model. For these parties we find that ethnic minority candidates are 
more likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population 
(Nu model). For two (centre)right-wing parties we find consistent evidence against ethnic 
affinity effects. Ethnic minority candidates affiliated with the Christian-Democrats (CDA) 
and the Party for Freedom (PVV) are less likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a 
larger ethnic minority population (Nu model), and if they receive votes, the vote shares 
are lower in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Mu model). For 
some parties the outcome of the logistic model is not consistent with the beta regression 
model. For Artikel 1, the social-liberals (D66), and the Liberal Party (VVD) ethnic minority 
candidates are more likely to receive votes in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic 
minority population (Nu model); but if they receive votes, the vote share is lower when 
the ethnic minority population is larger (Mu model). For Forum for Democracy (FvD) and 
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50Plus we find the opposite: ethnic minority candidates are more likely to receive no votes 
in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority population (Nu model); but if they do 
receive votes, the vote share is higher in neighbourhoods with a larger ethnic minority 
population (Mu model).
 
table D.7 | Zero-inflated beta regression model on candidates’ vote share
Mu model Nu model
B B
Ethnic minority background (Dutch=ref.) -0.3761*** 1.1520***
(0.0083) (0.0176)
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood 
x ethnic minority candidate for:
- Art 1 -0.0051*** -0.0324***
(0.0012) (0.0017)
- CDA -0.0034** 0.0757***
(0.0016) (0.0031)
- CU 0.0303*** -0.0302***
(0.0007) (0.0011)
- DENK 0.0159*** -0.1149***
(0.0019) (0.0035)
- D66 -0.0017*** -0.0140***
(0.0004) (0.0008)
- FvD 0.0196*** 0.0405***
(0.0026) (0.0040)
- GL 0.0111*** -0.0531***
(0.0003) (0.0011)
- PvdA 0.0081*** -0.0323***
(0.0004) (0.0007)
- PVV -0.0163*** 0.0369***
(0.0028) (0.0041)
- SP 0.0027*** -0.0431***
(0.0005) (0.0011)
- VVD -0.0179*** -0.0128***
(0.0008) (0.0012)
- 50Plus 0.0088*** 0.0592***
(0.0029) (0.0049)
Control variables
Party leader 2.7754*** -6.3697***
(0.0040) (0.0457)
First ethnic minority on the list 0.7400*** -2.3985***
(0.0050) (0.0116)
Re-nominated candidate 2012 0.2069*** -0.7628***
(0.0041) (0.0062)
Party 
- Art 1 -7.7229*** 4.8504***
(0.0269) (0.0507)
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- CDA -5.6101*** 1.8561***
(0.0089) (0.0158)
- CU -6.3690*** 2.6750***
(0.0117) (0.0191)
- DENK -7.0129*** 2.9978***
(0.0167) (0.0331)
- D66 -5.2710*** 1.1425***
(0.0066) (0.0124)
- FvD -6.5350*** 2.6129***
(0.0148) (0.0254)
- GL -5.2706*** 1.1535***
(0.0075) (0.0121)
- PvdA -5.7351*** 2.1943***
(0.0080) (0.0136)
- PVV -5.4782*** 2.9988***
(0.0090) (0.0201)
- SP -5.7485*** 2.2424***
(0.0086) (0.0162)
- VVD -5.1080*** 2.0499***
(0.0068) (0.0123)
- 50Plus -6.5293*** 2.6204***
(0.0126) (0.0220)
% ethnic minority population in neighbourhood for:
- Art 1 0.0353*** -0.0149***
(0.0013) (0.0018)
- CDA -0.0117*** 0.0127***
(0.0003) (0.0006)
- CU -0.0092*** 0.0098***
(0.0004) (0.0007)
- DENK 0.0181*** 0.0595***
(0.0019) (0.0036)
- D66 -0.0024*** 0.0085***
(0.0002) (0.0005)
- FvD -0.0062*** 0.0038***
(0.0005) (0.0009)
- GL -0.0044*** 0.0060***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
- PvdA -0.0003 0.0048***
(0.0003) (0.0005)
- PVV 0.0038*** -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0007)
- SP 0.0027*** -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0006)
- VVD -0.0067*** 0.0108***
(0.0002) (0.0005)
- 50Plus 0.0028*** 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0008)
N 1,162,308
Global Deviance -7772323
AIC -777071
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.05 * p < 0.1.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Achtergrond en doelstelling 
De samenstelling van de Nederlandse bevolking is de afgelopen decennia etnisch steeds 
diverser geworden. Etnische minderheden hebben op veel gebieden een zwakkere positie 
in Nederland en dit brengt verschillende uitdagingen met zich mee voor onze samenleving. 
Een van die uitdagingen is de integratie van etnische minderheden als burgers van onze 
democratie. Om een democratie te kunnen laten functioneren zijn actieve en betrokken 
burgers belangrijk, politieke participatie is namelijk een essentieel onderdeel van 
democratieën. Dat geldt natuurlijk voor alle burgers van een samenleving. De legitimiteit 
van democratie is gebaseerd op het idee dat gekozen vertegenwoordigers de belangen van 
de bevolking behartigen. Als bepaalde groepen in de samenleving nauwelijks deelnemen 
aan de politiek, is het waarschijnlijk dat de belangen van deze groepen niet worden 
behartigd en dat de legitimiteit van de democratie onder druk staat. In dit proefschrift 
onderzoek ik daarom de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en kijk 
ik naar hun stemgedrag.
Hoewel de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden in Nederland 
toeneemt, is er nog steeds sprake van ondervertegenwoordiging. Het aandeel Tweede 
Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond is bijvoorbeeld lager dan het aandeel 
Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond in de samenleving. Dit geldt overigens niet 
alleen voor Nederland, maar ook voor veel andere Westerse samenlevingen. Met de 
huidige demografische ontwikkelingen, wordt onze samenleving etnisch steeds diverser, 
en daarmee ook het electoraat. Alleen al door hun aantallen zullen etnische minderheden 
daardoor steeds belangrijker worden voor politieke partijen om zetels te winnen. Politieke 
partijen zijn dan ook meer aandacht gaan besteden aan de inclusie van Nederlanders met 
een migratieachtergrond. Het is echter nog onduidelijk of, en zo ja welke, relatie er bestaat 
tussen de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en het stemgedrag 
van etnische minderheden. Daar is in de literatuur nog niet veel aandacht aan besteed. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om een overzicht te geven van de politieke 
vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden en om na te gaan in hoeverre die 
politieke vertegenwoordiging samenhangt met hun stemvoorkeuren. Het onderzoek is 
grotendeels gericht op Nederland en heeft betrekking op de periode van 2010 tot en met 
2017. Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. Deel 1 geeft een overzicht van het aandeel 
Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond in de Tweede Kamer. Tevens onderzoek ik 
welke factoren de mate van vertegenwoordiging kunnen verklaren. Omdat er tot nu toe 
weinig kwantitatief onderzoek is gedaan naar de rol van politieke partijen in de politieke 
vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden, bestudeer ik drie relevante aspecten van 
het electorale proces. De drie aspecten zijn: of Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond 
worden genomineerd als kandidaat, op welke lijstpositie zij worden geplaatst en of ze 
op een veilige lijstpositie worden geplaatst. Een veilige lijstpositie betekent een plek op 
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de lijst waar het mogelijk is een zetel te winnen. Voor de laatste kandidaat op de lijst is 
dit bijvoorbeeld haast onmogelijk. Tot slot onderzoek ik hoeveel kandidaten met een 
migratieachtergrond uiteindelijk worden verkozen tot Tweede Kamerlid.
Deel 2 van dit proefschrift richt zich op de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. 
Zelfs als etnische groepen voldoende vertegenwoordigd zijn in politieke partijen en in de 
Tweede Kamer, zegt dit nog niets over de stemvoorkeuren van kiezers met (en zonder) 
migratieachtergrond. We weten niet of zij stemmen op partijen die hun belangen 
behartigen of niet. Ik onderzoek daarom of de voorkeur van etnische minderheden voor 
een bepaalde partij afhangt van de mate waarin partijen de belangen van deze groep 
behartigen. Daarnaast bekijk ik in hoeverre de partijvoorkeur van etnische minderheden 
wordt beïnvloed door het aantal kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Vervolgens ga 
ik na of kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond stemmen trekken onder mensen met 
een migratieachtergrond. Ik toets de zogeheten etnische affiniteitsthese (‘ethnic affinity 
thesis’) en in welke omstandigheden etnische affiniteitseffecten sterker zijn. Het gaat 
er in Deel 2 van dit proefschrift dan ook om helderheid te verkrijgen over of en hoe de 
politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden invloed heeft op hun voorkeuren 
voor bepaalde partijen en kandidaten. De onderzoeksvraag die ik in dit proefschrift wil 
beantwoorden is daarom als volgt: 
 ‘In hoeverre zijn etnische minderheden politiek vertegenwoordigd, hoe wordt dit 
beïnvloed door politieke partijen, en in hoeverre worden de stemvoorkeuren van etnische 
minderheden beïnvloed door de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden?’
Politieke vertegenwoordiging
Politieke partijen kunnen op verschillende manieren sociale groepen in de samenleving 
vertegenwoordigen. Er bestaat een belangrijk onderscheid tussen substantieve en 
descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Zij vormen dan ook twee belangrijke begrippen in dit 
proefschrift. Substantieve vertegenwoordiging gaat over het behartigen van de belangen 
en de beleidsvoorkeuren van bepaalde sociale groepen. Zo worden mensen met een lagere 
sociaaleconomische positie over het algemeen vertegenwoordigd door linkse partijen, 
terwijl de economische belangen van mensen met een hoger inkomen wellicht beter 
worden behartigd door economisch rechtsere partijen. Dit kan ook betrekking hebben op 
andere belangen, zoals culturele of religieuze belangen. Substantieve vertegenwoordiging 
gaat dus over wat er vertegenwoordigd wordt. 
Een ander aspect van politieke vertegenwoordiging is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. 
Descriptieve vertegenwoordiging gaat over wie vertegenwoordigt. Het gaat over de 
mate waarin vertegenwoordigers een afspiegeling zijn van het electoraat wat betreft 
allerlei kenmerken zoals leeftijd, geslacht, migratieachtergrond en opleidingsniveau. Als 
Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond worden vertegenwoordigd door Kamerleden 
met een vergelijkbare achtergrond heeft dat een belangrijke symbolische waarde. 
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Een argument tegen descriptieve vertegenwoordiging is dat het niet uitmaakt wie 
vertegenwoordigt, zolang de belangen van die groep maar behartigd worden. Bovendien 
hoeft een vertegenwoordiger van een bepaalde sociale groep helemaal niet dezelfde 
belangen te hebben als die groep. Desalniettemin is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging 
belangrijk, het gaat namelijk over identiteit en gedeelde ervaringen. Bovendien zijn 
etnische minderheden – of andere sociale groepen – dan niet alleen onderwerp van debat 
of beleid, maar ook actieve deelnemers aan het politieke proces. Dit kan, bijvoorbeeld 
door persoonlijke ervaringen, zorgen voor een andere perspectief op beleid. Kortom, 
zowel descriptieve als substantieve vertegenwoordiging zijn van belang voor etnische 
minderheden en beide komen in dit proefschrift aan bod.
De Nederlandse context 
Hoewel Nederland ooit bekend stond als het land van de multiculturaliteit, zijn juist 
integratie en migratie de afgelopen jaren het onderwerp geweest van hevige debatten. 
De maatschappelijke en politieke context van Nederland, juist in de periode waarop 
dit onderzoek zich richt, maken Nederland een interessante casus voor een studie over 
de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. In Nederland stond de 
PvdA lange tijd bekend als de partij voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. 
Desalniettemin heeft bijna elke politieke partij tegenwoordig Nederlanders met een 
migratieachtergrond op de kandidatenlijst staan. Diversiteit is een belangrijk onderwerp 
geworden. Dit blijkt ook wel uit de opkomst van nieuwe partijen DENK en Artikel 1 die in 
respectievelijk 2014 en 2017 zijn opgericht. 
De onderzoeksperiode van dit proefschrift beslaat drie Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, die 
van 2010, 2012 en 2017. Waar de coalitie na de verkiezingen van 2010 gekenmerkt werd door 
de gedoogsteun van de PVV, regeerden de VVD en PvdA van 2012 tot 2017. In 2017 deden 
verschillende nieuwe partijen mee aan de verkiezingen. Twee partijen presenteerden zich 
nadrukkelijk als vertegenwoordigers van Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. 
Ondanks de aandacht voor diversiteit, won alleen DENK zetels. Met drie zetels zijn ze een 
opvallende nieuwkomer in de Nederlandse politieke arena. Ook opvallend was het grote 
verlies van de PvdA, die van 38 naar negen zetels zakte. De afgelopen zeven jaar heeft het 
politieke landschap in Nederland zich op een unieke manier ontwikkeld en lijkt verder te 
zijn versplinterd. Bovendien heeft geen ander Europees land een partij gericht op mensen 
met een migratieachtergrond die daadwerkelijk zetels heeft gewonnen tijdens nationale 
verkiezingen. 
Mijn onderzoek richt zich grotendeels op Nederland. Ik wil echter de verwachtingen 
over de mogelijke relatie tussen de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische 
minderheden en hun stemvoorkeuren toetsen in een andere politieke context. Vandaar 
dat een van de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift over Canada gaat. In dat hoofdstuk ga ik 
van een verklarende vraag over Nederland naar een toetsende vraag over Canada. 
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In hoofdstuk 2, 3, 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift komen vier empirische studies aan bod. In de 
rest van deze samenvatting bespreek ik deze vier empirische studies, daarna sluit ik af met 
de conclusie. 
Deel 1: de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische 
minderheden
Hoofdstuk 2
In het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik in hoeverre politieke 
partijen een rol spelen in de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. 
Partijen hebben grote invloed op de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische 
minderheden omdat zij de samenstelling van de lijst bepalen. Daarom kijk ik naar het aantal 
kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond dat partijen selecteren, op welke lijstpositie zij 
terecht komen en of ze uiteindelijk verkozen worden. Dit kan verschillen tussen partijen, 
afhankelijk van verschillende partijkenmerken. Ik kijk naar drie van deze kenmerken. 
Het eerste kenmerk dat ik onderzoek zijn partijstandpunten – substantieve 
vertegenwoordiging – op het gebied van migratie- en integratievraagstukken. Vervolgens 
richt ik me op de invloed van steun voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond 
binnen partijen, zoals een diversiteitsnetwerk. Tot slot onderzoek ik of selectiemethoden 
van kandidaten invloed hebben op descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Wat betreft dit 
laatste kenmerk richt ik me op de inclusiviteit van het selectoraat, oftewel wie er binnen 
de partij mee mag beslissen over de kandidatenlijst. 
Om te bepalen in hoeverre Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond vertegen-
woordigd waren op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede Kamer, heb ik achtergrondgegevens 
verzameld van alle kandidaten die op de kandidatenlijst stonden bij de Tweede 
Kamerverkiezingen van 2012. Dit heb ik gedaan voor alle politieke partijen die tijdens 
deze verkiezingen ten minste één zetel wonnen. Hierbij maakte ik onderscheid tussen 
de vijf groepen: Nederlanders met een Marokkaanse, Turkse, postkoloniale en andere 
niet-westerse en westerse achtergrond. Ook verzamelde ik informatie over de drie 
partijkenmerken waar ik me in dit hoofdstuk op richt. 
Uit de resultaten van dit eerste deel van mijn proefschrift blijkt dat Nederlanders 
met een Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond ruim vertegenwoordigd waren op de 
kandidatenlijsten van Nederlandse politieke partijen en in de Tweede Kamer in 2012. Het 
aandeel kandidaten en Tweede Kamerleden met een Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond 
was zelfs groter dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. Daarentegen 
waren Nederlanders met een westerse, postkoloniale of andere niet-westerse 
achtergrond ondervertegenwoordigd. Het aandeel kandidaten en Kamerleden met deze 
migratieachtergronden was kleiner dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. 
Een vergelijkbare uitkomst vind ik in hoofdstuk 5 voor de Tweede Kamerverkiezing van 
2017. D66, GroenLinks en de PvdA zijn de partijen met de hoogste percentages kandidaten 
 255
en Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond. De mate waarin Nederlanders met een 
migratieachtergrond vertegenwoordigd zijn op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede Kamer 
verschilt dus per etnische groep en per partij. Een andere bevinding uit hoofdstuk 2 is dat 
een hoger aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond is gerelateerd aan een groter 
aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op veilige lijstposities en aan een hoger 
aandeel Tweede Kamerleden met een migratieachtergrond. 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht ik ook of partijkenmerken een rol spelen in de 
nominatie van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. Partijen met progressievere 
partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie nomineren vaker kandidaten met een 
migratieachtergrond. Wat betreft de lijstpositie constateerde ik dat kandidaten met een 
niet-westerse achtergrond op lagere lijstposities terechtkomen dan kandidaten zonder 
migratieachtergrond bij partijen die restrictievere standpunten hebben over migratie 
en integratie. Bovendien nomineren partijen die een of andere vorm van steun voor 
Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond hebben binnen de partij, meer kandidaten 
met een migratieachtergrond. Ik vond geen bewijs voor mijn verwachting dat steun 
binnen de partij gerelateerd zou zijn aan hogere lijstposities of een veilige lijstpositie. Ook 
de samenstelling van het selectoraat lijkt geen invloed te hebben op het nomineren van 
kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond. 
Deze studie heeft laten zien dat de descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische 
groepen verschilt tussen groepen en tussen politieke partijen. Dit benadrukt bovendien 
het belang om etnische groepen niet als homogeen te zien en om in toekomstig 
onderzoek meer aandacht te besteden aan westerse minderheden. De relatie tussen 
substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging die ik vond in deze studie laat zien dat 
de meeste partijen meer doen dan alleen etnische kandidaten op de lijst zetten. Ze zetten 
zich in voor etnische minderheden in zowel hun partijprogramma als binnen de partij zelf. 
Ik vond niet voor alle partijkenmerken bewijs dat zij invloed hadden op de descriptieve 
vertegenwoordiging binnen partijen. Een verklaring is wellicht dat ik alleen keek naar 
formele regels rondom steun voor etnische minderheden en de werving en selectie van 
kandidaten. Het selectieproces is ingewikkeld omdat er ook veel achter de schermen 
gebeurt, wat niet altijd gemakkelijk te onderzoeken is. 
Deel 2: de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden
Een van de doelen van etnische diversiteit in de politiek is om de belangen van verschillende 
etnische groepen te behartigen. Ik onderzoek daarom of etnische minderheden ook 
daadwerkelijk stemmen op partijen wiens doel het is om de belangen van deze groepen 
te behartigen. Ik doe dat door de invloed van zowel substantieve als descriptieve 
vertegenwoordiging op de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden in Nederland en in 
Canada te analyseren. Vervolgens bestudeer ik of kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond 
stemmen trekken onder Nederlanders met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond en in hoeverre 
dit verschilt tussen politieke partijen en etnische groepen. 
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Hoofdstuk 3
In de tweede empirische studie van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de partijvoorkeuren van 
etnische minderheden in Nederland. Vervolgens ga ik na of substantieve en descriptieve 
vertegenwoordiging invloed hebben op deze partijvoorkeuren. Ook onderzoek ik of 
individuele achtergrondkenmerken hier een rol in spelen. Er bestaan verschillende 
theoretische benaderingen om stemgedrag te verklaren. Zo stellen sociologische 
theorieën dat stemgedrag wordt beïnvloed door sociaal-demografische kenmerken zoals 
groepsidentiteit, klasse, geslacht of etnische achtergrond. Er bestaan ook theorieën 
die stellen dat kiezers rationeel zijn. Volgens deze theorieën vergelijken kiezers hun 
eigen positie op allerlei standpunten met die van partijen en stemmen ze op die partij 
die het beste hun belangen behartigt. In dit proefschrift formuleer ik verwachtingen 
over de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden op grond van beide theoretische 
benaderingen. 
Ik verwacht dat individuele kenmerken van etnische minderheden invloed hebben op 
hun partijvoorkeur, maar ook dat hun standpunten over verschillende onderwerpen een 
rol spelen. Kiezers zijn rationeel, maar die rationaliteit is gebaseerd op de sociale groep 
waar ze toe behoren. Mijn verwachting is daarom dat etnische minderheden een voorkeur 
hebben voor partijen van wie zij verwachten dat die de belangen van hun etnische groep 
zullen behartigen (groepsbelang). Dit zou verklaren waarom etnische minderheden 
niet altijd kiezen voor partijen die het beste hun individuele belangen behartigen 
(eigenbelang). Bovendien verwacht ik dat deze relatie tussen politieke vertegenwoordiging 
en partijvoorkeuren wordt beïnvloed door de individuele kenmerken. Bijvoorbeeld 
dat voor etnische minderheden die zich sterker identificeren met hun etnische groep, 
partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie een grotere rol spelen in hun keuze voor een 
politieke partij. Hiermee combineer ik individuele- en partijkenmerken als verklaringen 
voor partijvoorkeuren. 
Wat betreft substantieve vertegenwoordiging kijk ik naar partijstandpunten over 
migratie en integratie. Ook toets ik of de aanwezigheid van kandidaten met een andere 
etnische achtergrond een rol speelt in de partijvoorkeuren etnische minderheden. Dat 
de aanwezigheid van kandidaten met een andere etnische achtergrond kiezers trekt, kan 
verschillende redenen hebben. Het is een teken van erkenning van de groep, maar ook een 
gedeelde taal, cultuur of migratie-ervaring tussen kiezers en kandidaten kan van invloed 
zijn. Tot slot kunnen kiezers denken dat juist deze kandidaten hun belangen goed zullen 
behartigen en is het mogelijk dat deze kandidaten mobiliserend werken. 
Voor dit hoofdstuk verzamelde ik achtergrondgegevens van alle kandidaten die op 
de kandidatenlijst stonden bij de Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2010. Deze informatie 
heb ik samengevoegd met de informatie over de kandidaten voor de verkiezingen van 
2012 die ik voor hoofdstuk 2 verzamelde. Wederom richtte ik me op Nederlanders met 
een Turkse, Marokkaanse, postkoloniale, overige niet-westerse en westerse achtergrond. 
Kortom, voor dit hoofdstuk gebruik ik achtergrondgegevens van de kandidaten die bij de 
Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2010 en 2012 kandidaat stonden. Voor het bestuderen van 
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partijkeuzes heb ik gebruik gemaakt van enquêtegegevens, verzameld tussen 2010 en 
2015. Hiervoor combineerde ik de volgende enquêtes: de Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes 
(MIFARE), The Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), the Survey Integratie 
Minderheden (SIM) en Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS). 
De resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat name met voor Nederlanders met een 
Turkse en Marokkaanse achtergrond, maar ook die met een postkoloniale achtergrond, de 
PvdA de meest populaire partij was. Bovendien was deze partij populair onder diegenen 
met een lagere sociaaleconomische status en met een sterkere etnische identificatie. Maar 
niet alle Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond stemmen op de PvdA of andere linkse 
partijen. Bij Nederlanders met een westerse of andere niet-westerse achtergrond (oftewel, 
niet de Nederlanders met een Turkse, Marokkaanse of postkoloniale achtergrond) is er 
meer variatie in partijvoorkeur, een deel van deze groep stemt bijvoorbeeld op de VVD of 
de PVV. 
Economische partijstandpunten en partijstandpunten over migratie en integratie 
beïnvloeden de partijkeuzes van Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond, maar deze 
relatie is niet afhankelijk van individuele kenmerken zoals sociaaleconomische status. Dat 
laatste was wel mijn verwachting. Met betrekking tot descriptieve vertegenwoordiging 
blijkt uit de resultaten dat partijen met een hoger aandeel kandidaten met een 
migratieachtergrond een grotere kans hebben om stemmen te krijgen van kiezers met een 
migratieachtergrond. Hierbij wordt ook het belang van co-etnisch stemmen benadrukt: 
hoe groter het aandeel kandidaten met een specifieke migratieachtergrond, bijvoorbeeld 
een Turkse achtergrond, hoe groter de invloed op kiezers met dezelfde achtergrond. 
Kiezers met een Turkse migratieachtergrond zijn dus meer geneigd te stemmen op 
partijen met een groter aandeel kandidaten met een Turkse achtergrond. Daarnaast 
vind ik dat de invloed van descriptieve vertegenwoordig op partijkeuze sterker is voor 
Nederlanders met een westerse migratieachtergrond die zich sterker identificeren met 
hun etnische achtergrond. Dit heb ik niet gevonden voor Nederlanders met een niet-
westerse migratieachtergrond.
Hoofdstuk 4
Het grootste gedeelte van dit proefschrift gaat over Nederland, maar hoofdstuk 4 richt zich 
op Canada. Dit hoofdstuk is een extra test voor de invloed van substantieve en descriptieve 
vertegenwoordiging op de partijvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Hier toets ik of 
ik vergelijkbare effecten vind in een andere context en periode dan de Nederlandse. Ik 
bespreek eerst kort waarom Canada een interessant land is om dit te onderzoeken.
Zowel Canada als Nederland staan bekend als landen met een relatief goede politieke 
vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden. In dat opzicht lijken de landen misschien 
op elkaar, in vele andere opzichten niet. Waar Canada bekend staat als een land dat 
het multiculturalisme heeft omarmd, is het beleid rondom integratie in Nederland de 
afgelopen jaren steeds strikter geworden. Bovendien is de PVV een grote partij en heerst 
er een bepaald anti-immigratie sentiment in de samenleving. In Canada werd in 2015 
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juist het meest diverse kabinet tot nu toe geïnstalleerd. Er is geen anti-immigratiepartij 
van betekenis en de meeste partijen zitten redelijk op één lijn wat betreft immigratie- en 
integratievraagstukken. De drie grote partijen in Canada waar ik me in dit onderzoek op 
richt zijn de linkse New Democratic Party (NDP), de centrumpartij Liberal Party of Canada 
en de conservatievere Conservative Party of Canada.
Een ander belangrijk verschil tussen de twee landen is het electorale systeem. 
Nederland heeft een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging, het kiessysteem in 
Canada wordt ook wel first-past-the-post of single member plurality systeem genoemd. 
In Canada is het land opgedeeld in kiesdistricten. Elke partij nomineert één kandidaat 
per district en die kandidaat vertegenwoordigt de partij in dat district. Inwoners kunnen 
alleen stemmen op de kandidaten in hun eigen district. Bijvoorbeeld: in district 1 
nomineert de NDP kandidaat A, de Liberalen nomineren kandidaat B en de Conservatieven 
kandidaat C. In district 2 nomineren zij respectievelijk kandidaat D, E en F. Dan zullen 
inwoners uit district 1 die op de NDP willen stemmen, hun stem moeten uitbrengen op 
kandidaat A. Daarmee is een stem op een kandidaat gelijk aan een stem voor de partij. De 
kandidaat met de meeste stemmen in een district, wordt afgevaardigde in het parlement. 
In Nederland kunnen kiezers kiezen uit meerdere kandidaten van dezelfde partij. 
Ondanks deze verschillen tussen Nederland en Canada, lijken ze het dus beiden 
redelijk goed te doen op het gebied van de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische 
minderheden. Toch is het nog onduidelijk hoe politieke vertegenwoordiging samenhangt 
met stemvoorkeuren en of de mechanismen hierachter hetzelfde werken in landen met 
een verschillende politieke context. Om dit te toetsen gebruikte ik de Canadian Election 
Survey, van 1993-2015. 
De beschrijvende resultaten uit hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat de Liberal Party in Canada 
het meest populair is bij Canadezen met een migratieachtergrond. Bijna 60% van de 
respondenten stelde voor deze centrumpartij te stemmen, dit percentage ligt een stuk 
lager voor de twee andere partijen. In totaal had 22% van de kiezers een voorkeur voor 
de Conservatieve partij en 18% voor de linksere NDP. Dit is een opvallende bevinding 
in vergelijking met andere Westerse landen. In de meeste landen steunen etnische 
minderheden vooral linkse partijen, in Canada is juists de centrumpartij het meest 
populair. Wat betreft de invloed van substantieve en descriptieve vertegenwoordiging 
op partijkeuze, vond ik niet de verwachte resultaten. Politieke partijen die economisch 
rechtser zijn, sociaal conservatiever en strikter in hun opvattingen over immigratie en 
integratie, zijn populairder bij etnische minderheden. Ook in de Canadese context hadden 
individuele kenmerken van kiezers geen invloed op de relatie tussen substantieve en 
descriptieve vertegenwoordiging en partijvoorkeur. 
Verklaringen voor de bevindingen in Nederland en in Canada
De resultaten van beide studies laten zien dat de meest populaire partij onder etnische 
minderheden niet altijd de partij is die het beste hun belangen behartigt. Dit kan wellicht 
verklaren waarom ik geen duidelijk bewijs vond voor mijn verwachting dat de relatie 
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tussen substantieve vertegenwoordiging en partijkeuze zou afhangen van individuele 
kenmerken. Veel Westerse landen, waaronder Nederland en Canada, hebben een politieke 
partij die zich al lange tijd inzet voor de belangen van etnische minderheden. Zij zijn vaak 
ook de voortrekkers op het gebied van descriptieve vertegenwoordiging. Het is goed 
mogelijk dat de historische binding tussen dit soort partijen en etnische gemeenschappen 
ervoor zorgen dat mensen met een migratieachtergrond op deze partijen stemmen. 
Het is dan een soort norm geworden die voortkomt uit socialisatie in de gemeenschap. 
Dit zou een belangrijke verklaring kunnen zijn voor de partijvoorkeuren van etnische 
minderheden hoewel dit moeilijk te toetsen is. 
Mijn bevindingen kunnen dus een indicatie zijn dat een groepsnorm onder etnische 
minderheden belangrijker is dan eigenbelang. Een andere mogelijke verklaring voor mijn 
bevindingen is dat geen enkele partij er goed in slaagde om de substantieve belangen 
van mensen etnische minderheden te behartigen. Dit zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen door 
groep-specifieke belangen op het gebied van integratie te combineren met sociaal-
conservatieve partij standpunten. Het behartigen van dergelijke specifieke belangen van 
etnische minderheden lijkt een niche te zijn die – ten tijde van dit onderzoek – nog niet 
was opgevuld. Ondertussen zou dit in Nederland wel eens veranderd kunnen zijn door 
de komst van DENK. Of dergelijke ontwikkelingen ook mogelijk zijn in andere Westerse 
landen hangt af van het electorale systeem, de etnische samenstelling van de bevolking 
en de etnische gemeenschap. 
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat descriptieve vertegenwoordiging wel invloed heeft 
op partijkeuze in Nederland maar niet in Canada. Dit verschil is wellicht te verklaren 
door het verschillende politieke systeem. In het Nederlandse systeem kunnen kiezers 
kiezen tussen verschillende kandidaten op de kandidatenlijst van partijen. Hiermee 
is descriptieve vertegenwoordiging per partij misschien zichtbaarder dan in Canada. 
Het zou goed kunnen dat in Canada partijen veel zwaarder wegen dan kandidaten in 
stemvoorkeuren. Daarnaast komt het vaak voor dat in een district met veel inwoners met 
een migratieachtergrond, meerdere partijen een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond 
nomineren. De migratiestatus van de kandidaat speelt dan een kleinere rol. 
Hoofdstuk 5
In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk richt ik me op het stemmen voor kandidaten met een 
migratieachtergrond. Ik onderzoek in hoeverre kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond 
stemmen trekken in buurten met veel Nederlanders met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond. 
Dit wordt bekeken per partij en voor verschillende etnische groepen. Dergelijke voorkeuren 
voor kandidaten zijn voor etnische minderheden nog niet eerder onderzocht op nationaal 
niveau in landen met een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging, zoals Nederland. 
In dit hoofdstuk gebruik ik vergelijkbare theoretische proposities als in hoofdstuk 3 en 4. 
De verwachting dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond meer stemmen trekken in 
buurten met meer mensen met dezelfde achtergrond wordt ook wel de affinititeitsthese 
genoemd. Deze these stelt dat kiezers aangetrokken worden door kandidaten met wie 
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zij bepaalde kenmerken delen. Deze kenmerken zijn bijvoorbeeld sociale klasse, gender 
of etnische achtergrond. De op dit moment meest recente Tweede Kamerverkiezing van 
maart 2017 biedt een interessante context om de affiniteitsthese te toetsen. Het grootste 
gedeelte van de politieke partijen had kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op de 
lijst, zowel linkse als rechtse partijen. Daarnaast deden er twee nieuwe partijen mee aan 
deze verkiezingen die zich richten op Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Ik kon 
daarom bestuderen of er sprake is van affiniteitsstemmen binnen en tussen partijen. 
Voor de verkiezingen van 2017 verzamelde ik wederom achtergrondgegevens 
over kandidaten. In dit hoofdstuk richt ik me echter alleen op Turkse, Marokkaanse 
en Surinaamse/Antilliaanse Nederlanders. Naast gegevens over kandidaten heb ik 
verkiezingsuitslagen gebruikt. Met behulp van verkiezingsuitslagen van gemeentes heb 
ik gekeken naar het aantal stemmen dat individuele kandidaten kregen in elk stembureau 
in twintig grote steden in Nederland. Ik had beschikking over de verkiezingsuitslagen van 
2.121 stembureaus over het aantal stemmen voor 548 kandidaten. 
In hoofdstuk 5 van dit proefschrift vind ik bewijs voor de affinititeitsthese. Kandidaten 
met een migratieachtergrond trekken meer stemmen in buurten met een groter aandeel 
mensen met een migratieachtergrond. Deze effecten zijn sterker in buurten met een 
substantieel grotere groep mensen met een migratieachtergrond. Deze bevinding 
is in lijn met de mobiliteitshypothese die stelt dat mobilisatie in hechte etnische 
gemeenschappen de stemvoorkeur van deze gemeenschappen kan beïnvloeden. De 
resultaten laten eveneens zien dat etnische affiniteitseffecten verschillen tussen partijen, 
migratieachtergrond en tussen mannen en vrouwen. De effecten zijn het sterkst voor 
kandidaten van DENK en voor linkse partijen. Bovendien trekken kandidaten met een 
migratieachtergrond vooral stemmen in buurten met veel inwoners met dezelfde etnische 
achtergrond en zijn de effecten doorgaans sterker voor mannen dan voor vrouwen. 
De resultaten bevestigen dat etnische affiniteitsstemmen ook op nationaal niveau 
in landen met een systeem van evenredige vertegenwoordiging voorkomt. Het bewijst 
wederom dat het belangrijk is rekening te houden met verschillen tussen etnische groepen, 
voor sommige groepen vond ik sterker bewijs voor de affiniteitsthese dan voor andere 
etnische groepen, bovendien zijn de effecten het sterkst binnen de eigen etnische groep. 
Conclusie 
Dit proefschrift geeft inzicht in de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden 
en de invloed hiervan op stemvoorkeuren van deze groep. De onderzoeksvraag die centraal 
stond is als volgt: 
 ‘In hoeverre zijn etnische minderheden politiek vertegenwoordigd, hoe wordt dit 
beïnvloed door politieke partijen, en in hoeverre worden de stemvoorkeuren van etnische 
minderheden beïnvloed door de politieke vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden?’
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Wat betreft descriptieve vertegenwoordiging, ontdekte ik dat het aandeel Nederlanders 
met een Turkse of Marokkaanse achtergrond op kandidatenlijsten en in de Tweede 
Kamer groter is dan het aandeel van deze groepen in de samenleving. Dit terwijl andere 
etnische groepen ondervertegenwoordigd zijn. Bovendien hebben politieke partijen met 
progressieve standpunten over integratie- en migratievraagstukken een groter aandeel 
van kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op hun kandidatenlijsten. Hoewel bijna alle 
politieke partijen kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op hun lijsten in Nederland 
hebben, komt dit het meest voor bij linkse partijen. Niet alleen is er een grotere kans 
dat linkse politieke partijen kandidaten uit etnische minderheidsgroepen nomineren, 
ze trekken ook vaker de etnische stem. Door verschillende grootschalige enquêtes te 
combineren, vond ik in deze studie bewijs – zoals verwacht – voor de populariteit van 
de PvdA bij etnische minderheden bij nationale verkiezingen. Ik vond echter ook dat er 
verschillen zijn in de partijkeuze tussen etnische groepen. Vooral kiezers met een niet-
westerse achtergrond en mensen met een lage sociaaleconomische status stemmen 
vaker voor de PvdA. 
De bevindingen uit dit proefschrift laten eveneens zien dat niet alleen individuele 
kenmerken van invloed zijn op stemvoorkeuren, maar dat substantieve en descriptieve 
vertegenwoordiging ook een rol spelen bij de stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. 
Het belang van descriptieve vertegenwoordiging bij stemkeuze wordt verder aangetoond 
door de bevinding dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond een groter deel van 
de stemmen aantrekken in buurten met een grotere etnische minderheidsgroep. Dit 
ondersteunt de etnische affiniteitsthese, hoewel de mate van etnische affiniteitsstemmen 
afhankelijk is van etnische groep, partij en gender. Ook als ik kijk naar voorkeuren voor 
kandidaten, blijkt dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond van linkse partijen 
meer etnische stemmen trekken dan die van rechtse partijen. Deze inzichten dragen bij 
aan ons begrip van de effecten van descriptieve en substantieve vertegenwoordiging 
op stemvoorkeuren. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat de PvdA een relatief groot 
aandeel kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond op haar kandidatenlijst heeft. Dit is 
echter niet de partij die etnische minderheden het beste vertegenwoordigt als het gaat 
om economische, integratie- en migratievraagstukken. Dit suggereert dat, ondanks de 
descriptieve vertegenwoordiging van etnische minderheden door deze partij, andere 
partijen wellicht een betere keuze zijn wat betreft substantieve vertegenwoordiging. 
Dit kan voor een deel de populariteit van partij DENK in de meest recente Tweede 
Kamerverkiezingen van 2017 verklaren. Het lijkt erop dat deze partij de juiste samenstelling 
van de kandidatenlijst heeft gevonden in combinatie met een partijprogramma met 
onderwerpen die belangrijk zijn voor bepaalde etnische groepen in Nederland.
Er zijn verschillende lessen te leren op basis van de bevindingen van dit onderzoek. 
Ten eerste heeft dit proefschrift het belang van differentiatie tussen etnische groepen 
bij het bestuderen van hun stemgedrag wederom bevestigd. Etnische minderheden zijn 
geen homogene groep: ze verschillen in hun voorkeur voor partijen en de verklaringen 
voor hun partijvoorkeuren variëren eveneens. Het is daarom belangrijk om aandacht te 
besteden aan de vertegenwoordiging van de verschillende etnische groepen in Nederland. 
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Minderheden met een postkoloniale achtergrond waren ondervertegenwoordigd op 
de kandidaatslijsten en in de Tweede Kamer in 2010, 2012 en 2017. Bovendien is er bij 
de Tweede Kamerverkiezing van 2017 geen enkele kandidaat met een postkoloniale 
achtergrond gekozen. De vertegenwoordiging van specifieke, gemarginaliseerde groepen 
is bijzonder belangrijk omdat er geen bewijs voor is dat etnische minderheden als één 
groep stemmen. De resultaten laten juist zien dat descriptieve vertegenwoordiging en 
etnisch affiniteitsstemmen vooral relevant zijn voor de eigen etnische groep. Het aandeel 
kandidaten van een specifieke etnische groep op de kandidatenlijst van partijen zorgde 
voor een grotere voorkeur voor die partij bij die specifieke groep en ook kregen kandidaten 
met een specifieke migratieachtergrond meer stemmen in buurten met veel inwoners 
met eenzelfde migratieachtergrond. 
Ten tweede is het voor politieke partijen aan te raden goed na te denken over de manier 
waarop zij burgers met verschillende etnische achtergronden willen vertegenwoordigen. 
Vooral sociaaldemocratische partijen zoals de PvdA kunnen met dilemma’s worden 
geconfronteerd. Aan de ene kant is de positie van de PvdA met betrekking tot integratie- 
en migratievraagstukken verschoven van een progressieve positie naar het midden. Met 
de toenemende aandacht voor immigratie en integratie, was dit wellicht een strategie 
om traditionele PvdA-kiezers vast te houden. Deze verschoven positie, evenals de 
progressieve normen en waarden van deze partijen over kwesties zoals gender en lhbt-
gelijkheid, kunnen in conflict komen met de normen en waarden van sommige groepen 
Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond, bijvoorbeeld moslims. Het is daarom 
belangrijk om zorgvuldig kandidaten voor etnische minderheden te selecteren. Het 
eenvoudigweg nomineren van een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond staat niet 
gelijk aan het trekken van de etnische stem. Een kandidaat met een migratieachtergrond 
die zich niet identificeert met deze achtergrond of weinig gemeen heeft met potentiële 
kiezers zal waarschijnlijk niet zo veel stemmen trekken onder Nederlanders met een 
migratieachtergrond. Daar staat tegenover dat kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond 
met sterke banden met hun etnische gemeenschap misschien niet altijd dezelfde 
opvattingen hebben als de partij waarmee de kandidaat is verbonden. Dit was het geval 
bij de PvdA, waar twee leden de partij verlieten om DENK op te richten. Uiteraard is dit 
wederom afhankelijk van de kandidaat, de etnische achtergrond en de partij. 
Concluderend lijkt Nederland het goed te doen wat betreft de politieke vertegen-
woordiging van Turkse en Marokkaanse Nederlanders maar zijn andere etnische groepen 
een stuk minder goed vertegenwoordigd. Bovendien maakt de aanwezigheid van 
kandidaten met een migratieachtergrond en de substantieve vertegenwoordiging partijen 
aantrekkelijker voor Nederlanders met een migratieachtergrond. Deze studie heeft het 
belang aangetoond van zowel descriptieve als substantieve vertegenwoordiging voor de 
stemvoorkeuren van etnische minderheden. Daarom moeten diversiteit en inclusie een 
belangrijk punt blijven op de partijagenda. Dit is niet alleen gunstig voor partijen met 
betrekking tot het verkrijgen van politieke macht, maar het is ook belangrijk voor de 
legitimiteit van democratie in etnisch diverse samenlevingen zoals de onze.
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The Netherlands has experienced changes in the ethnic composition of its 
society. One of the challenges related to these changes is the integration of 
ethnic minorities as citizens of our democracy. This book investigates the 
political representation of ethnic minorities and its influence on their vote 
choice. This thesis shows that the share of Turkish and Moroccan minorities on 
parties’ candidate lists and in the House of Representatives is larger than their 
share in society. Other ethnic minority groups are, however, underrepresented. 
Furthermore, left-wing political parties are more likely to nominate ethnic 
minority candidates and more likely to attract the ethnic vote than right-wing 
parties. Parties with higher shares of ethnic minority candidates are more 
popular among ethnic minority voters. The importance of ethnic minority 
candidates is further demonstrated by the finding that ethnic minority 
candidates attract a larger share of votes among ethnic minority voters. This 
study has shown the relevance of political representation for the vote choice of 
ethnic minority citizens. 
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